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Impacts of climate change on growth and development (página 2)


Partes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

• Warming may induce sudden shifts in regional weather patterns like the monsoons or the El Niño. Such changes would have severe consequences for water availability and flooding in tropical regions and threaten the livelihoods of billions.

Melting or collapse of ice sheets would raise sea levels and eventually threaten at least 4 million Km2 of land, which today is home to 5% of the world"s population.

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3.1 Introduction This chapter examines the increasingly serious impacts on people as the world warms. Climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth has already warmed by 0.7°C since around 1900 and is committed to further warming over coming decades simply due to past emissions (Chapter 1). On current trends, average global temperatures could rise by 2 – 3°C within the next fifty years or so, with several degrees more in the pipeline by the end of the century if emissions continue to grow (Figure 3.1; Chapters 7 and 8).

This chapter examines how the physical changes in climate outlined in Chapter 1 affect the essential components of lives and livelihoods of people around the world – water supply, food production, human health, availability of land, and ecosystems. It looks in particular at how these impacts intensify with increasing amounts of warming. The latest science suggests that the Earth"s average temperature will rise by even more than 5 or 6°C if feedbacks amplify the warming effect of greenhouse gases through the release of carbon dioxide from soils or methane from permafrost (Chapter 1). Throughout the chapter, changes in global mean temperature are expressed relative to pre-industrial levels (1750 – 1850).

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The chapter builds up a comprehensive picture of impacts by incorporating two effects that are not usually included in existing studies (extreme events and threshold effects at higher temperatures). In general, impact studies have focused predominantly on changes in average conditions and rarely examine the consequences of increased variability and more extreme weather. In addition, almost all impact studies have only considered global temperature rises up to 4 or 5°C and therefore do not take account of threshold effects that could be triggered by temperatures higher than 5 or 6°C (Chapter 1).

Extreme weather events. Climate change is likely to increase the costs imposed by extreme weather, both by shifting the probability distribution upwards (more heatwaves, but fewer cold- snaps) and by intensifying the water cycle, so that severe floods, droughts and storms occur more often (Chapter 1).2 Even if the shape of the distribution of temperatures does not change, an upward shift in the distribution as a whole will disproportionately increase the probability of exceeding damaging temperature thresholds.3 Changes in the variability of climate in the future are more uncertain, but could have very significant impacts on lives and livelihoods. For example, India"s economy and social infrastructure are finely tuned to the remarkable stability of the monsoon, with the result that fluctuations in the strength of the monsoon both year-to-year and within a single season can lead to significant flooding or drought, with significant repercussions for the economy (see Box 3.5 later).4

Non-linear changes and threshold effects at higher temperatures (convexity). The impacts of climate change will become increasingly severe at higher temperatures, particularly because of rising risks of triggering abrupt and large-scale changes, such as melting of the Greenland ice sheet or loss of the Amazon forest. Few studies have examined the shape of the damage function at higher temperatures, even though the latest science suggests that temperatures are 5 or 6°C or higher are plausible because of feedbacks that amplify warming (Chapter 1). For some sectors, damages may increase much faster than temperatures rise, so that the damage curve becomes convex – the consequences of moving from 4 to 5°C are much greater than the consequences of moving from 2 to 3°C. For example, hurricane damages increase as a cube (or more) of wind- speed, which itself scales closely with sea temperatures (Chapter 1 and Section 3.6). Theory suggests impacts in several key sectors will increase strongly at higher temperatures, although there is not enough direct quantitative evidence on the impacts at higher temperatures (Box 3.1).

The combined effect of impacts across several sectors could be very damaging and further amplify the consequences of climate change. Little work has been done to quantify these interactions, but the potential consequences could be substantial. For example, in some tropical regions, the combined effect of loss of native pollinators, greater risks of pest outbreaks, reduced water supply, and greater incidence of heatwaves could lead to much greater declines in food production than through the individual effects themselves (see Table 3.2 later in chapter).

The consequences of climate change will depend on how the physical impacts interact with socio- economic factors. Population movement and growth will often exacerbate the impacts by increasing society"s exposure to environmental stresses (for example, more people living by the coast) and reducing the amount of resource available per person (for example, less food per person and causing greater food shortages).5 In contrast, economic growth often reduces vulnerability to climate change (for example, better nutrition or health care; Chapter 4) and increases society"s ability to adapt to the impacts (for example, availability of technology to make crops more drought-tolerant; Chapter 20). This chapter focuses on studies that in general calculate impacts by superimposing climate change onto a future world that has developed economically and socially and comparing it to the same future world without climate change (Box 3.2 for further details). Most of the studies generally assume adaptation at the level of an individual or firm, but not economy-wide adaptations due to policy intervention (covered in Part V).

Building on the analyses presented in this chapter, Chapters 4 and 5 trace the physical impacts through to examine the consequences for economic growth and social progress in developing and developed countries. Chapter 6 brings together evidence on the aggregate impacts of climate change, including updated projections from the PAGE2002 model that incorporate the risk of abrupt climate change.

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3.2 Water People will feel the impact of climate change most strongly through changes in the distribution of water around the world and its seasonal and annual variability. Water is an essential resource for all life and a requirement for good health and sanitation. It is a critical input for almost all production and essential for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.12 The location of water around the world is a critical determinant of livelihoods. Globally, around 70% of all freshwater supply is used for irrigating crops and providing food. 22% is used for manufacturing and energy (cooling power stations and producing hydro-electric power), while only 8% is used directly by households and businesses for drinking, sanitation, and recreation.13

Climate change will alter patterns of water availability by intensifying the water cycle.14 Droughts and floods will become more severe in many areas. There will be more rain at high latitudes, less rain in the dry subtropics, and uncertain but probably substantial changes in tropical areas.15 Hotter land surface temperatures induce more powerful evaporation and hence more intense rainfall, with increased risk of flash flooding.

Differences in water availability between regions will become increasingly pronounced. Areas that are already relatively dry, such as the Mediterranean basin and parts of Southern Africa and South America, are likely to experience further decreases in water availability, for example several (but not all) climate models predict up to 30% decrease in annual runoff in these regions for a 2°C global temperature rise (Figure 3.2) and 40 – 50% for 4°C.16 In contrast, South Asia and parts of Northern Europe and Russia are likely to experience increases in water availability (runoff), for example a 10 – 20% increase for a 2°C temperature rise and slightly greater increases for 4°C, according to several climate models.

