The Metaphysics of Peter Abelard

Abelard"s philosophy is the example in the Western tradition of the cast of mind that is now called "nominalism." Although it is his view that universals are mere words (nomina) that is typically thought to justify the label, Abelard"s nominalism-or, better, his irrealism-is in fact the hallmark of his metaphysics. He is an irrealist not only about universals, but also about propositions, events, times other than the present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic composites, and the like. Instead, Abelard holds that the concrete individual, in all its richness and variety, is more than enough to populate the world. He preferred reductive, atomist, and material explanations when he could get them; he devoted a great deal of e?ort to pouring cold water on the metaphysical excesses of his predecessors and contemporaries. Yet unlike modern philosophers, Abelard did not conceive of metaphysics as a distinct branch of philosophy. Following Boethius, he distinguishes philosophy into three branches:

logic, concerned with devising and assessing argumentation, an activity also known as dialectic; physics, concerned with speculation on the natures of things and their causes; and ethics, concerned with the upright way of life.1

Metaphysics falls under Abelard"s account of "physics" as the second branch of philosophy, which is suciently broad to allow for traditional metaphysical concerns as well as issues proper to natural philosophy.2 Determining his metaphysical commitments is a matter of teasing them out of his discussions

in philosophy of language and natural philosophy.

Antirealism

Abelard is notorious for his claim that universals are nothing but words,a thesis he defends by arguing at length that ontological realism about universals is incoherent. More exactly, Abelard holds that there cannot

be any real object in the world that satis?es Boethius"s criteria for the universal: being present as a whole in many at once so as to constitute their substance (i.e. to make the individual in which it is present what it is).

In his discussion of universals, Abelard echoes Boethius"s own dialectical strategy by attacking the view that the universal is a real constituent of each individual thing, and thereafter the view that the universal

is the collection of things; to this Abelard adds further arguments against a family of views that identify the universal with the individual thing in some fashion In each case Abelard tries to show that realism about universals leads to absurd consequences.

Individuals

From his antirealist arguments, Abelard concludes that there are no (nonsemantic) real objects in the world that satisfy Boethius"s criteria for the universal, whether as things in their own right or as real constituents of

or in things. Instead, everything that exists is individual, or, as Abelard sometimes puts it, "personally distinct.". He explains the individuality of the individual as follows:

Thus we say that individuals consist only in their personal distinctness, namely in that the individual is in itself one thing, distinct from all others; even putting all its accidents aside, it would always

remain in itself personally one-a man would neither be made something else nor be any the less a this if his accidents were taken away from him, e.g. if he were not bald or snubnosed.

To understand this passage properly we have to consider several topics.

First, the distinctive feature of individuals is their individuality, which, as Abelard maintains here, is ontologically primitive . Nearly all individuals, it turns out, are also form-matter composites, the exceptions being God, angels, and human beings; matter is basic and primary, whereas most forms are reducible to and supervenient upon their material components

Hylomorphic individuals are also one type within a wide variety of integral wholes present in the world, wherein the form is the organizing principle of the parts of the whole composite. Individuals have natures, and thereby belong to natural kinds; their natures also set the limits of what is possible.

Identity

Abelard endorses the traditional account of identity, derived from Boethius, which holds that things may be either generically, speci?cally, or numerically the same or di?erent.Yet the distinctions represented in the traditional account are not su-ciently -grained for Abelard"s philosophical purposes. He elaborates an original theory of identity, apparently developed in the instance for theological problems surrounding the

Trinity, but of general application. Four kinds of identity are at the heart of Abelard"s new theory: essential sameness and di-erence, closely tied to numerical sameness and di-erence; sameness and di?erence in de?nition; sameness and di-erence in property (in proprietate).

Roughly, Abelard"s account of essential and numerical sameness is intended to improve upon the identity-conditions for things in the world given by the traditional account; his account of sameness in de?nition in meant to supply identity-conditions for the features of things; and his account of sameness in property opens up the possibility of there being di-erent identity-condiitons for a single thing having several distinct features.

Conceptualism in Abelard

For Abelard, as for the ancients, the inquiry into knowledge began, not with the possibility of knowledge, but with the fact of knowledge. We discourse about Socrates, about men, about animals; and these discourses have meaning because, normally, we know what we are talking about.

