La era de la desigualdad (¿consecuencia directa del "imperialismo monetario"?) – Parte III (página 5)

The United States, where out-of-work transfers were relatively modest before the crisis, has done much more to strengthen income support in a counter-cyclical manner. The country"s transfer system directs a large share of working-age cash payments towards low-earning working families. To address the social risks of such a policy configuration when more and more people were finding themselves jobless for long periods, the United States combined a number of swift discretionary policy measures with "automatic" policy changes that extended unemployment insurance and safety-net benefits during the downturn, albeit from a comparatively low level (Immervoll and Richardson, 2013). Canada also combined discretionary and automatic policy adjustments. Although discretionary measures accounted for the majority of additional spending in both countries, the automatic benefit extensions described in Section 2 made support significantly more counter-cyclical, and it directed extra support to economically more fragile regions. Importantly, such automatic provisions also strengthen the credibility of expenditure reductions in line with the recovery. These experiences are relevant to countries considering how to adapt social support systems more readily to variations in economic circumstances and household needs.

Striking the right balance between benefit recipients" rights and responsibilities is one way to make transfers more responsive to labour-market conditions. Job-search requirements and activation measures help ensure that benefit expenditures decline when labour demand picks up. They also allow benefit administrations some room for manoeuvre to make benefits more accessible (e.g. by tailoring eligibility criteria to labour-market conditions) when job prospects are poor or when increasing numbers of jobseekers have no recent work experience. Moreover, activation policies contribute to better targeting by making support conditional on job-search efforts (Immervoll, 2012; OECD, 2013g). If well designed, such targeting can, in turn, create the fiscal space, and possibly the political support, that is needed to ensure support for individuals and families who require it.

Yet, a credible commitment to counter-cyclical redistribution rests on consistency between social spending and the revenues that finance them. In the United States, the pre-crisis boom years saw a budgetary and arguably a political marginalization of first-tier transfers (unemployment insurance) and second-tier benefits (e.g. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)) for workless individuals and households.20 At a time when the recovery is still weak and poverty high, the pre-crisis erosion of revenue sources produced by pro-cyclical tax reductions (notably in the case of unemployment insurance funds) has now created strong pressures for across-the-board budget cuts and specific benefit cuts at state and federal levels.

Unemployment benefit, general social assistance, and active labour market programmes together account for an average of less than 10% of public social spending in the OECD. However, the downturn placed heavy additional demands on them. Even in the current economic context, margins for savings are still narrow and, ideally, reductions in benefit duration and recipient numbers should be paced to match recovery. Governments can improve both fiscal and social sustainability by committing to funding with a long view in order to balance finances across the economic cycle and maintain effective income support during extended downturns.

Structural policy reforms need to continue and be fiscally and socially sustainable

Key structural reforms of pensions and health care systems begun before the crisis should continue. Pensions and health care each account for 30% of total public spending in the OECD on average, and successful reforms in these areas create the fiscal space that enables governments to provide disadvantaged groups with adequate support, notably in the context of often rapid population ageing. Structural health care reforms should focus on identifying and reducing unnecessary supply of services and on savings through efficiency gains. Untargeted cuts, for example in the form of higher co-payments, should be avoided as they restrict access to health services for the most vulnerable.

As for pensions, short-term and temporary reforms -like freezing benefit levels- have an immediate impact on public finances. But they may also heighten the risk of poverty among the low-income elderly unless supplementary measures are taken in parallel. Structural reforms that seek to restore the long-term sustainability of pension systems -e.g. raising retirement ages and lengthening contribution periods- can achieve greater savings, albeit with a longer time lag. While short-term fiscal pressures may cast the spotlight on certain elements of public pension provision, it is important to consider retirement income more broadly. The economic crisis has already had a serious effect on households. And it will not end there. It will also affect the retirement situation of the current working-age population. Across all spending areas, an overarching challenge is to identify reforms that are effective in alleviating the impact of economic crises on both households and government budgets, not only now, but for later years as well…

3. General Context Indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Household income

In 2010 half of the people in Mexico had incomes of less than USD 4 500. Half of the people in Luxembourg had incomes about eight times higher (Figure 3.1, Panel A). Countries with low household income included countries in Southern Europe, Turkey and much of Eastern Europe, as well as two Latin American countries -Chile and Mexico. Those with higher household incomes included Norway and Switzerland.

In most OECD countries incomes from work and capital (i.e. market income) fell considerably between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 3.1, Panel B). Higher unemployment and lower real wages brought down household market income, particularly in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain (5% or more per year). By contrast, market income increased significantly in Chile and Poland as well as to a lower extent in Austria, Germany and the Slovak Republic. On average, between 2007 and 2010, real household disposable income declined by much less than the market income (-0.5%), thanks to the effect of public cash transfers and personal income taxes. At the same time, incomes from work and capital fell by 2% per year.

Figure 3.2 focuses on the top and bottom 10% of the population. While on average across OECD countries real average household disposable income and the average income of the top 10% remained almost stable, the income of the bottom 10% fell by 2% per year over the period 2007 to 2010.

Out of the 33 countries where data are available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries. This pattern was particularly strong in some of the countries where household income decreased the most. In Italy and Spain, while the income of the top 10% remained broadly stable, the average income of the poorest 10% in 2010 was much lower than in 2007. Incomes of poorer households also fell by more than 5% annually in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Mexico. Among these countries, Iceland was the only one where the decrease in average annual income at the top (-13%) exceeded that of the bottom (-8%).

Figure notes: Figures 3.1, Panel B and 3.2: 2007 refers to 2006 for Chile and Japan. 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States. 2010 refers to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey. 2011 for Chile.

4. Self-sufficiency indicators -ELF- (Reproducción parcial)

Employment

Access to paid work is crucial for people"s ability to support themselves. On average, two out of three working age adults in the OECD area are employed (Figure 4.1, Panel A). In Iceland and Switzerland about eight out of ten are employed, compared to about one out of two in Greece and Turkey. Gender differences in employment rates are small in the Nordic countries, but such differences tend to be largest in Chile, Korea, Mexico and Turkey.

The economic crisis has had a large impact on the employment rates in many countries (Figure 4.1, Panel B). On average, the employment rate declined by 1 percentage point in the OECD area from mid-2007 to mid-2013, but the variation across countries is large. While the rates dropped by 10 or more percentage points in Greece and Spain; Chile, Israel and Turkey experienced an increase of 5 or more percentage points over the same period.

Women have improved their relative position in the labour market compared to men (Figure 4.1, Panel B). Only in Estonia, Korea and Poland, was the change in the employment rate the same for both sexes. In spite of this relatively more favourable development for women, the long-term increasing trend in female employment rates came to a halt in OECD countries after the onset of the crisis.

