Metacognition and its development

Enviado por douglasandrewtown

Being aware of our thinking as we perform a specific task and then using this awareness to control what we are doing is commonly known in thinking skills literature as "metacognition". More recently, the term "metacognitive approach" has been applied to strategy training aimed at teaching EFL students consciously to plan, monitor and evaluate their own learning and to analyse the different stages of a task in order to choose appropriate problem-solving strategies (see Robbins 2002). The purpose of this article is to provide some theoretical insights into the nature of metacognition and to outline additional ways of supporting students' metacognitive development.

Metacognitive skills and metacognitive knowledge

A clear distinction is generally made between metacognitive skills and metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive skills develop initially out of self-correcting activities in domain-specific learning (Bruner 1986 quoted in Von Wright 1992; 64) as children gradually learn to anticipate chains of events and compare alternative procedures or mentally correct an action plan before acting. Although these actions are often intentional – i.e. purposeful and directed towards conscious goals – (Von Wright 1992:61), most children nevertheless have difficulty in reflecting on their own intentions and seeing their goals as choices that exist among a number of alternative goals. Metacognitive skills improve task performance, but the choice of task remains largely predetermined by unconscious (or external) factors. Voluntary action depends on metacognitive knowledge, which results from introspection or self-reflection.

The emergence of conscious control

In order to understand how people come to gain control over their actions, we need to understand how self-knowledge and the ability to reflect on one's own behaviour emerge. It is here that computer-based models of cognition, which support much work on cognitive strategies, break down (since computers cannot be said to be 'conscious" of what they do) and that we must turn to social constructivist accounts of cognitive and emotional development for a theoretical explanation. Social constructivism starts from the notion that individual minds are constructed out of social interactions and social meanings. We shall return to the practical implications of this point later.

Vygotsky's (1978) theory of cognitive development is well known. Briefly, it states that the L1 linguistic system is at the root of all higher cognitive functions. Firstly, language frees the child from the stimulus-bound stage of natural perception. By using verbal labelling, the child singles out separate elements and forms "new (artificially introduced and dynamic) structural centres" which can be re-synthesised into new concepts (1978:32). Later, language acts as a cognitive barrier in problem solving, mediating between the presentation of the task and the child's final response. (By contrast, children with so-called 'attention deficit disorder', or ADD, seem to possess little ability to delay their responses). In short, problem solving is first effected through "ego-centric speech" (the child talks to himself or herself) and later, around the age of five, this is replaced by inner speech (reflections) (1986:30). Once egocentric speech has become thus internalised, the child is able to focus consciously on cognitive processes such as memory and to bring them under increasingly greater conscious control (1986:170).

However, as Von Wright (1992:61) points out, a crucial step towards greater expertise in self-reflection is the development of the concept of self. The concept of self is a social construct that we acquire by being treated as a self by others. In G H Mead's (1934) words: "self-consciousness involves the individual's becoming an object to himself by taking the attitudes of other individuals towards himself within an organised setting of social relationships, and … unless the individual had thus become an object to himself, he would not be self-conscious or have a self at all" (quoted in Von Wright 1992:61). This suggests that individuals with a poorly developed or confused self-concept will lack insight into their own intentions, motives and intellectual functions, and that development of metacognitive awareness in later life may ultimately depend on early social conditioning. My own (unpublished) replication study based on Rosenberg (1979) found that self-esteem, rather than age, determined teenagers' and young adults' ability to focus on their psychological "inner worlds", set realistic goals outside the classroom, follow them through, evaluate the results and learn from their mistakes.

The fallibility of metacognitive knowledge

Conventional analyses usually divide metacognitive knowledge into knowledge concerning person, task and strategy variables (Von Wright 1992:64). Thus, Marzano et al (1988) list the various types of knowledge that are important to metacognition as: (a) executive control, which evaluates current state of knowledge; (b) declarative knowledge, which is being conscious of the facts surrounding a situation; (c) conditional knowledge which describes why a strategy works; (d) procedural knowledge, which has to do with various actions performed in a task. However, knowing when, how and why to use a particular strategy in an objective, factual sense does not guarantee that it will be used. This knowledge only counts as metacognitive knowledge when it is spontaneously integrated with awareness of our thinking on a specific task and when we use this awareness to control what we are doing (cited in Harrison 1991:37).

The value of Von Wright's emphasis on self-knowledge, I believe, is that it emphasises the subjective basis of metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge includes conscious knowledge of one's actions, intentions and motives, and also of one's intellectual functions. The latter "creates conditions for a wider application of specific competences and learned rules" (Von Wright 1992:62) by integrating information which previously belonged to separate cognitive systems (transfer of learning). But, like any other type of self-knowledge, it is fallible.

Metacognitive strategies

How, then, do metacognitive strategies such as planning, monitoring and evaluating one's own learning evolve? According to Vygotsky (1968:168) " in order to subject a function to intellectual and volitional control, we must first possess it". In other words, self-reflection will develop first as a skill before it can be used as a series of consciously controlled strategies. We have already noted the role played by language and social relationships in the emergence of these processes. The emphasis on social interaction as a condition for the training of reflective skills is today shared by most approaches to instruction (Von Wright 1991:66). Reciprocal (peer) teaching, for example, forces the "teacher" to use a whole series of metacognitive processes such as determining what the learner already knows, deciding what is to be taught/learnt and how; monitoring comprehension and evaluating the outcome in terms of increased comprehension, which in turn encourage the "teacher" to reflect upon his or her own thinking processes (ibid). In social constructivist terms, metacognitive processes begin as social processes and gradually become "internalised".