These changes in the annual volume of water each region receives mask another critical element of climate change – its impact on year-to-year and seasonal variability. An increase in annual river flows is not necessarily beneficial, particularly in highly seasonal climates, because: (1) there may not be sufficient storage to hold the extra water for use during the dry season,17 and (2) rivers may flood more frequently.18

In dry regions, where runoff one-year-in-ten can be less than 20% of the average annual amount, understanding the impacts of climate change on variability of water supplies is perhaps even more crucial. One recent study from the Hadley Centre predicts that the proportion of land area experiencing severe droughts at any one time will increase from around 10% today to 40% for a warming of 3 to 4°C, and the proportion of land area experiencing extreme droughts will increase from 3% to 30%.19 In Southern Europe, serious droughts may occur every 10 years with a 3°C rise in global temperatures instead of every 100 years if today"s climate persisted.20

As the water cycle intensifies, billions of people will lose or gain water. Some risk becoming newly or further water stressed, while others see increases in water availability. Seasonal and annual variability in water supply will determine the consequences for people through floods or droughts. Around one-third of today"s global population live in countries experiencing moderate to high water stress, and 1.1 billion people lack access to safe water (Box 3.3 for an explanation of water stress). Water stress is a useful indicator of water availability but does not necessarily reflect access to safe water. Even without climate change, population growth by itself may result in several billion more people living in areas of more limited water availability.

The effects of rising temperatures against a background of a growing population are likely to cause changes in the water status of billions of people. According to one study, temperature rises of 2°C will result in 1 – 4 billion people experiencing growing water shortages, predominantly in Africa, the Middle East, Southern Europe, and parts of South and Central America (Figure 3.3).21 In these regions, water management is already crucial for their growth and development. Considerably more effort and expense will be required on top of existing practices to meet people"s demand for water. At the same time, 1 – 5 billion people, mostly in South and East Asia, may receive more water.22 However, much of the extra water will come during the wet season and will only be useful for alleviating shortages in the dry season if storage could be created (at a cost). The additional water could also give rise to more serious flooding during the wet season.

Melting glaciers and loss of mountain snow will increase flood risk during the wet season and threaten dry-season water supplies to one-sixth of the world"s population (over one billion people today). Climate change will have serious consequences for people who depend heavily on glacier meltwater to maintain supplies during the dry season, including large parts of the Indian sub-continent, over quarter of a billion people in China, and tens of millions in the Andes.23 Initially, water flows may increase in the spring as the glacier melts more rapidly. This may increase the risk of damaging glacial lake outburst floods, especially in the Himalayas,24 and also lead to shortages later in the year. In the long run dry- season water will disappear permanently once the glacier has completely melted. Parts of the developed world that rely on mountain snowmelt (Western USA, Canadian prairies, Western Europe) will also have their summer water supply affected, unless storage capacity is increased to capture the "early water".

In the Himalaya-Hindu Kush region, meltwater from glaciers feeds seven of Asia"s largest rivers, including 70% of the summer flow in the Ganges, which provides water to around 500 million people. In China, 23% of the population (250 million people) lives in the western region that depends principally on glacier meltwater. Virtually all glaciers are showing substantial melting in China, where spring stream-flows have advanced by nearly one month since records began. In the tropical Andes in South America, the area covered by glaciers has been reduced by nearly one-quarter in the past 30 years. Some small glaciers are likely to disappear completely in the next decade given current trends.25 Many large cities such as La Paz, Lima and Quito and up to 40% of agriculture in Andean valleys rely on glacier meltwater supplies. Up to 50 million people in this region will be affected by loss of dry-season water.26

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3.3 Food In tropical regions, even small amounts of warming will lead to declines in yield. In higher latitudes, crop yields may increase initially for moderate increases in temperature but then fall. Higher temperatures will lead to substantial declines in cereal production around the world, particularly if the carbon fertilisation effect is smaller than previously thought, as some recent studies suggest. Food production will be particularly sensitive to climate change, because crop yields depend in large part on prevailing climate conditions (temperature and rainfall patterns). Agriculture currently accounts for 24% of world output, employs 22% of the global population, and occupies 40% of the land area. 75% of the poorest people in the world (the one billion people who live on less than $1 a day) live in rural areas and rely on agriculture for their livelihood.29

Low levels of warming in mid to high latitudes (US, Europe, Australia, Siberia and some parts of China) may improve the conditions for crop growth by extending the growing season30 and/or opening up new areas for agriculture. Further warming will have increasingly negative impacts – the classic "hill function" (refer back to Box 3.1) – as damaging temperature thresholds are reached more often and water shortages limit growth in regions such as Southern Europe and Western USA.31 High temperature episodes can reduce yields by up to half if they coincide with a critical phase in the crop cycle like flowering (Figure 3.4).32

The impacts of climate change on agriculture depend crucially on the size of the "carbon fertilisation" effect (Box 3.4). Carbon dioxide is a basic building block for plant growth. Rising concentrations in the atmosphere may enhance the initial benefits of warming and even offset reductions in yield due to heat and water stress. Work based on the original predictions for the carbon fertilisation effect suggests that yields of several cereals (wheat and rice in particular) will increase for 2 or 3°C of warming globally, according to some models, but then start to fall once temperatures reach 3 or 4°C.33 Maize shows greater declines in yield with rising temperatures because its different physiology makes it less responsive to the direct effects of rising carbon dioxide. Correspondingly, world cereal production only falls marginally (1 – 2%) for warming up to 4°C (Box 3.4).34 But the latest analysis from crops grown in more realistic field conditions suggests that the effect is likely to be no more than half that typically included in crop models.35

When a weak carbon fertilisation effect is used, worldwide cereal production declines by 5% for a 2°C rise in temperature and 10% for a 4°C rise. By 4°C, entire regions may be too hot and dry to grow crops, including parts of Australia. Agricultural collapse across large areas of the world is possible at even higher temperatures (5 or 6°C) but clear empirical evidence is still limited.