While employment has dropped, part-time work has increased in many countries. Even if these people avoid unemployment, the consequence for many of them is under-employment and reduced incomes. Involuntary part time as a share of total employment has increased substantially in Ireland, Italy and Spain following the onset of the crisis (Figure 4.2). The increase has been strongest for women, where involuntary part-time reached about 14% of total employment in Italy and Spain in 2012. But also in Australia and Ireland, about 10% of women worked involuntarily in part-time jobs. For men, the share of involuntary part-time was about 5% in Ireland and Spain in 2012.

Immigrants" employment thus seems to be more sensitive to economic conditions than that of the natives. On average, the change in employment rates for the foreign-born between 2007 and 2012 was approximately the same as for the native-born (Figure 4.3).This, however, hides large differences across countries. In those countries which experienced the sharpest drop in employment rates of the native-born (Greece, Ireland and Spain), foreign-born fared even worse than the natives. In contrast, in countries with increasing employment rates, such as Germany, there was a larger increase in the employment rates of the foreign-born than among the natives.

Figure notes: Figure 4.1: Panel A: Data for the Russian Federation are annual and refer to 2012. Data for Mexico refer to Q1 2013. Panel B: Data for South Africa refer to Q1 2007. Figure 4.2: Data for Switzerland refer to 2010 instead of 2012. Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage point change of the total population. Figure 4.3: Data refer to 2008 instead of 2007 for Canada, Germany and Ireland; and to Q2 2007 for Switzerland.

Unemployment

Record high unemployment rates in a number of countries have put stress on the benefit systems (see "Recipients of out-of-work benefits" indicator). Unemployment, and particularly long-term unemployment, may also harm career chances in the future, reduce life satisfaction and increase social costs. Establishment in the labour market for youth has become more difficult, while older unemployed often have problems re-entering the workforce.

During the second quarter of 2013, the highest unemployment rates in the OECD were in Greece and Spain – eight times higher than the lowest unemployment rate, in Korea

(Figure 4.4, Panel A). The average unemployment rate of 9.1% in the OECD covers a wide diversity. Austria, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland had an unemployment rate below 5%. As many as ten countries had an unemployment rate above 10%.

The economic crisis has had a strong, but varied impact on unemployment rates (Figure 4.4, Panel B). The average OECD unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points between mid-2007 and mid-2013. Greece and Spain were hit particularly hard, seeing an increase of above 18 percentage points. Increases of more than 5 percentage points were also observed in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. Countries which succeeded in reducing their unemployment rates included Chile, Germany, Israel, Korea and Turkey.

In most countries, male unemployment has been more affected by the crisis than female unemployment. The gender difference is particularly strong in countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where the contraction of the construction industry is a major factor driving the increased unemployment. High representation of women in the public sector can also be one explanation why women have fared better than men during the crisis in many countries. However, women in Estonia, Luxembourg and Turkey had a stronger increase in the unemployment rates than men.

Long-term unemployment has increased in many countries. The share of people unemployed for one year or more as a percentage of the total unemployment has increased the most in Ireland, Spain and the United States (Figure 4.5), and by as much as 30 percentage points in Ireland. Mid-2013, six out of ten unemployed were out of work for one year or more in Greece, Ireland and the Slovak Republic. The share of long-term unemployed decreased by 10 percentage points or more in Germany and Poland. In spite of the positive achievements, long-term unemployment still accounts for more than 40% of total unemployment in Germany and Poland.

Youth have been hit particularly hard by the deteriorated labour market situation (see also the "NEETs"" indicator). The unemployment rate for young people aged 15-24 increased by 20 percentage points or more from mid-2007 to mid-2013 in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Figure 4.6). At the OECD level, the rate increased by 7 percentage points during the same period. Mid-2013, more than 50% of the age group was out of work in Greece and Spain. At the other end of the scale, youth unemployment rates dropped in Austria, Chile, Germany, Israel and Turkey. Germany, Japan and Switzerland had mid-2013 the lowest unemployment rate for this age group, at about 7%.

Figure note: Figure 4.4, Panel A: Data for the Russian Federation are annual and refer to 2012.

Youth neither in employment, education nor training (NEETs)

Participation in employment, education or training is important for youth to become established in the labour market and achieve self-sufficiency. Record high unemployment rates in a number of countries have hit youth especially hard. In addition, inactivity rates of youth are substantial in many countries, meaning that they are neither employed, nor registered as unemployed, in education or in training.

More than 20% of all youth aged 15/16-24 were unemployed or inactive, and neither in education nor in training (NEET) in Greece, Italy, Mexico and Turkey in the fourth quarter of 2012 (Figure 4.7, Panel A). The lowest rates were observed in Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, with rates of 6% or lower. The average NEET rate in the OECD area was about 13%.

The NEET rate has increased in most OECD countries since the onset of the economic crisis (Figure 4.7, Panel B). From the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2012, the increase was strongest in Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, there were also some countries where the NEET rates dropped. The decrease was particularly strong in the Czech Republic and Turkey. The higher NEET rates in many counties can mainly be explained by increased unemployment. At the average OECD level, the inactivity rate declined by 1 percentage point, and in most countries the rate declined or increased moderately.

On average across OECD countries, the NEET rates for the broader 15-29 age group are higher for people with low education levels than for those with high education (Figure 4.8). The gap is highest in Belgium, Mexico and the United Kingdom. The share of 15-24 year-olds who are unemployed or inactive and neither in education nor in training is higher for foreign-born than for natives (Figure 4.9). Exceptions are Hungary, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The impact of the crises on the NEET rates is relatively similar for foreign-born and natives in most countries. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway and Slovenia, were the relative change in the rates for foreign-born larger than for natives.

The NEET rates in emerging economies are generally high (Figure 4.7, Panel A). In India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, more than 20% of the population aged 15/16-24 were unemployed or inactive and neither in education nor in training in the fourth quarter of 2012.

Figure notes: Figure 4.7: Detailed data are not available for South Africa. Argentina and Brazil: Selected urban areas only. Saudi Arabia and China: May include some unemployed people who are students. Figure 4.8: For Japan, data refer to 15-24 year-olds. Figure 4.9: The results for NEET in Europe are overestimated because they are based on three quarters, including summertime, when under declaration of school enrolment of students is commonly observed. Data are sorted by increasing rate of unemployment for the foreign-born population.

Education spending

On average, OECD countries spent USD 9 300 per child per year from primary through tertiary education in 2010 (Figure 4.12, Panel A). Spending was highest in the United States with just over USD 15 000 per child, followed closely by Switzerland. On the opposite end, spending was USD 5 000 or less in Chile and Mexico. Spending was also relatively low (around USD 6 000) in several Eastern European countries.

The crisis has halted the long-term trend of increasing spending in education. While public spending as a percentage of GDP for all levels of education increased by 8% between 2008 and 2009 on average across OECD countries, it fell by 1.5% between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 4.12, Panel B). Public expenditures on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP decreased in two-thirds of those OECD countries for which data are available, most likely as a consequence of fiscal consolidation policies. Drops of more than 4% were seen in Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

On average across the OECD countries, less investment was put into early education as compared to later years, with spending per child amounting to USD 6 800 at the preprimary level, USD 8 000 at the primary level, USD 9 000 at the secondary level and USD 13 500 at the tertiary level (Figure 4.13). These averages mask a broad range of expenditure per student by educational institutions across the OECD countries, varying by a factor of 9 at the pre-primary level, 11 at the primary level, 7 at the secondary level and 4 at the tertiary level.

