Thematic evaluation of UNODC alternative development initiatives

Executive Summary

1. Background

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) works with the international community and Member States to take action against illicit drug production, trafficking and crime. The United Nations and other international agencies have undertaken various forms of rural development initiatives that aim at reducing and eradicating the production of illicit drug crops for about 30 years. The mandate for UNODC and its predecessor agencies to undertake drug control and especially Alternative Development (AD) is articulated in the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 1998 Resolution S-20/4 E and United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drug (CND 45/14) documents. A historical analysis of these initiatives shows that the concept of AD has evolved over the last 30 years. UNODC has adopted a project approach as its preferred implementation modality to this day.

The initial rural development activities designed to curb drug production and promote licit economic activities that involved crop substitution began in the 1970s. This approach was followed in the 1980s by Integrated Rural Development (IRD). IRD attempted to address the broad socio-economic and infrastructural development issues as a basis of creating conditions for licit economic development. This approach was expensive and met with limited success. Alternative Development was then developed and viewed as a unique development approach that addressed problems in drug dependent economies. Today AD has evolved even further and now encompasses sustainable livelihoods.

UNGASS defines AD as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of crops through rural development measures within the context of sustained national economic growth. The ultimate goal of AD is to help shape a set of conditions which, given sufficient time and growth of the licit economy, could lead to permanent behavioural change in drug producing areas. AD aims at creating conditions for those who give up growing illicit drug crops to participate in licit economic activities and hence permanently give up growing drugs. UNODC"s AD projects have placed more emphasis on measuring the reduction of drug crop acreages than the impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries, although there are exceptions.

2. Purpose and Objectives

The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to review Alternative Development strategies in different regions and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC strategy development in this area.

In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes and sustainability of selected Alternative Development interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices. Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were reviewed.

3. Methodology

The Thematic Evaluation used information already available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports, existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of this exercise.

In addition to document reviews, the evaluation team conducted field visits and interviews with relevant key informants. Field visits (Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) were conducted to collect information to complement and refine information already available, as well as to produce country reports as an input to the final comprehensive report. The major sources of information were semi- structured interviews with different stakeholders, by using open-ended questions.

The evaluation team consisted of five consultants and two IEU evaluators.

4. Limitations

The evaluation faced various limitations. The field visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products. This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately, the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the Evaluation to collect necessary information.

5. Major Findings

The key findings of the report are organized in the following three categories: A. Alternative Development as a Discipline

B. Alternative Development as practiced at UNODC C. External Relations and Synergies

A. Alternative Development as a Discipline

Finding 1. There is no universally accepted definition of Alternative Development operating around the world across agencies and writers, despite the UNGASS definition of 19981. At least four views are found: that AD is a multifaceted strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that AD is one leg of a stool along side eradication, interdiction, policing and education, that AD is a series of discrete projects (or pilot projects), and that AD is equivalent to crop substitution. (Pages 5-8)

Finding 2. A drop in illicit crop production is not the only indicator by which success can be measured. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence at the macro level that the rural development components of AD reduced the amount of drug crops cultivated. There is an attribution gap between AD interventions and reduction of illicit crop cultivation at a national level. Agriculture and social interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure exerted by the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where reduction in drug cropping occurs, other factors, including general economic growth, can be identified as alternate explanations for the change or as contributory factors to change. Further, intimidation and coercion by traffickers are another constraint that AD has to deal with. (Pages 8-10)

Finding 3. From a technical perspective, the rural development methodologies used in AD projects are not notably different from those employed in other development settings. They need to be informed by good development practices, but must be adapted to local conditions. (Pages 10-11)

B. Alternative Development as practiced at UNODC

Finding 4. There is limited information available on the impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries of UNODC AD projects, as opposed to crop reduction data. According to the information available, beneficiary"s livelihoods show an improvement due to AD interventions. (Pages 11-12)

Finding 5. Eradication is less politically acceptable than AD and there is little evidence that eradication reduces cultivation in the long-term – drug crops move, production technologies evolve, and total production decreases very slowly if at all. (Pages 12-13)

Finding 6. UNODC has used projects as a modality to implement AD emphasizing the first part of the UNGASS definition: "[…] through specifically designed rural development measures", and less on the second part "[…] in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts". (Page 13)

Finding 7. UNODC"s AD interventions have played a vital and very positive role in the formulation of drug control policy in many countries. (Pages 13-14)

Finding 8. Despite some efforts at improvement UNODC working and funding processes hinder efficient implementation of AD activities. (Pages 15-17)

Finding 9. UNODC is less likely to produce significant impact with AD at the macro level, given the resources it receives for AD. (Pages 17-18)