While agriculture in higher-latitude developed countries is likely to benefit from moderate warming (2 – 3°C), even small amounts of climate change in tropical regions will lead to declines in yield. Here crops are already close to critical temperature thresholds36 and many countries have limited capacity to make economy-wide adjustments to farming patterns (Figure 3.5). The impacts will be strongest across Africa and Western Asia (including the Middle East), where yields of the predominant regional crops may fall by 25 – 35% (weak carbon fertilisation) or 15 – 20% (strong carbon fertilisation) once temperatures reach 3 or 4°C. Maize-based agriculture in tropical regions, such as parts of Africa and Central America, is likely to suffer substantial declines, because maize has a different physiology to most crops and is less responsive to the direct effects of rising carbon dioxide.37

Many of the effects of climate change on agriculture will depend on the degree of adaptation (see Part V), which itself will be determined by income levels, market structure, and farming type, such as rain-fed or irrigated.38 Studies that take a more optimistic view of adaptation and assume that a substantial amount of land at higher latitudes becomes suitable for production find more positive effects of climate change on yield.39 But the transition costs are often ignored and the movement of population required to make this form of adaptation a reality could be very disruptive. At the same time, many existing estimates do not include the impacts of short-term weather events, such as floods, droughts and heatwaves. These have only recently been incorporated into crop models, but are likely to have additional negative impacts on crop production (Table 3.2). Expansion of agricultural land at the expense of natural vegetation may itself exert additional effects on local climates with tropical deforestation leading to rainfall reductions because of less moisture being returned to the atmosphere once trees are removed.40

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Figure 3.5 Change in cereal production in developed and developing countries for a doubling of carbon dioxide levels (equivalent to around 3°C of warming in models used) simulated with three climate models (GISS, GFDL and UKMO Hadley Centre)

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Declining crop yields are likely to leave hundreds of millions without the ability to produce or purchase sufficient food, particularly in the poorest parts of the world. Around 800 million people are currently at risk of hunger (~ 12% of world"s population),41 and malnutrition causes around 4 million deaths annually, almost half in Africa.42 According to one study, temperature rises of 2 to 3°C will increase the people at risk of hunger, potentially by 30 – 200 million (if the carbon fertilisation effect is small) (Figure 3.6).43 Once temperatures increase by 3°C, 250 – 550 million additional people may be at risk – over half in Africa and Western Asia, where (1) the declines in yield are greatest, (2) dependence on agriculture highest, and (3) purchasing power most limited. If crop responses to carbon dioxide are stronger, the effects of warming on risk of hunger will be considerably smaller. But at even higher temperatures, the impacts are likely to be damaging regardless of the carbon fertilisation effect, as large parts of the world become too hot or too dry for agricultural production, such as parts of Africa and even Western Australia.

Ocean acidification, a direct result of rising carbon dioxide levels, will have major effects on marine ecosystems, with possible adverse consequences on fish stocks. For fisheries, information on the likely impacts of climate change is very limited – a major gap in knowledge considering that about one billion people worldwide (one-sixth of the world"s population) rely on fish as their primary source of animal protein. While higher ocean temperatures may increase growth rates of some fish, reduced nutrient supplies due to warming may limit growth.

Ocean acidification is likely to be particularly damaging. The oceans have become more acidic in the past 200 years, because of chemical changes caused by increasing amounts of carbon dioxide dissolving in seawater.44 If global emissions continue to rise on current trends, ocean acidity is likely to increase further, with pH declining by an additional 0.15 units if carbon dioxide levels double (to 560 ppm) relative to pre-industrial and an additional 0.3 units if carbon dioxide levels treble (to 840 ppm).45 Changes on this scale have not been experienced for hundreds of thousands of years and are occurring at an extremely rapid rate. Increasing ocean acidity makes it harder for many ocean creatures to form shells and skeletons from calcium carbonate. These chemical changes have the potential to disrupt marine ecosystems irreversibly – at the very least halting the growth of corals, which provide important nursery grounds for commercial fish, and damaging molluscs and certain types of plankton at the base of the food chain. Plankton and marine snails are critical to sustaining species such as salmon, mackerel and baleen whales, and such changes are expected to have serious but as-yet-unquantified wider impacts.

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3.4 Health Climate change will increase worldwide deaths from malnutrition and heat stress. Vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever could become more widespread if effective control measures are not in place. In higher latitudes, cold-related deaths will decrease. Climate-sensitive aspects of human health make up a significant proportion of the global disease burden and may grow in importance.46 The health of the world"s population has improved remarkably over the past 50 years, although striking disparities remain.47 Slum populations in urban areas are particularly exposed to disease, suffering from poor air quality and heat stress, and with limited access to clean water.

In some tropical areas, temperatures may already be at the limit of human tolerance. Peak temperatures in the Indo-Gangetic Plain often already exceed 45°C before the arrival of the monsoon.48 In contrast, in northern latitudes (Europe, Russia, Canada, United States), global warming may imply fewer deaths overall, because more people are saved from cold-related death in the winter than succumb to heat- related death in the summer (Figure 3.7; more detail in Chapter 5).49 In cities heatwaves will become increasingly dangerous, as regional warming together with the urban heat island effect (where cities concentrate and retain heat) leads to extreme temperatures and more dangerous air pollution incidents (see Box 6.4 in Chapter 5).

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Climate change will amplify health disparities between rich and poor parts of the world. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that climate change since the 1970s is already responsible for over 150,000 deaths each year through increasing incidence of diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition, predominantly in Africa and other developing regions (Figure 3.8).50 Just a 1°C increase in global temperature above pre-industrial could double annual deaths from climate change to at least 300,000 according to the WHO.51 These figures do not account for any reductions in cold-related deaths, which could be substantial.52 At higher temperatures, death rates will increase sharply, for example millions more people dying from malnutrition each year.53 Climate change will also affect health via other diseases not included in the WHO modelling.54

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The distribution and abundance of disease vectors are closely linked to temperature and rainfall patterns, and will therefore be very sensitive to changes in regional climate in a warmer world. Changes to mosquito distributions and abundance will have profound impacts on malaria prevalence in affected areas.