In 2010, public funding accounted for 84% of all funds for educational institutions, on average across the OECD countries (Figure 4.14). It varied from around 60% in Chile and Korea to over 95% in Finland and Sweden. The share of public funding decreased from 2000 to 2010. The decline was remarkable for tertiary institutions, from 76% in 2000 to 68% in 2010. This trend is mainly influenced by non- European countries, where tuition fees are generally higher and enterprises participate more actively in providing grants to finance tertiary education.

Argentina, Brazil and Russian Federation (emerging economies for which data are available) all had education spending comparable to the low-spending OECD countries (Figure 4.12, Panel A).

Figure notes: Figure 4.12: Level of spending not available for Canada, Germany, Greece and Turkey.

Figure 4.13: 2009-10 change not available for Canada, Germany, Greece, Turkey, Argentina and Brazil; Figure 4.14: Pre-primary data not available in 2010.

Equity indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Income inequality

Income inequality is an indicator of how material resources are distributed across society. Some people consider that high levels of income inequality are morally undesirable. Others regard income inequality as harmful for instrumental reasons – seeing it as causing conflict, limiting co-operation or creating psychological and physical health stresses (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Often the policy concern is focused more on the direction of change of inequality, rather than its level.

Income inequality varied considerably across the OECD countries in 2010 (Figure 5.1, Panel A). The Gini coefficient ranges from 0.24 in Iceland to approximately twice that value in Chile and Mexico. The Nordic and central European countries have the lowest inequality in disposable income while inequality is high in Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and the United States. Alternative indicators of income inequality suggest similar rankings. The gap between the average income of the richest and the poorest 10% of the population was almost 10 to 1 on average across OECD countries in 2010, ranging from 5 to 1 in Denmark, Iceland and Slovenia to almost six times larger (29 to 1) in Mexico.

Keeping measurement-related differences in mind, emerging countries have higher levels of income inequality than OECD countries, particularly in Brazil and South Africa. Comparable data from the early 1990s suggest that inequality increased in Asia, decreased in Latin America and remained very high in South Africa.

The distribution of income from work and capital (market income, pre-taxes and transfers) widened considerably during the first phase of the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, market income inequality rose by 1 percentage point or more in 18 OECD countries (markers in Figure 5.1, Panel B). The increase was particularly large in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Japan and Spain, but also in France and Slovenia. On the other hand, market income inequality fell in Poland and, to a smaller extent, in the Netherlands.

The distribution of income that households "take home" (disposable income, post-taxes and transfers) remained unchanged on average, due to the effect of cash public transfers and personal taxes. Between 2007 and 2010, the Gini coefficient for disposable income remained broadly stable in most OECD countries (bars in Figure 5.1, Panel B). It fell the most in Iceland, New Zealand, Poland and Portugal, and increased the most in France, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. Overall, the welfare state prevented inequality from going from bad to worse during the first phase of the crisis.

Income inequality increased especially at the top of the distribution: the share of pre-tax income of the top 1% earners more than doubled their share from 1985 to 2010 in the United Kingdom and the United States (Figure 5.2). In Spain and Sweden, the data show a clear upward trend albeit less marked than in English-speaking countries. The upward tendency is also less marked in France, Japan and most continental European countries. Overall, the economic 2007/08 crisis has brought about a fall in top income shares in many countries, but this fall appears to be of a temporary nature.

Figure notes: Figure 5.1: Gini coefficients refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09. Gini coefficients are based on equivalized incomes for OECD countries and the Russian Federation and per capita incomes for all key partners except India and Indonesia for which per capita consumption was used.

Poverty

Poverty rates measure the share of people at the bottom end of the income distribution. Often a society"s equity concerns are greater for the relatively disadvantaged. Thus poverty measures generally receive more attention than income inequality measures, with greater concerns for certain groups like older people and children, since they have no or limited options for working their way out of poverty.

The average OECD relative poverty rate in 2010 was 11% for the OECD (Figure 5.3, Panel A). Poverty rates were highest at above 20% in Israel and Mexico, while poverty in the Czech Republic and Denmark affected only about one in 20 people. Anglophone and Mediterranean countries and Chile, Japan and Korea have relatively high poverty rates.

The initial phase of the crisis had a limited impact on relative income poverty (i.e. the share of people living with less than half the median income in their country annually).

Between 2007 and 2010, poverty increased by more than 1 percentage point only in Italy, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Turkey (bars in Figure 5.3, Panel B). Over the same period, it fell in Chile, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom, while changes were below 1 percentage point in the other OECD countries.

By using an indicator which measures poverty against a benchmark "anchored" to half the median real incomes observed in 2005 (i.e. keeping constant the value of the 2005 poverty line), recent increases in income poverty are much higher than suggested by "relative" income poverty. This is particularly the case in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico and Spain ("diamond" symbols in Figure 5.3, Panel B). While relative poverty did not increase much or even fell in these countries, "anchored" poverty increased by 2 percentage points or more between 2007 and 2010, reflecting disposable income losses of poorer households in those countries. Only in Belgium, Germany, Israel and Poland did "anchored" poverty fall at the same time as relative poverty stagnated or increased.

Households with children and youth were hit particularly hard during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, average relative income poverty in OECD countries rose from

12.8 to 13.4% among children (0-18) and from 12.2 to 13.8% among youth (18-25). Meanwhile, relative income poverty fell from 15.1 to 12.5% among the elderly. This pattern confirms the trends described in previous OECD studies, with youth and children replacing the elderly as the group at greater risk of income poverty across the OECD countries.

Since 2007, child poverty increased considerably in 16 OECD countries, with increases exceeding 2 percentage points in Belgium, Hungary, Italy Slovenia, Spain and Turkey (Figure 5.4). On the other hand, child poverty fell by more than 2 percentage points in Portugal and the United Kingdom. At the same time, youth poverty increased considerably in 19 OECD countries.

In contrast to other age groups, the elderly have been relatively immune to rises in relative income poverty during the crisis. In the three years prior to 2010, poverty among the elderly fell in 20 out of 32 countries, and increased by 2 percentage points or more only in Canada, Korea, Poland and Turkey. This partly reflects the fact that old age pensions were less affected by the recession. In many countries (at least until 2010), pensions were largely exempted from the cuts implemented as part of fiscal consolidation.

Figure notes: Figures 5.3 and 5.4: Data refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09, changes are not available.

Living on benefits

Most OECD countries operate transfer programmes that aim at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low income criterion as the central entitlement condition. These guaranteed minimum-income benefits (GMI) provide financial support for low-income families and aim to ensure an acceptable standard of living. As such, they play a crucial role as last-resort safety nets, especially during prolonged economic downturns when long-term unemployment rises and increasing numbers of people exhaust their entitlements for unemployment benefits.