Abelard raises two questions about universal nouns, questions that he thinks are more important and more fruitful than those posed earlier by Porphyry (Logica Ingredientibus as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 92): [4]

There is the question as to what is the common cause of the application [impositio] of universal nouns, in virtue of which cause different things agree. Or there is the question about the ideas associated with universal nouns, since no thing seems to be conceived by those ideas nor do the universal utterances seem to deal with any thing.

This passage indicates Abelard's twofold purpose in the theory of knowledge. On the one hand, because he wanted to avoid the kind of nominalism which implies that universals are merely mental figments, he sought to discover the causes, in reality, for the application of universal nouns to existing things. On the other hand, because he wanted to avoid the kind of realism which implies that universals or essences are material substances, he sought to understand the nature of human abstractions, which he held are not things. (As we shall see, the motivation for this twofold purpose was at least partly theological: Abelard believed that both nominalism and realism led to heresy.)

Against the nominalists, Abelard answers the first of his questions as follows (Logica Ingredientibus as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 205):

Individual men who are separate from each other, while they differ both in their own essences and in their own forms … nevertheless agree in this: that they are men. I do not say that they agree in man, since a man is not any thing unless it is a distinct man. Rather I say in being a man. Being a man is not a man nor any thing if we consider the matter carefully…. We mean merely that they are men and do not differ at all in this regard, that is, not in as much as they are men, although we call on no essence.

Abelard's point may seem obvious: that we call men 'men' simply because they are indeed men. But Abelard is not attempting here to define what it is to be a man. He is merely noting why universals nouns are commonly applied — and showing a certain courage in not losing sight of three crucial facts: (1) that we do possess universal knowledge, (2) that the only things are particulars (and therefore that "essences" do not exist), and (3) that universals are truly tied to particulars.

Against the realists, Abelard contends that "being a man" is not a universal thing, even though it is universally applied — i.e., we cannot infer the existence of physical or metaphysical universals from the existence of linguistic ones. Abelard's phrase "being a man" is an example for him of a dictum (roughly, a statement of how things stand in the world), which is closely allied with his notion of a status(roughly, the condition of being a certain sort of thing). In the same passage as that quoted above, Abelard declares that men "agree in the status of a man, i.e. in this: that they are men". Now Abelard admits that it may sound strange that a dictum or status, neither of which is a thing, could be the cause of the common application of universal nouns; but he thinks that the demand that a cause be a physical thing is spurious. And he is emphatic that a dictum or statusis not a thing: "we cannot call the status of a man the things themselves established in the nature of man" (Logica Ingredientibusas quoted in Tweedale 1976, 206).

Abelard's denial that natures are things is not a mere logical quibble for him, but an issue of great theological moment. For the main context of his denial is a discussion of the status and meaning of the Trinity within Christian theology. There existed two opinions concerning the Trinity: one was that the Trinity exists "only in words, not in reality" (nominalism), the other was that the Trinity exists "only in reality, not in words" (realism). Now the first view leads to heresy, since it claims that God is not truly three. And, Abelard argues, so also the second view leads to heresy: for if the divine Persons are different in reality, then their different natures or properties require three separate essences, thus undermining the oneness of God.

Yet according to Abelard the three Persons do have different properties or natures. It is only that "when we hear properties spoken of, we are not to understand that we believe that there are some forms in God. Rather we speak of properties as distinguishers…. Or if someone understands some forms by this, it is certain that they are not in any way different from the substances they are in" (Theologica Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 191). "For if the paternity is in God, is it not true that God the Father consists of two items, i.e. of God and paternity, and that He relates as a whole to these two which he is made up?" Abelard answers: "Certainly not!" (Theologica Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 193).

To overcome these theological difficulties, Abelard attempts to develop a new mode of differentiation in which we use "properties as distinguishers". For it was clear to him that both God and God's paternity exist, and he realized that "exist" is being used in two different senses here. "For when we say that a man exists it is as though we posited a man in his manner of substance, i.e. said that something is itself or that something is a man. But if we say that paternity exists it is as though we posited something to be a father, not paternity itself to be its own essence" (Theologica Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 195).

Thus all existence statements say that something is true of an existing, concrete item. The first kind of statement says that a concrete subject simply exists; the second states that a particular thing possesses a certain property or status or nature.