This will be particularly significant in Africa, where 450 million people are exposed to malaria today, of whom around 1 million die each year. According to one study, a 2°C rise in temperature may lead to 40 – 60 million more people exposed to malaria in Africa (9 – 14% increase on present-day), increasing to 70 – 80 million (16 – 19%) at higher temperatures, assuming no change to malaria control efforts.55 Much of the increase will occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, including East Africa. Some studies suggest that malaria will decrease in parts of West Africa, e.g. taking 25 – 50 million people out of an exposed region, because of reductions in rainfall.56 Changes in future exposure depend on the success of national and international malaria programmes. Such adaptations are not taken into account in the estimates presented, but the effectiveness of such programmes remains variable.57 Climate change will also increase the global population exposed to dengue fever, predominantly in the developing world, e.g. 5 – 6 billion people exposed with a 4°C temperature rise compared with 3.5 billion people exposed with no climate change.58

Health will be further affected by changes in the water cycle. Droughts and floods are harbingers of disease, as well as causing death from dehydration or drowning.59 Prolonged droughts will fuel forest fires that release respiratory pollutants, while floods foster growth of infectious fungal spores, create new breeding sites for disease vectors such as mosquitoes, and trigger outbreaks of water-borne diseases like cholera. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, Honduras recorded an additional 30,000 cases of malaria and 1,000 cases of dengue fever. The toxic moulds left in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina continue to create health problems for its population, for example the so-called "Katrina cough".

3.5 Land Sea level rise will increase coastal flooding, raise costs of coastal protection, lead to loss of wetlands and coastal erosion, and increase saltwater intrusion into surface and groundwater. Warming from the last century has already committed the world to rising seas for many centuries to come. Further warming this century will increase this commitment.60 Rising sea levels will increase the amount of land lost and people displaced due to permanent inundation, while the costs of sea walls will rise approximately as a square of the required height. Coastal areas are amongst the most densely populated areas in the world and support several important ecosystems on which local communities depend. Critical infrastructure is often concentrated around coastlines, including oil refineries, nuclear power stations, port and industrial facilities.61

Currently, more than 200 million people live in coastal floodplains around the world, with 2 million Km2 of land and $1 trillion worth of assets less than 1-m elevation above current sea level. One-quarter of Bangladesh"s population (~35 million people) lives within the coastal floodplain.62 Many of the world"s major cities (22 of the top 50) are at risk of flooding from coastal surges, including Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Mumbai, Calcutta, Karachi, Buenos Aires, St Petersburg, New York, Miami and London.63 In almost every case, the city relies on costly flood defences for protection. Even if protected, these cities would lie below sea level with a residual risk of flooding like New Orleans today.

The homes of tens of millions more people are likely to be affected by flooding from coastal storm surges with rising sea levels. People in South and East Asia will be most vulnerable, along with those living on the coast of Africa and on small islands. Sea level rises will lead to large increases in the number of people whose homes are flooded (Figure 3.9).64 According to one study that assumes protection levels rise in line with GDP per capita, between 7 – 70 million and 20 – 300 million additional people will be flooded each year by 3 to 4°C of warming causing 20 – 80 cm of sea level rise (low and high population growth assumptions respectively).65 Upgrading coastal defences further could partially offset these impacts, but would require substantial capital investment and ongoing maintenance. At higher levels of warming and increased rates of sea level rise, the risks will become increasingly serious (more on melting polar ice sheets in Section 3.8).

South and East Asia will be most vulnerable because of their large coastal populations in low-lying areas, such as Vietnam, Bangladesh and parts of China (Shanghai) and India. Millions will also be at risk around the coastline of Africa, particularly in the Nile Delta and along the west coast. Small island states in the Caribbean, and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (e.g. Micronesia and French Polynesia, the Maldives, Tuvalu) are acutely threatened, because of their high concentrations of development along the coast. In the Caribbean, more than half the population lives within 1.5 Km of the shoreline.

Some estimates suggest that 150 – 200 million people may become permanently displaced by the middle of the century due to rising sea levels, more frequent floods, and more intense droughts. Today, almost as many people are forced to leave their homes because of environmental disasters and natural resource scarcity as flee political oppression, religious persecution and ethnic troubles (25 million compared with 27 million).66 Estimates in this area, however, are still problematic. Norman Myers uses conservative assumptions and calculates that climate change could lead to as many as 150 – 200 million environmental refugees by the middle of the century (2% of projected population).67 This estimate has not been rigorously tested, but it remains in line with the evidence presented throughout this chapter that climate change will lead to hundreds of millions more people without sufficient water or food to survive or threatened by dangerous floods and increased disease. People may also be driven to migrate within a region – Chapter 5 looks in detail at a possible climate-induced shift in population and economic activity from southern regions to northern regions of Europe and the USA.

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3.6 Infrastructure Damage to infrastructure from storms will increase substantially from only small increases in event intensity. Changes in soil conditions (from droughts or permafrost melting) will influence the stability of buildings. By increasing the amount of energy available to fuel storms (Chapter 1), climate change is likely to increase the intensity of storms. Infrastructure damage costs will increase substantially from even small increases in sea temperatures because: (1) peak wind speeds of tropical storms are a strongly exponential function of temperature, increasing by about 15 – 20% for a 3°C increase in tropical sea surface temperatures;68 and (2) damage costs typically scale as the cube of wind-speed or more (Figure 3.10).69 Storms and associated flooding are already the most costly natural disaster today, making up almost 90% of the total losses from natural catastrophes in 2005 ($184 billion from windstorms alone, particularly hurricanes and typhoons).70 A large proportion of the financial losses fall in the developed world, because of the high value and large amount of infrastructure at risk (more details in Chapter 5).

High latitude regions are already experiencing the effects of warming on previously frozen soil. Thawing weakens soil conditions and causes subsidence of buildings and infrastructure. Climate change is likely to lead to significant damage to buildings and roads in settlements in Canada and parts of Russia currently built on permafrost.71 The Quinghai-Tibet Railway, planned to run over 500 Km of permafrost, is designed with a complex and costly insulation and cooling system to prevent thawing of the permafrost layer (more details in Chapter 20). However, most of the existing infrastructure is not so well designed to cope with permafrost thawing and land instability.