In a large majority of OECD countries, incomes for the long-term unemployed are much lower than for the recently unemployed (Figure 5.6). Making GMI benefits more accessible is key to maintaining a degree of income security for the long-term unemployed. In addition, rising numbers of people who have neither a job nor an unemployment benefit means that the generosity of GMI benefits is likely to receive more public attention.

Benefits of last resort are sometimes significantly lower than commonly used poverty thresholds (Figure 5.5). Poverty avoidance or alleviation is primary objectives of GMI programmes. When comparing benefit generosity across countries, a useful starting point is to look at benefit levels relative to commonly used poverty thresholds.

The gap between benefit levels and poverty thresholds is very large in some countries. In a few countries there is no generally applicable GMI benefit (Greece, Italy and Turkey). For GMI recipients living in rented accommodation, housing-related cash benefits can provide significant further income assistance, bringing overall family incomes close to or somewhat above the poverty line (Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom). However, family incomes in these cases depend strongly on the type of housing, the rent paid and also on the family situation. In all countries, income from sources other than public transfers is needed to avoid substantial poverty risks.

On average across OECD countries, GMI benefit levels have changed little since the onset of the economic and financial crisis. The real value of these benefits was largely the same in 2011 as in 2007. Most countries, including those with significant fiscal consolidation programmes, have so far not reduced benefit levels for the poorest. However, at the same time, countries that were especially hard-hit by the crisis and where GMI were non-existent or very low, have not taken major measures to strengthen benefit adequacy (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States).

Social spending

In 2012-13, public social spending averaged an estimated 21.9% of GDP across the 34 OECD countries (Figure 5.7, Panel A). In general, public spending is high in continental and northern European countries, while it is below the OECD average in most countries in Eastern Europe and outside Europe. Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France spent more than 30% of GDP on social expenditures. By contrast, Korea and Mexico spent less than 10% of GDP. Social spending in the emerging economies in the late 2000s was lower than the OECD average, ranging from around 2% in Indonesia to about 15-16% in Brazil and the Russian Federation (Figure 5.7, Panel A).

Public social spending in per cent of GDP increased in all OECD countries with the exception of Hungary from 2007-08 to 2012-13 (Figure 5.7, Panel B). The growth fully took place during the period 2007-08, as a response to increased unemployment and other consequences of the economic crisis. In this initial phase, Estonia and Ireland had the strongest increase in expenditure shares. From 2009-10 to 2012-13, fiscal consolidation reduced public social spending. Nearly two-thirds of the OECD countries reduced social spending in this period. The real drop in public social spending in some countries is larger than indicated by change in the shares of GDP, since the level of GDP also fell. Indeed in some countries, the rise of the ratio of public social spending in GDP is explained largely by the fact that GDP declined.

On average in the OECD, pensions, health services and income support to the working-age population and other social services each amount to roughly one-third of the total expenditures. In a majority of OECD countries, pensions are the largest expenditure area (Figure 5.8). In Anglophone countries and most other countries outside of Europe, health dominates public social expenditure. In a few countries, such as Denmark, Ireland and Norway, the largest share is devoted to income support of the working age population.

Accounting for the impact of taxation and private social benefits (Figure 5.8) leads to a convergence of spending to- GDP ratios across countries. Net total social spending is 22-28% of GDP in many countries. It is even higher for the United States at 29% of GDP, where the amount of private social spending and tax incentives is much larger than in other countries.

In Europe, people seem to be most satisfied with the health care provisions and less satisfied with the pension provisions, unemployment benefits and the way inequality and poverty are addressed (Figure 5.9). Satisfaction with health care provisions is highest in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with pension provisions is highest in Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with how inequality and poverty are addressed is in general quite low.

Figure notes: Figure 5.7, Panel A: Data refer to 2009 for Turkey, 2010 for Japan, 2012 for Chile, Korea, and Mexico and to the last years available for key partners. Figure 5.8: Income support to the working-age population refers to cash benefits towards incapacity, family, unemployment and other social policy areas. Data for Israel concern public social spending only. Total net social expenditure data are not available for Hungary, Greece, Switzerland and Turkey. Data for Switzerland refer to 2008.

Recipients of out-of-work benefits

Cash transfers for working-age people provide a major income safety net in periods of high unemployment. In most countries two different layers of support can be distinguished: a primary out-of-work benefit (generally unemployment insurance benefits); and a secondary benefit (unemployment assistance or minimum-income benefits such as social assistance) for those who are not or no longer entitled to insurance benefits.

In 2010, the shares of working-age individuals receiving primary out-of-work benefits were highest in Iceland, France, Finland, Spain and the United States, with rates of around 5% or more (Figure 5.10, Panel A). At the other end of the spectrum, only about 1% in Japan, Korea, Slovak Republic and Chile received unemployment insurance benefits. There is no nation-wide unemployment insurance programme in Mexico and recipient data are not available for Greece and Turkey.

The large variation in the numbers in part reflects labour market conditions and partly the design of social benefit systems. Low participation in unemployment insurance programmes reduces coverage among the unemployed. An example is Chile, where unemployment insurance is organized as an individual saving scheme. In Sweden, where unemployment insurance membership is voluntary, recipient numbers dropped despite rising unemployment. Benefit receipt increased most in Iceland, Estonia, United States, Ireland and Spain, all countries where unemployment soared during the economic crisis.

Receipt of secondary out-of-work benefits generally increased by much less between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 5.11, Panel B). Rising long-term unemployment and increasing joblessness among people without access to insurance benefits led, however, to a substantial rise in Ireland and Spain (unemployment assistance), and in the United States (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP). Receipt rates dropped somewhat in the Czech Republic and in France, as well as in some countries with more favourable labour-market developments (Australia, Germany, Poland).

By 2010, receipt of secondary benefits was highest in Ireland, Mexico and the United States (Figure 5.11, Panel A) and lowest in Belgium, Israel and Japan. The composition of these safety nets differs across countries. Social assistance dominates in Mexico (Oportunidades) and the United States (SNAP and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF). Unemployment assistance is important in Ireland, Germany, Spain, Finland and the United Kingdom. Australia, Iceland and New Zealand also provide targeted income support to a large number of lone parents. In Germany, the largely unchanged number of recipients during a period of falling unemployment suggests that reducing safety-net beneficiary numbers can be difficult.

Figure notes: Secondary out-of-work benefits for a number of countries are not shown due to missing information. In the United Kingdom, insured jobseekers can receive a flat-rate benefit during the first six months of unemployment, which becomes means-tested afterwards. The split between these two categories was not available and total beneficiary numbers are indicated both as primary and secondary benefits.

Social cohesion indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Life satisfaction

Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic development, but also by people"s diverse experiences and living conditions. People in Norway and Switzerland are most satisfied with their lives (Figure 7.1, Panel A). The measured level in these countries was 3 steps higher than in Hungary, the country at the bottom of the 11-step ladder in 2012.