Some practical implications

The effective use of metacognitive strategies is one of the primary differences between more and less able learners and students need to be taught such strategies through direct instruction, modelling, and practice. Robbins has already provided an excellent bibliography for the CALLA approach to strategy training in SHARE 90. Perhaps the main implication of this article is that instruction is more likely to produce permanent results in students with (1) high self-esteem (the basis of accurate metacognitive knowledge) and (2) extensive experience of peer teaching and assessment (resulting in a broader range of metacognitive skills).

Assessing students' self-esteem

Recent empirical research in developmental and educational psychology strongly supports a multifaceted view of self-concept, which distinguishes academic self-concept from physical self-concept, and so on. The clearest example of measures based on this view is Marsh's (1992) "Self-Description Questionnaire I, II, or III" for ages seven to young adult. Other widely used measures, such as Fitts' (1991) "Tennessee Self Concept Scale", stress the distinctiveness of various self-concept facets but place global self-concept at the top of the hierarchy. Unfortunately, such instruments are expensive and generally available only to trained psychologists. However, interested readers can find a test of global self-concept at: http://literacy.kent.edu/Midwest/Resc/Kansas/psassessment.html. This contains (1) a self and tutor rating scale, (2) a checklist for identifying difficult daily living situations and (3) a tutor observation checklist. Please note, however, that teachers without training in counselling should not try to offer therapy and that these scales are not designed for children.

Enhancing students' self-esteem

One effective way of enhancing students' self-esteem and academic achievement is adventure education. In a meta-analysis of ninety-six studies of adventure education, Hattie, et al. (1997) categorized the benefits of adventure studies into six broad outcomes: leadership, self-concept, academic achievement, personality, interpersonal relations and adventuresomeness. All of the outcomes except adventuresomeness maintained effects over time. Positive change is thought to take place because participation in problem-solving tasks challenges self-imposed limits, leading to improvements in relationships with others and self-concept.

On a day-to-day basis, variations on Circle Time have been used at most levels of education for enhancing students' general and academic self-esteem by challenging limiting beliefs and fostering awareness of multiple options. Hillyard (2002), a firm proponent of the metacognitive approach in bilingual education in Argentina, claims that not only children but also adolescents find whole-class discussions of this type highly rewarding.

Peer teaching and peer assessment

Peer teaching may involve learners of different ages or of the same age. Although not exclusively an experiment in peer teaching, the University of Dundee's paired reading project has shown the value of support from more able readers (teachers, parents, other adults or older children) in developing reading and thinking skills among primary school children. Interestingly, it was the least able children (both tutors and tutees) that benefited most from this activity. The corresponding web page http://www.dundee.ac.uk/psychology/ReadOn/ also contains links to other articles on peer teaching.

Group projects are another obvious activity for promoting planning, monitoring and evaluation through peer teaching, especially among older children. Books such as "Project Work" by Diana L. Fried-Booth (O.U.P.) – which also contains a project in which adult EFL students teach primary school children – provide valuable advice and worksheets for teacher, group and individual reviews.

Self-evaluation is a difficult strategy to acquire, partly because it often comes at the end of a project or task when learners have run out of time, interest or both, partly because it often involves comparing oneself with others, a strategy recommended by Oxford (1990: 163) but which is potentially threatening to learners with low self-esteem. Nevertheless, many ELT textbooks contain reading and writing activities (e.g. jigsaw reading; assessing other students' drafts) in which learners teach one another and receive peer feedback on their understanding or performance. A non-threatening and on-going method of peer assessment and awareness raising in oral skills, which comes with a rationale and materials, can be found at http://www.finchpark.com/courses/assess/oralpeer02.htm Finally, games can also include informal peer teaching and evaluation. One of my own can be found at http://www.eslcafe.com/ideas/sefer.cgi?display:989526399-5862.txt

Conclusion

Metacognitive strategy training enhances learning inside and outside the classroom but many students have difficulty in using this approach once there is no longer a reminder to do so. Within a social-constructivist perspective, metacognitive skills and metacognitive knowledge, including a realistic self-concept, develop through social interaction and are then internalised. The key to more effective metacognitive strategy training would seem to be through simultaneous training in social strategies together with social learning tasks. The latter may serve to reduce or eliminate negative aspects of an individual's self-concept such as learned helplessness, negative self-labels, competitiveness, perfectionism etc., which prevent realistic and effective goal-setting, planning, attending, monitoring or evaluating in real life contexts.

References

Fried-Booth, D. L. (1986). Project Work. Oxford: O.U.P.

Harrison, C.J. (1991). 'Metacognition and motivation'. Reading Improvement. Vol. 28. No. 1 35-38.

Hattie, J.; Marsh, H. W.; Neill, J. T. & Richards, G. E. (1997). Adventure education and Outward Bound: Out-of-class experiences that make a lasting difference. Review of Educational Research, 67, 43-87.

Hillyard, S. (2002). Personal Communication (interview regarding on-going investigation at Wellspring School, Buenos Aires).

Oxford, R. (1990). Language Learning Strategies: What Every Teacher Should Know. Boston MA.: Heinle and Heinle Publishers.

Robbins, J.A. (2002). http://jillrobbins.com/articles/LSIrobbins.html (visited Dec.13 2002)

Von Wright, J. (1992). 'Reflections on reflection'. Learning and Instruction. Vol. 2. 59-68

Vygotsky, L.S. (1975). Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge MA.: MIT Press.

Douglas Andrew Town BSc (Hons) Psychology, MA (English Language Teaching), Diploma in Translation (Spanish) Profesor de la Universidad de Belgrano, Argentina (Licenciatura en Inglés).