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3.7 Environment Climate change is likely to occur too rapidly for many species to adapt. One study estimates that around 15 – 40% of species face extinction with 2°C of warming. Strong drying over the Amazon, as predicted by some climate models, would result in dieback of forest with the highest biodiversity on the planet. The warming of the 20th century has already directly affected ecosystems. Over the past 40 years, species have been moving polewards by 6 Km on average per decade, and seasonal events, such as flowering or egg-laying, have been occurring several days earlier each decade.72 Coral bleaching has become increasingly prevalent since the 1980s. Arctic and mountain ecosystems are acutely vulnerable – polar bears, caribou and white spruce have all experienced recent declines.73 Climate change has already contributed to the extinction of over 1% of the world"s amphibian species from tropical mountains.74

Ecosystems will be highly sensitive to climate change (Table 3.4). For many species, the rate of warming will be too rapid to withstand. Many species will have to migrate across fragmented landscapes to stay within their "climate envelope" (at rates that many will not be able to achieve). Migration becomes more difficult with faster rates of warming. In some cases, the "climate envelope" of a species may move beyond reach, for example moving above the tops of mountains or beyond coastlines. Conservation reserves may find their local climates becoming less amenable to the native species. Other pressures from human activities, including land-use change, harvesting/hunting, pollution and transport of alien species around the world, have already had a dramatic effect on species and will make it even harder for species to cope with further warming. Since 1500, 245 extinctions have been recorded across most major species groups, including mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and trees. A further 800 known species in these groups are threatened with extinction.75

A warming world will accelerate species extinctions and has the potential to lead to the irreversible loss of many species around the world, with most kinds of animals and plants affected (see below). Rising levels of carbon dioxide have some direct impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity,76 but increases in temperature and changes in rainfall will have even more profound effects. Vulnerable ecosystems are likely to disappear almost completely at even quite moderate levels of warming.77 The Arctic will be particularly hard hit, since many of its species, including polar bears and seals, will be very sensitive to the rapid warming predicted and substantial loss of sea ice (more detail in Chapter 5).78

1°C warming. At least 10% of land species could be facing extinction, according to one study.79

Coral reef bleaching will become much more frequent, with slow recovery, particularly in the southern Indian Ocean, Great Barrier Reef and the Caribbean.80 Tropical mountain habitats are very species rich and are likely to lose many species as suitable habitat disappears.

2°C warming. Around 15 – 40% of land species could be facing extinction, with most major species groups affected, including 25 – 60% of mammals in South Africa and 15 – 25% of butterflies in Australia. Coral reefs are expected to bleach annually in many areas, with most never recovering, affecting tens of millions of people that rely on coral reefs for their livelihood or food supply.81 This level of warming is expected to lead to the loss of vast areas of tundra and forest – almost half the low tundra and about one-quarter of the cool conifer forest according to one study.82

3°C warming. Around 20 – 50% of land species could be facing extinction. Thousands of species may be lost in biodiversity hotspots around the world, e.g. over 40% of endemic species in some biodiversity hotspots such as African national parks and Queensland rain forest.83 Large areas of coastal wetlands will be permanently lost because of sea level rise (up to one-quarter according to some estimates), with acute risks in the Mediterranean, the USA and South East Asia. Mangroves and coral reefs are at particular risk from rapid sea level rise (more than 5 mm per year) and their loss would remove natural coastal defences in many regions. Strong drying over the Amazon, according to some climate models, would result in dieback of forest with the highest biodiversity on the planet.84

Temperatures could rise by more than 4 or 5°C if emissions continue unabated, but the full range of consequences at this level of warming have not been clearly articulated to date. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of ecological processes leads quickly to the conclusion that many of the ecosystem effects will become compounded with increased levels of warming, particularly since small shifts in the composition of ecosystems or the timing of biological events will have knock-on effects through the food- chain (e.g. loss of pollinators or food supply).85

3.8 Non-linear changes and threshold effects Warming will increase the chance of triggering abrupt and large-scale changes. Human civilisation has lived through a relatively stable climate. But the climate system has behaved erratically in the past.86 The chaotic nature of the climate system means that even relatively small amounts of warming can become amplified, leading to major shifts as the system adjusts to balance the new conditions. Abrupt and large-scale changes could potentially destabilise regions and increase regional conflict – for example shutdown of Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (more details in Chapter 5).87 While there is still uncertainty over the possible triggers for such changes, the latest science indicates that the risk is more serious than once thought (Table 3.3).88 Some temperature triggers, like 3 or 4°C of warming, could be reached this century if warming occurs quite rapidly.

Melting/collapse of polar ice sheets would accelerate sea level rise and eventually lead to substantial loss of land, affecting around 5% of the global population. The impacts of sea level rise in the long term depend critically on changes in both the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets. As temperatures rise, the world risks crossing a threshold level of warming beyond which melting or collapse of these polar ice sheets would be irreversible. This would commit the world to increases in sea level of around 5 to 12-m over coming centuries to millennia, much greater than from thermal expansion alone, and significantly accelerate the rate of increase (Chapter 1). A substantial area of land and a large number of people would be put at risk from permanent inundation and coastal surges. Currently, around 5% of the world"s population (around 270 million people) and $2 trillion worth of GDP would be threatened by a 5-m rise (Figure 3.11). The most vulnerable regions are South and East Asia, which could lose 15% of their land area (an area over three times the size of the UK). Many major world cities would likely have to be abandoned unless costly flood defences were constructed.89

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Warming may induce sudden shifts in regional weather patterns that have severe consequences for water availability in tropical regions. The strongly non-linear nature of weather systems, like the Asian and African monsoons, and patterns of variability, such as the El Niño (chapter 1), suggests that they may be particularly vulnerable to abrupt shifts. For example, recent evidence shows that an El Niño with strong warming in the central Pacific can cause the Indian monsoon to switch into a dry state, leading to severe droughts90 . Currently, this type of shift is a temporary occurrence, but in the past, there is evidence that climate changes have caused such shifts to persist for many decades. For example, cold periods in the North Atlantic since the last ice age, such as a 2.5°C regional cooling during the Little Ice Age, led to an abrupt weakening of the Asian summer monsoon.91 If such abrupt shifts were replicated in the future, they could have a very severe effect on the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people (Box 3.5). The impacts would be strongest in the tropics, where such weather systems are a key driver of rainfall patterns. However, the confidence in projections of future changes is relatively low. Currently, several climate models predict that in the future average rainfall patterns will look more like an El Niño.92 This could mean a significant shift in weather in many parts of the world, with areas that are normally wet perhaps rapidly becoming dryer. In the long term, it may be possible to adapt to such changes, but the short-term impacts would be highly disruptive.