There are broad regional or cultural country groupings of life satisfaction. Four of the top five countries are Nordic. Continental Western and Eastern European OECD members are not particularly satisfied with their lives, with the notable exceptions of Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and the Netherlands. Predominantly Anglophone OECD countries are all in the top half of the list when measuring life satisfaction, and follow in a tight group after the predominately Nordic top cluster.

Life satisfaction deteriorated during the first years of the crisis between 2007 and 2012, particularly in European Mediterranean countries. Indeed life satisfaction dropped mostly in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, followed by the United States (Figure 7.1, Panel B). On the other hand, life satisfaction improved most in non-European countries, in Chile and Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Nordic and Eastern European countries.

Life satisfaction levels for men and women across OECD countries are highly correlated (Figure 7.2). In countries where life satisfaction is high, both men and women tend to have higher life satisfaction than in countries where the levels are lower.

On average across OECD countries, women report slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than men do.

On average, the level of life satisfaction decreases with age (Figure 7.3). Beyond the OECD average, life satisfaction is "u-shaped" in some countries, increasing from about the age of 55. It is not surprising to see that on average 25-34 year-olds (entering the labour market) and 50+ (leaving the labour market) reported lower levels of life satisfaction in 2012 than in 2007. According to related data for Europe, groups who tended to see the greatest deterioration in incomes and labour-market prospects are more likely to have low levels of subjective well-being.

As for emerging economies, life satisfaction also varies between them, from above 6 in Argentina, Brazil and Saudi Arabia, to below 5 in India and South Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, it increased in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia and the Russian Federation), and it decreased in three countries (India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).

Figure notes: Figure 7.1: Data refer to 2011 for Chile instead of 2012; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic and Slovenia, average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Portugal, and 2008 for Iceland and Luxembourg.

Figures 7.2 and 7.3: Data refer to 2011 for Brazil and Chile and 2009 for Switzerland; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland; average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria,

Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal; 2008 for Iceland and Portugal; and 2009 for Luxembourg.

Confidence in institutions

A cohesive society is one where citizens have confidence in national-level institutions and believe that social and economic institutions are not prey to corruption. Confidence and corruption issues are dimensions which are strongly related to societal trust.

Confidence in the national government is generally high in Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, while it is low in the Czech Republic, Greece and Japan. Large differences can be observed across countries (Figure 7.7, Panel A).

In a majority of OECD countries, trust in national governments declined from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.7, Panel B). The decline was particularly large in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, all countries hit hard by the crisis. However, other countries experienced a substantial increase in trust, notably Israel, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.

Youth tended to have more trust in national governments than the total population, and their confidence declined less from 2007 to 2012. This could be the consequence of less political involvement, but also that youth are more optimistic about the future.

The economic crisis from 2008 was closely related to the crisis in the financial sector. In most OECD countries, confidence in financial institutions fell from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.8). Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States experienced the most substantial drops in confidence. Only in Iceland, Japan and Norway can a positive change be observed.

Corruption can be a sign of the degree of informality and distrust in the economy. Countries which suffered the biggest declines in GDP from 2007 to 2012 were also among those where corruption had increased (Figure 7.9). Increase in corruption was particularly high in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. These countries also saw a stronger decline in confidence in the national government. Lower levels of corruption could be seen particularly in Australia, Germany, Japan and Mexico.

Among the emerging economies, confidence in national governments increased in Brazil, Indonesia and the Russian Federation, while it declined in India and South Africa. While confidence in financial institutions in general declined in the OECD countries, it increased in Argentina, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.

Figure notes: Figure 7.7: No data available for change in China.

Figure 7.9: No data available for change in Slovenia and Switzerland.

(Información de Hemeroteca)

– El saldo de la recesión en España: los pobres pierden un 33% de su renta; los ricos, un 3% (Vozpópuli – 19/3/14)

Según la OCDE, la crisis ha costado 2.600 euros por persona a las clases más bajas mientras que apenas ha afectado al 10% de la población más rica. El retroceso de las rentas bajas no ha sido tan notable en ningún otro país desarrollado. La OCDE advierte: los recortes de desigualdad en el futuro normalmente no duran lo suficiente para atenuar lo ya pasado.

La crisis no es igual para todos. Es lo que denuncia la OCDE que revela que en España, la crisis sólo existe para los pobres. Para el 10% de los españoles más ricos, la recesión ni siquiera ha comenzado. Según los datos de la OCDE, la depresión económica ha costado a los españoles más pobres unos 2.600 euros por persona al año desde 2007, un 33% de su renta disponible. Por el contrario, los estratos más ricos apenas han perdido un 1% al año desde 2007 hasta sumar un 3% de caída de renta total.

Los datos de la OCDE -agrupados en un estudio titulado "2014: sociedad de un vistazo"- revelan que España es uno de los países más golpeados por la crisis (superado por Estonia, Irlanda, Grecia, México e Islandia) pero, al mismo tiempo, desvela que ese golpe lo han encajado unas rentas bajas que han caído como en ningún otro país desarrollado: a ritmos del 14% anual en algunos ejercicios.  

Lo grave no es sólo la creciente desigualdad derivada de la crisis, que ha aumentado un 3%. Lo peor es que las ayudas públicas no sólo no están corrigiendo sino que están agravando esa situación. Según el análisis de la organización internacional, el 30% de la población más rica recibe más ayudas que el 30% de los más pobres. Ante esa situación, la OCDE concluye: "las prestaciones asistenciales para los desempleados de larga duración y para las familias de trabajadores pobres deben ser fortalecidas urgentemente".

De hecho, dado que el desempleo es la primera causa de pobreza, el organismo internacional considera especialmente graves los recortes de gasto en las llamadas "políticas activas", las encaminadas a la formación y búsqueda de empleo de los parados, que han perdido un 66% de sus fondos entre 2007 y 2011 para caer de los 390 euros por persona a menos de 160 euros por parado.

Por sectores de población, los jóvenes y las familias con hijos son las que más han sufrido el impacto de la crisis. Entre esos dos grupos, el riesgo de pobreza ha subido de manera "particularmente prolongada" hasta un 5% colocando a España a niveles de Turquía o Estonia. La tasa de ni-nis, jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan, es la quinta más alta de toda la OCDE y, como consecuencia de ello, España es el segundo país con mayor número de emigrantes. Sólo los ciudadanos de Grecia dejan más su país que los españoles.

La OCDE adivina la reforma fiscal

Curiosamente, la OCDE -que redactó su informe antes de que los sabios presentaran sus conclusiones al Gobierno-adivina cuál iba a ser la propuesta de la "comisión Lagares" y apuesta por la misma fórmula de subida del IVA: "una posible forma de financiar estas prestaciones asistenciales podría ser la reducción en el número de productos o servicios que se benefician de un IVA preferencial o que están enteramente exentos de él". El organismo internacional -al que los expertos del Gobierno atribuyen en su informe sus "contribuciones clave"- asegura que "los grupos de bajos ingresos consumen menos que los grupos de altos ingresos y, en consecuencia, las rebanas del IVA les benefician menos".