If, then, everything that is true is true of particulars, whence universals? The fact that all particular men agree in the dictum of "being a man" may be the common cause of applying the term 'man' to them, but that fact does not give us knowledge of what human beings are — and it is this sort of knowledge that we associate with true, universal knowledge of the things themselves. Types or natures would seem to fit the bill, i.e., they seem to be things that are truly predicated of many individuals at the same time — but nowhere does Abelard take the easy way out by saying this.

What Abelard says is that expressions (sermones) are universals. This may strike the reader as not much advanced from Roscelin's view that universals are the flatus vocis (the blowing of the voice). To buttress his claims, Abelard invokes the weight of Aristotle: "he says that 'a universal is what is formed so as to be predicated of many', that is, he draws on its formation, i.e. its establishment. For what is the formation of expressions other than their establishment by men? It gets its being a noun or an expression from its establishment…. Thus we say that expressions are universals since in virtue of their formation … they are predicated of many" (Logica Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 143).

It seems that earlier in his career, Abelard had held the nominalist view that utterances (voces) are universals, but that later on he revised his position. According to his later view, utterances are the bare, concrete, physical sounds of words, while sermones are these sounds as vested by human beings with meaning – sermones are, as it were, abstract yet determinate entities. As we saw in the discussion of abstract properties or types such as paternity, to say that a particular thing "is" an abstract item (e.g., "Socrates is a biped") amounts to noting a certain fact about a concrete item (Socrates has two feet). Abelard applies this notion also to expressions: when he says that expressions are universals, what he means is that utterances have been established by human beings through language as being universal, that is, as being predicable of many simultaneously. Utterances (voces) established as meaningful are expressions (sermones).

Now this talk of establishing utterances as meaningful may lead one to believe that human beings impose on the world the commonality of universals, or that meaning is merely a linguistic convention. But Abelard is opposed to this view (Logica Ingredientibus as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 208):

Now let us answer the question that we promised above to discuss, namely whether the commonness of universal nouns is judged to be due to a common cause of application [impositio] or on account of a common conception or both. Nothing prevents its being due to both, but that common cause which is understood to pertain to the nature of things seems to have the greater force.

It is all well for Abelard to say this, but what does he claim is the cause of this objectivity of universal expressions? What is the nature of the "common conceptions" that they provide us with notions both universal and objective? Or, we moderns might ask, what is it about the world and about the mind that makes conceptual knowledge possible?

At first blush it may seem impossible to answer this Kantian question in Abelardian terms, since there are in Abelard's extant writings no treatments of the nature of the mind or of the world. However, we do have his views on how the mind interacts with the world to establish utterances as expressions — that is, we are in possession of his theory of abstraction. And his theory of abstraction is the explanatory key to Abelard's views on universals.

Abelard's main presentation of the topic of abstraction is contained in his Glosses on Porphyry (McKeon 1929, 245-246):

In relation to abstraction it must be known that matter and form always subsist mixed together, but the reason of the mind has the following power: that it may now consider matter by itself, now turn its attention to form alone, now conceive both intermingled. The first two processes, of course, are by abstraction; they abstract something from things that are conjoined in order that they may consider something's very nature. But the third process is by conjunction. For example, the substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and invested with infinite forms.

Abelard's examples are not so important here as the method or procedure of "attending to" or "considering" only certain aspects of a thing — for we could just as well attend to a man's bipedality or paternity or whatnot in isolation from all his other forms or attributes or properties. 

Thus according to Abelard, we observe concrete things that are similar in a certain respect or property (e.g., that men walk on two feet) — and, comparing the concrete instances and attending only to the property of bipedality in isolation from the other characteristics of human beings, we come to know that man is a biped — that is, we establish the physical utterance "biped" as a universal expression referring to a fact about human beings that we have attended to. By attending, then, to each characteristic we observe, we can understand the nature of things, thereby building up a body of abstract, general knowledge about concrete things.

We can now better understand the "mode of differentiation" that Abelard developed to analyze the notoriously thorny theological issue of the Trinity (Theologica Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 190):

The Persons, i.e. the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are different from each other in the way that things which are different by definition or property are different; that is, although the very same essence which is God the Son is God the Father or God the Holy Spirit, nevertheless the property of God the Father in as much as He is the Father is other than that of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit.