For example, the strong El Niño in 1997/98 had severe impacts around the Indian and Pacific oceans, causing flooding and droughts that led to thousands of deaths and several billion dollars of damage.

Extreme high temperatures will occur more often, increasing human mortality during the dry pre-monsoon months and damaging crops.93 Critical temperatures, above which damage to crops increases rapidly, are likely to be exceeded more frequently. A recent study predicts up to a 70% reduction in crop yields by the end of this century under these conditions, assuming no adaptation.94

Box 3.5 Possible impacts of an abrupt change in Asian monsoon reliability Any changes in rainfall patterns of the Asian monsoon would severely affects the lives of millions of people across southern Asia. Summer monsoon rains play a crucial role for agricultural and industrial production throughout South and East Asia. In India, for example, summer monsoon rains provide 75 – 90% of the annual rainfall.

Models suggest that climate change will bring a warmer, wetter monsoon by the end of the century.95 This could increase water availability for around two billion people in South and East Asia.96 However, the increased runoff would probably increase flood risk, particularly because models predict that rain will fall in more intense bursts. Without adaptation this could have devastating impacts. For example, over 1000 people died when Mumbai was devastated by flash floods from extremely heavy rainfall in August 2005.97

A record-breaking one-metre of rain fell in just 24 hours and parts of Mumbai were flooded to a depth of 3 metres. Schools, banks, the stock exchange, and the airport all had to be closed. Hundreds of cases of dysentery and cholera were recorded as a result of contaminated water, and medical supplies were limited because of damages to storage warehouses.

But it is changes in the timing and variability of rainfall, both within the wet season and between years that are likely to have the most significant impacts on lives and livelihoods. A year-to-year fluctuation of just 10% in average rainfall can lead to food and water shortages. Confidence in projections of future rainfall variability is relatively low; however, this represents the difference between steady, predictable rainfall and a destructive cycle of flooding and drought. Most models predict a modest increase in year-to-year variability but to differing degrees. At the heart of this are the projections of what will happen to El Niño.

Changes in variability within the wet season are more uncertain, but also vital to livelihoods. For example, in 2002, the monsoon rains failed during July, resulting in a seasonal rainfall deficit of 20%. This caused a massive loss of agricultural production, leading to severe hardship for hundreds of millions of people.

3.9 Conclusion Climate change will have increasingly severe impacts on people around the world, with a growing risk of abrupt and large-scale changes at higher temperatures. This chapter has outlined the main mechanisms through which physical changes in climate will affect the lives and livelihoods of people around the world. A warmer world with a more intense water cycle and rising sea levels will influence many key determinants of wealth and wellbeing, including water supply, food production, human health, availability of land, and the environment. While there may be some initial benefits in higher latitudes for moderate levels of warming (1 – 2°C), the impacts will become increasingly severe at higher temperatures (3, 4 or 5°C). While there is some evidence in individual sectors for disproportionate increases in damages with increasing temperatures, such as heat stress (Box 3.1), the most powerful consequences will arise when interactions between sectors magnify the effects of rising temperatures. For example, infrastructure damage will rise sharply in a warmer world, because of the combined effects of increasing potency of storms from warmer ocean waters and the increasing vulnerability of infrastructure to rising windspeeds. At the same time, the science is becoming stronger, suggesting that higher temperatures will bring a growing risk of abrupt and large-scale changes in the climate system, such as melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet or sudden shift in the pattern of monsoon rains. Such changes are still hard to predict, but their consequences could be potentially catastrophic, with the risk of large-scale movement of populations and global insecurity. Chapter 6 brings this disparate material together to examine the full costs in aggregate.

While modelling efforts are still limited, they provide a powerful tool for taking a comprehensive look at the impacts of climate change. At the same time, it is the underlying detail, as described in this and the next two chapters, rather than the aggregate models that should be the primary focus. It is not possible in aggregate models to bring out the key elements of the effects, much is lost in aggregation, and the particular model structure can have their own characteristics. What matters is the magnitude of the risks of different kind for different people and the fact that they rise so sharply as temperatures move upwards.

Chapters 4 and 5 pick up this story. The poorest will be hit earliest and most severely. In many developing countries, even small amounts of warming will lead to declines in agricultural production because crops are already close to critical temperature thresholds. The human consequences will be most serious and widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa, where millions more will die from malnutrition, diarrhoea, malaria and dengue fever, unless effective control measures are in place. There will be acute risks all over the world – from the Inuits in the Arctic to the inhabitants of small islands in the Caribbean and Pacific. Developed countries may experience some initial benefits from warming, such as longer growing seasons for crops, less winter mortality, and reduced heating demands. These are likely to be short-lived and counteracted at higher temperatures by sharp increases in damaging extreme events such as hurricanes, floods, and heatwaves.

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Implications of Climate Change for Development

Key Messages Climate change poses a real threat to the developing world. Unchecked it will become a major obstacle to continued poverty reduction. Developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change because of their geographic exposure, low incomes, and greater reliance on climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture. Ethiopia, for example, already has far greater hydrological variability than North America but less than 1% of the artificial water storage capacity per capita. Together these mean that impacts are proportionally greater and the ability to adapt smaller. Many developing countries are already struggling to cope with their current climate. For low-income countries, major natural disasters today can cost an average of 5% of GDP.

Health and agricultural incomes will be under particular threat from climate change. For example: • Falling farm incomes will increase poverty and reduce the ability of households to invest in a better future and force them to use up meagre savings just to survive.

• Millions of people will potentially be at risk of climate-driven heat stress, flooding, malnutrition, water related disease and vector borne diseases. For example, dengue transmission in South America may increase by 2 to 5 fold by the 2050s.

• The cost of climate change in India and South East Asia could be as high as a 9-13% loss in GDP by 2100 compared with what could have been achieved in a world without climate change. Up to an additional 145-220 million people could be living on less than $2 a day and there could be an additional 165,000 to 250,000 child deaths per year in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2100 (due to income losses alone).