Ese mismo argumento ha sido plasmado en idénticos términos por los miembros de la Comisión Lagares y ha sido elevado al Gobierno. Tal y como publicó Vozpópuli, la OCDE, junto al FMI y a la UE se ha reunido hasta en seis ocasiones con los sabios para tutelar la presentación de las reformas.

Anexo: Historias del presente (las caras del dolor)

Informe Save the Children – 2.826.549 razones – La protección de la infancia frente a la pobreza: un derecho, una obligación y una inversión – 30 de enero de 2014

1. Introducción

La situación de pobreza en la que se encuentran más de dos millones y medio de niños y niñas en España es una situación sobre la que alertan casi a diario las organizaciones sociales y los medios de comunicación.

En los últimos años, la coyuntura económica de crisis ha expuesto a muchas familias a una disminución de sus ingresos, algo que ha disparado todos los indicadores de pobreza y exclusión social a niveles alarmantes. Particularmente grave es el hecho de que más de un 30% de la población menor de 18 años se encuentre en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social, lo que convierte a los niños y las niñas en el grupo de edad más vulnerable frente a la pobreza actualmente.

En este informe, Save the Children analiza cómo esta situación de pobreza o exclusión social que cuantifican los datos estadísticos se materializa en la vida cotidiana de los niños y las niñas. Señala el modo en que la situación de pobreza se erige en un serio obstáculo, en ocasiones insalvable, para el disfrute y ejercicio de derechos esenciales reconocidos en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Plantea, en definitiva, observar la situación de pobreza infantil en España desde una perspectiva de derechos de infancia.

Para ello resulta fundamental entender lo que nos dicen los datos y estadísticas oficiales, así como las diferentes organizaciones sociales que intervienen ante la pobreza y exclusión social sobre la situación de pobreza infantil. Pero, sobre todo, atender a cómo nos describen su situación las familias, los niños y las niñas, así como los profesionales que trabajan con ellos.

La pobreza infantil no es simplemente un índice alarmante de insuficiencia o falta de recursos económicos. Es el contexto en el que Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana, Andrea, Hugo, Lara, Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo viven su infancia, crecen y se preparan para su vida adulta.

Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana, Andrea, Hugo, Lara, Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo son ciudadanos del presente y actores clave del futuro de este país, cuya sociedad debe tomar conciencia a todos los niveles (gubernamental, legislativo, judicial, empresarial, asociativo e individual) de la gravedad de que vean limitada la realización de sus derechos.

La sociedad en su conjunto debe ser consciente de la necesidad de adoptar medidas efectivas para paliar la actual situación garantizando el respeto, promoción y protección de los derechos reconocidos a todos los niños y las niñas en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño.

El Estado -los poderes y administraciones públicas- tiene la obligación de actuar como garantes de la plena realización de estos derechos de los que son titulares los niños y las niñas, una obligación adquirida a nivel internacional, definida en los tratados de Derechos Humanos. Sin embargo, su actuación ante la actual coyuntura económica antepone a esta obligación el cumplimiento con las exigencias de las instituciones financieras nacionales e internacionales. Las políticas "de austeridad" están agravando considerablemente la situación al restringir, aún más, la ya limitada capacidad del modelo de protección social para dar una respuesta adecuada a las necesidades de niños, niñas y familias en una situación económica desfavorable. Además, en este mismo sentido se están llevando a cabo una serie de reformas estructurales de las políticas y servicios sociales que resultan preocupantes porque anteponen la eficiencia económica del modelo a la mayor garantía posible de los derechos de la población en general, y de los niños y las niñas en particular.

Abordar la situación en la que viven actualmente Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana, Andrea, Hugo, Lara, Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo, entre los más de dos millones y medio de niños y niñas que se encuentran en riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social en España, requiere la adopción de medidas urgentes que garanticen el disfrute de todos los derechos reconocidos en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño.

(Nombres ficticios para proteger la identidad de los niños, las niñas y sus familias)

"¿De verdad las cosas funcionan así? ¿Yo calculo mal al tomar una decisión, entonces todo cambia y empieza a torcerse… y son mis hijos de 11 y 4 años quienes pagan por ello?"

Carmen, madre de Lucas y Eva

"Mamá, cuando tengas trabajo, si te queda dinero, si puedes, me gustaría que me compraras…"

María, 7 años

"Lo ideal sería que mi madre encontrase trabajo, y que mejorara, estuviese más feliz… que no se matase tanto en buscarse la vida"

Ana, 16 años

"Toma mamá, estos 30 euros del premio son para que pagues la factura del agua"

Lara, 11 años

"La crisis, claro que afecta a las personas, y a mí, y a todos, hay mucha gente que no trabaja y que no tienen qué comer ni ropa para vestirse"

Cristina, 12 años

"Dado que la mayoría de los que viven en la pobreza son niños, y que la pobreza en la infancia es una causa básica de pobreza en la vida adulta, los derechos de los niños deben tener prioridad. […] A fin de erradicar la pobreza, los Estados deben adoptar medidas inmediatas para combatir la pobreza en la infancia"

Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, Relatora Especial sobre Pobreza Extrema y Derechos Humanos

"(No) proteger a los niños de la pobreza es uno de los errores más costosos que puede cometer una sociedad. Son los propios niños quienes asumen el mayor de todos los costos, pero también sus países deben pagar un muy alto precio por su error: menor nivel de competencias y productividad, menor nivel de logros en materia de salud y educación, mayor probabilidad de desempleo y dependencia de la seguridad social, mayor costo de los sistemas de protección judicial y social, y pérdida de cohesión social. Por tanto, salvo en un enfoque de muy corto plazo, los argumentos económicos sustentan la protección de los niños contra la pobreza".

Centro de Investigaciones Innocenti. UNICEF.

"El Comité de Derechos del Niño recomendó expresamente a España "que redoble sus esfuerzos por prestar la asistencia adecuada a los padres y tutores legales en el ejercicio de sus responsabilidades relacionadas con la crianza, en particular a los de familias en situaciones de crisis debido a la pobreza, la falta de vivienda adecuada o la separación. También le recomienda que vele por que se satisfagan las necesidades de todos los niños y que adopte todas las medidas necesarias para asegurar que ningún grupo de niños viva por debajo del umbral de la pobreza. El Comité recomienda igualmente al Estado parte que refuerce el sistema de prestaciones familiares y por hijo para apoyar a los padres y los niños en general y que preste apoyo adicional a las familias monoparentales, las que tienen muchos hijos y aquellas cuyos padres están desempleados"

En el caso de España la tasa de riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social de menores de 18 años se situaba en 2012 en el 33.8%, lo que en números absolutos supone 2.826.549 niños y niñas viviendo en riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social.