According to Abelard, God has certain properties or characteristics, but these are not in reality separate from His nature or essence — they are "aspects" or "properties" of His nature. The result is that when we attend to God's power, we say "Father"; when we attend to His wisdom, we say "Son"; when we attend to His love, we say "Holy Spirit". Nor are our words in any way arbitrary: according to Abelard, God is indeed powerful, wise, and loving, and we simply recognize those facts when we use the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Further, despite Abelard's claim that "words change their ordinary sense when their application is transferred from creatures to God" (Marenbon 1997, 155), he decidedly does not think that these principles of analysis apply only to God and the Trinity. For even though Abelard cleaved to the common medieval view that God is not a substance (Marenbon 1997, 124), he held that the relation of the essence or nature God to the aspect or property Father is the same as, generally, that of any substance to any of its attributes or properties.  It is mainly the latter, i.e. the properties or features of concrete things, that we deal with in abstraction — and Abelard claims that, as in the case of the Trinity, we deal with them truly.  Thus, no matter how much truth may be a relation between the mind's abstractive power and the particular concretes, Abelard's focus is always fundamentally on the particular concretes, whence we truly derive our conceptual knowledge of the world.Abelard's conceptualism does not exclude a kind of objectivism.

Biography of Peter Abelard

Abelard, Peter, born at Pailais, in Brittany, 1079. Designed for the military profession, he followed those of philosophy and theology. His life was one of strange chances and changes, brought about mainly through his love for Heloise, the niece of one Fulbert, a Canon of the Cathedral of Paris, and by his rationalistic views. Although a priest, he married Heloise privately. He was condemned for heresy by the Council of Soissons, 1121, and again by that of Sens, 1140; died at St. Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saoae, April 21, 1142. For a long time, although his poetry had been referred to both by himself and by Heloise, little of any moment was known except the Advent hymn,Mittit ad Virginem, (q.v.). In 1838 Greith pub, in his Spicihgium Vaticanum, pp. 123-131, six poems which had been discovered in the Vatican. Later on, ninety-seven hymns were found in the Royal Library at Brussels, and pub. in the complete ed. of Abelard's works, by Cousin, Petri Abx-lardi Opp., Paris, 1849. In that work is one of his best-known hymns, Tuba Domini, Paule, maxima (q.v.). Trench in his Sac. Lat. Poetry, 1864, gives his Ornarunt terram germina (one of a series of poems on the successive days' work of the Creation), from Du Meril's Poesies Popul. Lat. du Moyen Age, 1847, p. 444.

Peter Abelard: Moral Influence

Abelard was a logician, scholastic philosopher, and theologian from France. He is perhaps best known for his tragic love affair with his student Heloise. Abelard and Heloise carried on a passionate romance, until her uncle discovered them. They were separated but still managed to conceive a child together and secretly marry. Heloise"s uncle was outraged and sent a gang of thugs to Abelard"s home. They beat him severely and even castrated him! Abelard and Heloise spent the rest of their lives devoted to the monastic life. They continued a correspondence through letters that have become very well known. Abelard, a contemporary of Anselm, rejected the idea that Jesus had to die to satisfy the father"s offended honor.

"How cruel and wicked is seems that anyone should demand the blood of an innocent person as the price for anything, or that it should in any way please him that an innocent man should be slain-still less that God should consider the death of his Son so agreeable that by it he should be reconciled to the world!"

Abelard is representative of the Moral Influence or Exemplary model of the Atonement. He appeals to the effect Jesus" death has in awakening our compassion and provoking our grief. Through the remorse that we feel in contemplating the cross, we share in the sufferings of Christ. In one of his many letters to Heloise, Abelard writes:

"Have compassion on him who suffered willingly for your redemption, and look with remorse on him who was crucified for you…He himself is the way whereby the faithful pass from exile to their own country. He too has set up the Cross, from which he summons us as a ladder for us to use. On this, for you, the only begotten Son of God was killed; he was made an offering because he wished it. Grieve with compassion over him alone and share his suffering in grief."

Because of the spectacular and unmerited act of love that Christ has shown to sinners their hearts rightfully belong to him. He has given us himself and in return he deserves our whole selves. The Lord of all the universe desires us! This should melt our hearts and inspire us to amendment of life.

He bought you not with his wealth, but with himself. He bought and redeemed you with his own blood. See what right he has over you, and know how precious you are…You are greater than heaven, greater than the world, for the Creator of the world himself became the price for you. What has he seen in you, I ask you, when he lacks nothing, to make him seek even the agonies of a fearful and inglorious death in order to purchase you?