Severe deterioration in the local climate could lead, in some parts of the developing world, to mass migration and conflict, especially as another 2-3 billion people are added to the developing world"s population in the next few decades: • Rising sea levels, advancing desertification and other climate-driven changes could drive millions of people to migrate: more than a fifth of Bangladesh could be under water with a 1m rise in sea levels – a possibility by the end of the century.

• Drought and other climate-related shocks risk sparking conflict and violence, with West Africa and the Nile Basin particularly vulnerable given their high water interdependence.

These risks place an even greater premium on fostering growth and development to reduce the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change. However, little can now be done to change the likely adverse effects that some developing countries will face in the next few decades, and so some adaptation will be essential. Strong and early mitigation is the only way to avoid some of the more severe impacts that could occur in the second half of this century. 4.1 Introduction While all regions will eventually feel the effects of climate change, it will have a disproportionately harmful effect on developing countries – and in particular poor communities who are already living at or close to the margins of survival. Changes in the climate will amplify the existing challenges posed by tropical geography, a heavy dependence on agriculture, rapid population growth, poverty, and a limited capacity to cope with an uncertain climate. The world is already likely to fall short of the Millennium Development Goals for 2015 in many regions of the world (see Box 4.1 for the Goals). Climate change threatens the long- term sustainability of development progress.1

Box 4.1 Millennium Development Goals In September 2000, 189 countries signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In so doing, they agreed on the fundamental dimensions of development, translated into an international blueprint for poverty reduction. This is encapsulated by the Millennium Development Goals that are focused on a target date of 2015:

• Halve extreme poverty and hunger • Achieve universal primary education • Empower women and promote equality between women and men • Reduce under five mortality by two thirds • Reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters • Reverse the spread of diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria • Ensure environmental sustainability • Create a global partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade and debt relief But it is important to recognise that the scale of future climate impacts will vary between regions, countries and people. The last 30 years or so has already seen strong advances in many developing countries on income, health and education. Those developing countries that continue to experience rapid growth will be much better placed to deal with the consequences of climate change. Other areas, predominantly low-income countries, where growth is stagnating may find their vulnerability increases.

The challenge now is to limit the damage, both by mitigation and adaptation. It is vital therefore to understand just how, and how much, climate change is likely to slow development progress. The chapter begins by examining the processes by which climate change impacts will be felt in developing counties. Section 4.2 considers what it is about the starting position of these countries that makes them vulnerable to the physical changes set out in Chapter 3. Understanding why developing countries are especially vulnerable is critical to understanding how best to improve their ability to deal with climate change (discussed in Chapter 20). Sections 4.3 and 4.4 move on to consider the consequences of a changing climate on health, income and growth. The first part of the analysis draws on evidence from past and current exposure to climate variability to show how vulnerable groups are affected by a hostile climate. The second summarises key regional impacts. Section 4.5 explores the potential effects on future growth and income levels, which in turn affect the numbers of people living below poverty thresholds as well as the child mortality rate. The chapter concludes with Section 4.6 reviewing the possible consequences for migration, displacement and risk of conflict resulting from the socio-economic and environmental pressures of climate change.

4.2 The vulnerability of developing countries to a changing climate Developing countries are especially vulnerable to the physical impacts of climate change because of their exposure to an already fragile environment, an economic structure that is highly sensitive to an adverse and changing climate, and low incomes that constrain their ability to adapt. The effects of climate change on economies and societies will vary greatly over the world. The circumstances of each country – its initial climate, socio-economic conditions, and growth prospects – will shape the scale of the social, economic and environmental effects of climate change. Vulnerability to climate change can be classified as: exposure to changes in the climate, sensitivity – the degree to which a system is affected by or responsive to climate stimuli,2 and adaptive capacity – the ability to prepare for, respond to and tackle the effects of climate change. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Developing countries score poorly on all three criteria. This section provides a brief overview of some of the key vulnerabilities facing many developing countries. Unless these vulnerabilities are overcome they are likely to increase the risk and scale of damaging impacts posed by climate change.

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Exposure: The geography of many developing countries leaves them especially vulnerable to climate change. Geographical exposure plays an important role in determining a country"s growth and development prospects. Many developing countries are located in tropical areas. As a result, they already endure climate extremes (such as those that accompany the monsoon and El Niño and La Niña cycles), intra and interannual variability in rainfall,3 and very high temperatures. India, for example, experienced peak temperatures of between 45°C and 49°C during the pre-monsoon months of 2003.4 Geographical conditions have been identified as important contributors to lower levels of growth in developing countries. If rainfall – that arrives only in a single season in many tropical areas – fails for example, a country will be left dry for over a year with powerful implications for their agricultural sector. This occurred in India in 2002 when the monsoon rains failed, resulting in a seasonal rainfall deficit of 19% and causing large losses of agricultural production and a drop of over 3% in India"s GDP.5 Recent analysis has led Nordhaus to conclude that "tropical geography has a substantial negative impact on output density and output per capita compared to temperate regions".6 Sachs, similarly, argues that poor soils, the presence of pests and parasites, higher crop respiration rates due to warmer temperatures, and difficulty in water availability and control explain much of the tropical disadvantage in agriculture.7 Climate change is predicted to make these conditions even more challenging, with the range of possible physical impacts set out in Chapter 3. Even slight variations in the climate can have very large costs in developing countries as many places are close to the upper temperature tolerance of activities such as crop production. Put anther way, climate change will have a disproportionately damaging impact on developing countries due, in part at least, to their location in low latitudes, the amount and variability of rainfall they receive, and the fact that they are "already too hot".8

Sensitivity: Developing economies are very sensitive to the direct impacts of climate change given their heavy dependence on agriculture and ecosystems, rapid population growth and concentration of millions of people in slum and squatter settlements, and low health levels. Dependence on agriculture: Agriculture and related activities are crucial to many developing countries, in particular for low income or semi-subsistence economies. The rural sector contributes 21% of GDP in India, for example, rising to 39% in a country like Malawi,9 whilst 61% and 64% of people in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are employed in the rural sector.10 This concentration of economic activities in the rural sector – and in some cases around just a few commodities – is associated with low levels of income, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.11 The concentration of activities in one sector also limits flexibility to switch to less climate-sensitive activities such as manufacturing and services. The agricultural sector is one of the most at risk to the damaging impacts of climate change – and indeed current extreme climate variability – in developing countries, as discussed in Chapter 3.