El porcentaje de niños y niñas en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social sólo es superior en: Bulgaria 52.3%, Rumanía 52.2%, Hungría 40.9%, Letonia 40.5%, Grecia 35.4%, Italia 34.3%, Irlanda 44 37.6%. El octavo mayor de los 28 países miembro de la Unión Europea.

Es importante recordar de nuevo que en Eurostat las cifras de riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social identifican a los menores de 18 años como grupo de edad, mientras el Instituto Nacional de Estadística ofrece datos sobre menores de 16 años. En este sentido, los datos correspondientes a 2011 de menores de 16 años en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social es del 29.9%.

De acuerdo con el Padrón continuo del Instituto Nacional de Estadística, el número de niños y niñas en España a 1 de enero de 2012 era de 8.362.305.

2 Datos

En España hay 8.362.305 niños y niñas.*

El 29.9%, es decir, 2.500.329 niños y niñas viven en hogares con ingresos bajo el umbral de pobreza relativa, y el 33.8%, es decir, 2.826.549 niños y niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social.

Entre las familias monoparentales, el 45.6% de los niños y las niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social.

Entre las familias cuyos padres no alcanzaron la educación secundaria, el 57.6% de los niños y las niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social.

Entre las familias en las que al menos uno de los progenitores es de origen extranjero,

el 49.2% de los niños y las niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza relativa.

(*) Datos a 1 de enero de 2012 según el padrón continuo del Instituto Nacional de Estadística. El resto de datos que aparecen en esta sección han sido obtenidos de Eurostat, Encuesta sobre Ingresos y Condiciones de Vida. (Datos actualizados el 8 de noviembre de 2013, extraídos el 13 de noviembre de 2013)

La siguiente tabla refleja la tasa de niños y niñas bajo el umbral de pobreza relativa en la Unión Europea, la Zona Euro, España y Francia antes y después de las prestaciones o transferencias sociales:

Esta diferencia en la efectividad de las transferencias sociales para la reducción de la pobreza puede explicarse a partir del siguiente gráfico:

Recomendaciones

El Gobierno Central en colaboración con los Gobiernos Autonómicos deben poner en marcha de manera coordinada y con urgencia una serie de medidas destinadas a:

• 1. Promover un mejor conocimiento de la situación de pobreza infantil en España

• 2. Acordar un marco común para garantizar plenamente la realización de los derechos de los niños y las niñas en todo el territorio nacional

• 3. Aumentar la transparencia de la información relativa a los recursos públicos destinados por cada administración

• 4. Elaborar y aprobar un Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social 2013-2016

• 5. Elaborar y aprobar un Plan de Apoyo a las Familias que tomando como referencia las medidas de la recomendación de la Comisión Europea "Invertir en la Infancia: romper el ciclo de las desventajas"

• 6. Aprobar una Ley marco de Servicios Sociales que garantice la realización y prestación de los servicios recogidos en el Catálogo de Referencia de Servicios Sociales

• 7. Reforzar el sistema de prestaciones de la Seguridad Social destinadas a la protección de las familias

• 8. Reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda y alquiler social

• 9. Medidas urgentes para garantizar la sostenibilidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la calidad y seguridad de sus prestaciones

• 10. Medidas urgentes de racionalización del gasto público en el ámbito educativo

• 11. Establecer una salvedad que garantice que la concesión de las becas escolares

• 12. Garantizar la plena disponibilidad y acceso a todos los materiales y actividades educativas necesarias

• 13. Garantizar el derecho de todos los niños y todas las niñas a crecer en su entorno familiar sin que los motivos económicos puedan motivar la separación del núcleo familiar.

Oxfam Media Briefing – A Tale of Two Britains – 17 de marzo de 2014

The gap between rich and poor is growing- income and wealth are concentrated at the top while those at the bottom face increasingly hard times

Inequality is a growing problem in the UK. Whilst austerity measures in Britain continue to hit the poorest families hardest, a wealthy elite have seen their incomes spiral upwards, exacerbating income inequality which has grown under successive governments over the last quarter of a century.

Since the mid-1990s the incomes of the top 0.1 percent have grown almost 4 times faster than the incomes of the bottom 90 percent of the population. In real terms, that means the richest 0.1 percent have seen their income grow by more than £ 461 a week, the equivalent of over £ 24,000 a year. That"s enough to buy a small yacht or a sports car. By contrast the bottom 90 per cent have experienced a real terms increase of only £ 147 a year -insufficient to insure a family car. That equates to £ 2.82 a week- the average cost of a large cappuccino.

Today, the five richest families in the UK are wealthier than the bottom 20 per cent of the entire population. That"s just five households with more money than 12.6 million people -almost the same as the number of people living below the poverty line in the UK. The extreme levels of wealth inequality occurring in Britain today threaten to exclude the poorest, whose standards of living are being squeezed as they are hit by increasing costs for basics like food and energy bills and cuts to services and support when they are most needed.

Starting with this week"s Budget, the Government needs to re-balance the books by raising revenues from those who can afford it -by clamping down on companies and individuals who avoid paying their fair share of tax and starting to explore greater taxation of extreme wealth- rather than relying on cuts to services that disproportionately impact on the poorest in society, some 13 million people who are currently classed as living below the poverty line.

Britain in the 21st Century is a deeply divided nation. Whilst a handful of people at the top have never had it so good, millions of families are struggling to make ends meet. Growing numbers of Britons are turning to charity-run food-banks, yet at the same time the highest earners in the UK have had the biggest tax cuts of any country in the world. And whilst low-paid workers are seeing their wages stagnate, the super-rich are seeing their pay and bonuses spiral up.

Oxfam"s new figures show just how stark the divide between Britain"s richest and the rest is.

• The most affluent family in the UK (Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor and family), have more wealth than the poorest 10 percent of the population, 6.3 million people (£ 7.9 and £ 7 billion respectively).

• The richest 5 families in Britain are wealthier than the bottom 20 percent of the population in the UK (with a wealth of £ 28.2 billion and £ 28.1 billion respectively).

• Incomes for the bottom 90 percent increased by 27 percent between 1993 and 2011. Incomes for the richest 0.1 percent increased by 101 percent over the same time period. In other words, the incomes of the top 0.1 percent have grown almost 4 times faster than for the bottom 90 percent of the population.

• Once you factor in increases in the cost of living over the last ten years, then the real squeeze for the majority of Britons becomes apparent as does the divide between those at the top and the rest. Since 2003 the majority of the British public (95 percent) have seen a 12 percent real terms drop in their disposable income (after housing costs), whilst the richest 5 percent of the population have seen their disposable income increase.

Oxfam"s analysis: numbers and methodology

Oxfam used the latest list of billionaires from Forbes released on March 4, 2014 to calculate the accumulated wealth of the richest families in Britain and data from Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook to calculate the wealth of the bottom 10 and 20 percent of the population.

To calculate changes in income since 1993 (the earliest year with comparable data on income), Oxfam used the Top Income Database. For the changes in income for 95 percent of the population after housing costs, Oxfam used data from the Family Resources Survey 2002-2003 to 2011-2012 (data for which the survey has comparable methodology) as reported by the Institute For Fiscal Studies" "Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2013".