Abelard believes that the revelation of God"s love in Christ has the power to transform our hearts. The power of God"s love is so great that it dethrones any contrary affection within us. When we understand how much God loves us, we stop clinging to sin and instead cling to Christ. In loving us God has made us his children.

"Redemption is that greatest love kindled in us by Christ"s passion, a love which not only delivers us from the bondage of sin, but also acquires for us the true freedom of children, where love instead of fear becomes the ruling affection."

Christ justified us by taking our human nature. The passion of Christ transforms our character. Our heart, changed by the love of God, has a new willingness to serve him and endure suffering. It creates boldness in us that we didn"t have before.

"It seems to us that we are justified in the blood of Christ and reconciled to God in this, that through the singular grace manifested to us in that his son took our nature and that teaching us by both word and example he persevered even unto death, Jesus bound us closer to himself by love, so that, fired by so great a benefit of divine grace, true charity would no longer be afraid to endure anything for his sake."

Abelard emphasizes the subjective element of the atonement. For Abelard, our crucial need is not that we satisfy God"s wrath against us, but that we come to be repentance and that our hearts be changed. For Abelard, the only thing God ask is that we admit of failure, accept his love, and love him in return.

References

*http://thepropertyofjesus.blogspot.com/2011/04/peter-abelard-moral-influence.html

*http://www.hymnary.org/person/Abelard_P

*http://stpeter.im/writings/rand/abelard.html

*http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Abelard_on_Metaphysics.CC.pdf

About the author:

Post-Doctor Omar Gómez Castañeda, Senior, Ph.D

Filósofo, Economista e Historiador Latinoamericano

*Doctor en Filosofía,Distinción en Filosofía Antigüa egresado de Belford University,Humble,Texas,Estados Unidos en el año 2006.(www.belforduniversity.net/verification/).Graduate: ID:RV414771-PASSWORD:44198958). *Miembro Asociado de la Sociedad Venezolana de Filosofía, Caracas,Distrito Capital(2006-Actualidad) (cyoris[arroba]ucab.edu.ve).(Google:Sociedad Venezolana de Filosofía). *Ex - Profesor Titular de la Cátedra:"Historía de la Filosofía" en el Diplomado en Filosofía dictado por el Departamento de Capacitación Docente de la Universidad Fermín Toro,Cabudare Barquisimeto,Estado Lara(2007-08). *Investigador,escritor y asesor de temas filosóficos(2006-Actualidad). *Creador del Grupo de Filósofos en Facebook(2008) (www.facebook.com). *Miembro y amigo a través de Facebook (www.facebook.com) de los grupos de: Filósofos y Filósofas de Facebook;Colegio "Hermano Nectario María",Valencia,Estado Carabobo,Venezuela y Humanidades y Educación de la Universidad Central de Venezuela.

*Grupo de Filósofos y Filósofas

*Filosofía y Más

*Filosofía Chile

*Filosofía Costa Rica

*Los Filósofos Antigüos

Publicaciones,Obras y Trabajos:

*"Ensayo de la interpretación filosófica del hombre universal actual en la economía globalizada de finales del Siglo XX".Esta obra está registrada como documento público,ante el Ministerio de Justicia,Registro Subalterno del Primer Circuito,Municipio Iribarren,Nº 20,Protocolo 3,del 24 de Octubre de 1997.Dirección:Calle 20,entre Carreras 15 y 16,Torre David,Piso 12,Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela.Esta Obra también concursó ante el V Premio de Investigación Filosófica Federico Riu,auspiciado por la Embajada de España,la Fundación Federico Riu y la Universidad Central de Venezuela,Año 1998.

*Economía y Filosofía:dos disciplinas sociales que se ocupan de los problemas hombre y sus posibles soluciones.Artículo alojado en Contribuciones a la Economía(www.eumed.net).

*Filosofía Antigüa,Material Compilado Universidad Fermín Toro,Cabudare,Estado Lara(2006-2007).

*¿Qué es la Filosofía del Siglo XXI? alojado en Contribuciones a la Economía Agosto,2007.Texto completo en http://www.edumed.netce/207b/orgc-0708.htm y en www.pensardenuevo.com.