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Dependence on vulnerable ecosystems: All humans depend on the services provided by natural systems. However, environmental assets and the services they provide are especially important for poor people, ranging from the provision of subsistence products and market income, to food security and health services.12 Poor people are consequently highly sensitive to the degradation and destruction of these natural assets and systems by climate change. For example, dieback of large areas of forest – some climate models show strong drying over the Amazon if global temperature increases by more than 2°C, for example – would affect many of the one billion or more people who depend to varying degrees on forests for their livelihoods (Table 4.1).13

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Population growth and rapid urbanisation: Over the next few decades, another 2-3 billion people will be added to the world"s population, virtually all of them in developing countries.14

This will add to the existing strain on natural resources – and the social fabric – in many poor countries, and expose a greater number of people to the effects of climate change. Greater effort is required to encourage lower rates of population growth. Development on the MDG dimensions (in particular income, the education of women, and reproductive health) is the most powerful and sustainable way to approach population growth.15

Developing countries are also undergoing rapid urbanisation, and the trend is set to continue as populations grow. The number of people living in cities in developing countries is predicted to rise from 43% in 2005 to 56% by 2030.16 In Africa, for example, the 500km coast between Accra and the Niger delta will likely become a continuous urban megalopolis with more than 50 million people by 2020.17 It does not follow from this that policies to slow urbanisation are desirable. Urbanisation is closely linked to economic growth and it can provide opportunities for reducing poverty and decreasing vulnerability to climate change.18 Nonetheless, many of those migrating to cities live in poor conditions – often on marginal land – and are particularly vulnerable because of their limited access clean water, sanitation, and location in flood-prone areas.19 In Latin America, for example, where urbanisation has gone far further than in Africa or Asia, more and more people are likely be forced to locate in cheaper, hazard prone areas such as floodplains or steep slopes.

Food insecurity, malnutrition and health: Approximately 40% of the population of sub- Saharan Africa is undernourished, largely because of the poor diet and severe and repeated infections that afflict poor people.20 Even if the Millennium Development Goals are met, more than 400 million people could be suffering from chronic hunger in 2015.21 Malnutrition is a health outcome in itself, but it also lowers natural resistance to infectious diseases by weakening the immune system. This is a challenge today – malnutrition was associated with 54% of child deaths in developing countries in 2001 (10.8 million children), as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Climate change will potentially exacerbate this vulnerability as a greater number of malaria carrying mosquitoes move into previously uninfected areas. This is likely to generate higher morbidity and mortality rates among people suffering from malnutrition than among food-secure people.

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Adaptive capacity: People will adapt to changes in the climate as far as their resources and knowledge allow. But developing countries lack the infrastructure (most notably in the area of water supply and management), financial means, and access to public services that would otherwise help them adapt. Poor water-related infrastructure and management: Developing countries are highly dependent on water – the most climate-sensitive economic resource – for their growth and development. Water is a key input to agriculture, industry, energy and transport and is essential for domestic purposes. Irrigation and effective water management will be very important in helping to reduce and manage the effects of climate change on agriculture.22 But many developing countries have low investment in irrigation systems, dams, and ground water. For example, Ethiopia has less than 1% of the artificial water storage capacity per capita of North America, despite having to manage far greater hydrological variability.23 Many developing countries do not have enough water storage to manage annual water demand based on the current average seasonal rainfall cycle, as illustrated in Table 4.2. This will become an even greater bind with a future, less predictable cycle.

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In addition, inappropriate water pricing and subsidised electricity tariffs that encourage the excessive use of groundwater pumping (for agricultural use, for example) also increase vulnerability to changing climatic conditions. For example, 104 of Mexico"s 653 aquifers (that provide half the water consumed in the country) drain faster than they can replenish themselves, with 60% of the withdrawals being for irrigation.25 Similarly, water tables are falling in some drought-affected districts of Pakistan by up to 3 meters per year, with water now available only at depths of 200-300 meters.26 The consequences of inadequate investment in water-related infrastructure and poor management are important given that most climate change impacts are mediated through water (as discussed in Chapter 3).

Low incomes and underdeveloped financial markets: In many developing countries the capacity of poor people to withstand extreme weather events such as a drought is constrained both by low income levels and by limited access to credit, loans or insurance (in terms of access and affordability).27 These constraints are likely to become worse as wet and dry seasons become increasingly difficult to predict with climate change.28 This is often exacerbated by weak social safety nets that leave the poorest people very vulnerable to climate shocks. At the national level, many low-income countries have limited financial reserves to cushion the economy against natural disasters,29 coupled with underdeveloped financial markets and weak links to world financial markets that limit the ability to diversify risk or obtain or reallocate financial resources. Less than 1% of the total losses from natural disasters, for example, were insured in low-income countries during the period 1985 to 1999.30

Poor public services: Inadequate resources and poor governance (including corruption) often result in poor provision of public services. Early warning systems for extreme weather conditions, education programmes raising awareness of climate change, and preventive measures and control programmes for diseases spread by vectors or caused by poor nutrition are examples of public services that would help to manage and cope with the effects of climate change but receive weak support and attention in developing countries.

Implications for future vulnerability of different growth pathways. The following sections assume current levels of vulnerabilities in the developing world. However, some parts of the developing world may look very different by the end of the century. If development progress is strong, then much of Asia and Latin America may be middle income or above, with substantial progress also being made in Africa. Growth and development should equip these countries to better manage climate change, and possibly avoid some of the most adverse impacts. For example, if there are more resources to build protection against rising sea levels, and economies become more diversified. But the extent to which these countries will be able to cope with climate change will depend on the scale of future impacts, and hence the action today to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

Further, the speed of climate change over the next few decades will – in part – determine the ability of developing countries to develop and grow. Climate change is likely to lead to an increase in extreme weather events.31 Evidence (discussed below) shows that extreme climate variability can set back growth and development prospects in the poorest countries. If climatic shocks do become more intense and frequent before these countries have been able to reduce their vulnerability, long-term growth potential could be called into question. And some developing countries are already exposed to the damaging impacts of climate change that, in extreme cases such as Tuvalu, have already constrained their long-term development prospects.

Partes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

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