The richest and the rest – a global perspective

Economic inequality is far from being a UK only problem – a similar picture of a rapidly increasing gap between rich and poor can be seen in most countries across the globe. The entire wealth of the world is divided in two: almost half going to the richest 1 percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent. Working For the Few, an Oxfam report published ahead of this year"s World Economic Forum in Davos, revealed that the richest 85 people on the planet own the same amount between them as half the world"s population -that"s 3.5 billion people.

This widening inequality is creating a vicious circle where wealth and power are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, leaving the rest behind. Our report showed that increasing inequality is allowing the wealthy to capture government policymaking. This means the rules are constantly rewritten in favour of the rich, for example through policies such as like lower taxes for high earners.

Seven out of 10 people in the world live in countries where economic inequality has increased in the last 30 years.

Inequality has shot up the global agenda recently, with leaders and influential figures from President Obama to the Pope making the issue a key priority for 2014.

Taxing times

Tax evasion, by companies and individuals, costs the UK economy billions of pounds every year. The "tax gap"- the total amount of missing tax money the Treasury is owed – is estimated to be around £ 35 billion a year.

Of that tax gap, Oxfam estimates that at least £ 5.2 billion a year is being evaded by wealthy individuals who use tax havens. That"s the equivalent of £ 200 a year for every single household in the UK.

The Government has made a good start on cracking down on tax evasion, including at the 2013 G8, but needs to continue to increase transparency and accountability -for instance with effective legislation on Beneficial Ownership- and ensure that HMRC are well resourced for the task.

Surviving on a shoestring

One in five people in the UK are living in poverty – cuts to social security and public services are combining with falling incomes and rising costs for basics like food and fuel bills to create a deeply damaging situation in which millions are struggling to get by. Although unemployment numbers are falling, the number of people in insecure jobs is on the rise and many are on wages that don"t pay enough to make ends meet. For the first time, more working households are living in poverty in the UK than non-working ones. In 2012 just over half of the 13 million people in poverty were from working families.

Austerity policies are massively increasing poverty and inequality in the UK – damage that could take two decades or more to reverse. Our research suggests 800,000 children and an extra 1.9 million adults in the UK could be pushed into poverty by 2020. The unprecedented rise of over 500,000 Britons needing emergency aid from food banks is just one example among many of what poverty looks like in the UK. There is significant public concern about the lack of say ordinary people have in the changes that affect their lives. According to a recent Oxfam poll, more than two thirds of the British population thinks the rich have too much influence over where the country is headed.

Case Study: "The bills are going up but the money isn"t"

Anna, 35, lives in Devon, with her partner Mike and their children. Mike works full time at an electronics company, whilst Anna is a stay at home mum.

"They"ve been laying off people at Mike"s work at the minute, so he"s constantly terrified that he"s going to lose his job. He brings home between £ 1000 and £1100 a month. It"s alright, but not great when you consider that our rent is £ 800 per month, it doesn"t go very far at all. We get help with tax credits but it"s getting harder and harder to pay the bills every month and not charge things on the credit cards. The bills are going up and the money isn"t.

"Personally, I feel so strongly about how there is so much inequality in our society and it's getting worse. There are all these people looking down their noses at the "undeserving poor" and it really makes me cross. We"re being kept poor. We"re being kept in a position where we aren"t able to improve our lives.

"I mean who"s the real scrounger? Someone who might get seventy pound per week because they haven"t got a job, or someone who gets a ridiculous amount of money in bonuses after they bankrupted the country? I"d like to be able to earn a wage myself… there is no way for us to get out of this position until somebody does something about the cost of housing and other stuff. The people who can afford to pay for it are getting away scot free."

Why does Oxfam care about inequality?

Extreme economic inequality is damaging because of the negative impact it has on poverty reduction and overall prosperity. It multiplies social problems and compounds other inequalities such as those between men and women. In many cases extreme economic inequality causes unequal political representation: those with the most money are able to rig the rules, and influence government policy in their favour, often at the expense of everyone else.

For many workers across the globe, doing a day"s work doesn"t necessarily mean they earn enough to live on, and companies are making profits whilst workers" wages and conditions are not enough to live decent lives.

Whilst the opportunity to prosper is an important incentive that helps drive the economy and implies some level of inequality, even the International Monetary Fund"s recent study finds that extreme income inequality undermines both the pace and sustainability of economic growth. The IMF also made the case that redistribution efforts -including progressive taxation and spending on health and education- are pro-growth.

In developed and developing countries alike we are increasingly living in a world where the lowest tax rates, the best health and education and the opportunity to influence are being given not just to the rich but also to their children.

For decades, Oxfam has worked to increase access to high-quality health care and education. Despite great progress, millions of families in the poorest countries are not able to send their children to school or pay for healthcare should anyone fall sick. Governments don"t have the money to pay for these basic essential services – not because the money isn"t there, but because the richest and most powerful aren"t paying their fair share.

While many rich people use a portion of their wealth to support individual good causes, this should not be used as an excuse for governments failing to tackle the problem of growing inequality.

Oxfam"s call to action

All parties need to focus on reducing inequality and consider how they will:

Tackle unfair tax rules to combat inequality and ensure those who can afford it are paying their fair share: Clamp down on tax dodgers by improving transparency and accountability standards in global and UK tax rules and increasing government capacity to tackle tax evasion.

Look at ways of raising revenue through progressive taxation and balancing the books on the shoulders of those who can afford it: In particular, the Government should implement a financial transactions tax to ensure the financial sector contributes its fair share, and focus on the greater taxation of wealth, by exploring things like a land value tax.

Ensure that the strategy to reduce the deficit does not hitting the poorest hardest: Use the revenue from more progressive taxation to prevent long-term damage caused by cuts to social security and public services. Support women and parents to be part of the country"s return to growth through the provision of universal affordable childcare.

Ensure that work really pays for the poorest: Outline a long-term strategy for raising the minimum wage to a living wage, using tools such as government procurement to promote a living wage. Ensure that increasing the tax allowance really works for the poorest by also increasing the earnings disregard by £ 200 per year.

Audit policy to ensure it is being designed to improve equality: We would like to see party manifestos include an analysis of the impact of their pledges on economic inequality in the UK.

As a first step, we are calling on the Government to continue taking tough action to tackle tax dodging as part of this week"s Budget.

Save the Children denuncia que actualmente hay casi 27 millones de niños en riesgo de pobreza en Europa (Vozpópuli – 15/4/14)

"La pobreza es muy dura porque te roba tus sueños y tus esperanzas"… "La pobreza no tiene pasaporte y nadie está a salvo"… Ante una situación de urgencia, pedimos medidas de urgencia: "Esta situación no puede esperar a que mejore la economía. Lo que perdamos ahora con niños, no se puede recuperar más tarde", sostiene la ONG Save the Children.

Autor:

Ricardo Lomoro