*¿Qué es Lógica Filosófica? alojado en Contribuciones a la Economía,Septiembre 2007.Texto completo en http://www.edumed.net/ce/207c/orgc-0710b.htm.¿Por qué es necesario conocer de filosofía en nuestros días? alojado en la Red Pensar de Nuevo,Buenos Aires,Argentina(www.pensardenuevo.org).

*La Filosofía de la Economía alojado en: www.economicasunp.edu.ar/…/Gomez_Castañeda_Omar_Ricardo-La_filosofia_de_la_economia.pdf-Similares

*La meditación trascendental:Un instrumento ó técnica para comprender los principios de la Filosofía Antigüa Hindú en nuestros días, alojado en el muro del Grupo de Filósofos creado por el Post-Doctor Omar Gómez C,Senior,Ph.D en Facebook(www.facebook.com),14 de Julio del 2008.Alojado también en Zona Económica(www.zonaeconómica.com), el 5 de Abril del 2009,a las 22:50.

*La razón y la fé,alojado en los muros de:Grupo de Filósofos, Filósofos y Filósofas de Facebook,Colegio Hermano Nectario María,Valencia,Estado Carabobo,Venezuela y Humanidades y Educación de la Universidad Central de Venezuela en Facebook(www.facebook.com),14 de Agosto del 2008.Alojado también en la Organización Pensar de Nuevo(www.pensardenuevo.org).

*La Filosofía China,alojado el 23 de Abril del 2009 en www.zonaeconomica.com/omar-gomez-castañeda/filosofia-china,Buenos Aires,Argentina.

*Filosofía japonesa,alojado en pensardenuevo.org/filosofia-japonesa/-

*La Filosofía y Características de la Sociedad Venezolana actual y sus Perspectivas a principios de éste siglo XXI,alojado el 14/7/2010 en pensardenuevo.org/la-filosofia-y-caracteristicas-de-la-sociedad-

venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas-a-principios-de-este-siglo..-

En caché-Similares.

*Ensayo sobre los Evangelios Gnósticos en www.monografias.com.(2011)

*Influencia del pensamiento aristotélico en la actualidad en www.monografias.com(2011) .

*El Cosmos(Nuestro Universo),alojado en www.edu.red(2011) .

* La ética y la moral,de elaboración propia.Trabajo donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Carrera 24,entre Calles 24 y 25,Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela,Año 2011.

*¿Qué es lo eterno y qué es Dios? en /trabajos85/que-es-lo-eterno-y-que-es-dios/que-es-lo-eterno-y-que-es-dios y donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela,Año 2011

*The Philosophy of the American dream en /trabajos87/the-philosophy-of-the-american-dream/the-philosophy-of-the-american-dream

.*La energía geotérmica en: /trabajos86/energia-geotermica/energia-geotermica.*El Ente y el Ser en: /trabajos87/ente-y-ser/ente-y-ser.

*Análisis de la sociedad venezolana actual y sus perspectivas alojado en: /trabajos87/analisis-sociedad-venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas/analisis-sociedad-venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas2

*Tales de Mileto,de elaboración propia y donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela. iutirlalara[arroba]hotmail.com .Anaximandrode Mileto,de elaboración propia y donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela. iutirlalara[arroba]hotmail.com .

*The Philosophy today in the World alojado en:/trabajos89/the-philosophy-today-in-the-world/the-philosophy-today-in-the-world.

*El pueblo colombiano:Su filosofía,cultura e historia en /trabajos89/pueblo-colombiano-su-filosofia-cultura-e-historia/pueblo-colombiano-su-filosofia-cultura-e-historia

*El Bosón de Higgs en /trabajos94/boson-higgs/boson-higgs

*Los nuevos agujeros en el centro del sol en /trabajos94/nuevos-agujeros-centro-del-sol/nuevos-agujeros-centro-del-sol

*La filosofía de René Descates en /trabajos97/filosofia-rene-descartes/filosofia-rene-descartes

*Vida,obra y pensamiento del filósofo Fernando Savater,de elaboración propia y donado a la Biblioteca del Instituto Universitario de Tecnología Industrial(IUTIRLA),Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela. [email protected]. Dicha donación fué realizada el 30 de Agosto del 2013.

Autor:

Post-Doctor Omar Gómez Castañeda, Senior, Ph.D