Finding 10. UNODC field projects are not designed within realistic budget expectations. Changes from agreed designs, many of which are not accompanied by formal adjustment of indicators, mean that there is no clear way of measuring performance or improving effectiveness. (Pages 18-20)

C. External Relations and Synergies

Finding 11. There is a gap between what UNODC is expected to do and what it is enabled to do. National governments, not UNODC, are responsible for developing and implementing national drug control and economic development programs. UNODC has no control over the funds donors will provide. Drug policy planning and administration take place within complex international and national political systems that UNODC can influence but not control. UNODC's role is best described as catalytic. (Pages 20-21)

Finding 12. UNODC has not used the Office's unique leadership position to its best advantage to mould the diverse views of the donor community into a strategic consensus leading to coherent action on AD. This has negative effects on funding for UNODC AD projects. (Page 21)

Finding 13. UNODC has not taken full advantage to identify opportunities to partner with other organizations on AD and rural development and in some cases misses opportunities for multiplying the impact of investments. This process should begin at the design stage of project development. (Pages 21-22)

6. Outcomes

The report identified several outcomes, including:

• Some AD interventions, in particular road construction, have proved to have lasting positive impacts in remote rural areas.

• Several technology introductions accomplished in AD projects, in particular the gabion weir technology2 in Southeast Asia, have proved their worth repeatedly in bringing irrigation water to farmers fields at a very low cost. This is something UNODC AD could have capitalized on and hence created better impacts.

• The development of marketing skills that is the focus of the many Latin America projects is starting to have a positive impact and this trend is likely to continue into the future. This is an area that UNODC should both monitor and study closely and hence replicate best practices.

• UNODC has been unable to build a consensus of opinion around AD. The Office needs to invest in building consensus especially among donors. Success will depend on UNODC"s ability to build this consensus and hence mobilize and galvanize donors to provide resources.

7. Sustainability

The interventions mentioned above as having had important positive outcomes and impacts can be considered sustainable, in particular road building and gabion weir construction. Some other interventions undertaken in AD projects, however, are unlikely to be sustainable. These include paying teachers' salaries in Lao PDR and non-agricultural careers training in Myanmar. Unless complementary activities to support market system development and trade are undertaken, the sustainability of the market interventions in Latin America will be limited. UNODC should note the successes, but also deal with shortcomings if its AD interventions are to become sustainable.

• Sustainability of AD will only be achieved if all involved look to development as a long-term endeavour. Donors must realize this and provide UNODC with the necessary support to stay until the work is complete. A drop in illicit crop production is not the only indicator by which success can be measured. Development indicators must be the basis for which to assess impact and sustainability.

8. Lessons Learned

Some lessons learned and best practices from this evaluation include:

• It appears unwise to implement AD projects under a national executing modality where partner organizations lack familiarity and experience with the ambitious and demanding nature of AD approaches, or where qualified local staff is not available or unwilling to work in a remote area. Where strong implementing partners are available, UNODC may take a secondary role;

• AD activities are found to be effective only when they are culturally appropriate. In Latin America, working with farmer"s organizations is a necessary condition for success. In Asia, adjusting program activities to accommodate ethnic differences is necessary;

• Knowledge management is key to improving organizational performance and learning;

• To improve their effectiveness, UNODC AD initiatives must support and strengthen communication and cooperation between organizations and actors in the construction of a better future in drug affected regions;

• It is seen to be essential that UNODC attract implementation partners as early in the program formulation process as possible. To maximize the attractiveness of cooperation, UNODC will need to advocate interests much wider than drug control;

• The Kokang and Wa initiative (KOWI) as an innovative partnership mechanism is a model that should be replicated.

9. Constraints

Some constraints identified from this evaluation include:

• Weaknesses in project design and monitoring systems hinder adequate monitoring and evaluation of AD interventions.

• Inadequate performance monitoring by Headquarters, Field Offices and on-site project staff negatively affects project implementation;

• AD is not well defined in UNODC and the Office has trouble articulating a strategy and communicating it to donors and partners. There is no framework or common language for AD worldwide;

• Inadequate resources and a limited capacity at UNODC and an inability of donors to commit funding to long-term projects and skill development;

10. Recommendations

The evaluation makes only one recommendation, as all other steps that UNODC can take must follow from it:

The Executive Committee of UNODC should immediately commission an externally managed, high-level strategic exercise to determine how the Office will continue to address the AD goals as spelled out in its mandate. The participants in this exercise must be willing to challenge every aspect of the Office's rationale to AD, its approach to design and mode of implementation, soliciting and allocating funding, monitoring and evaluation. No question should be taboo, including whether UNODC has the capacity to properly execute its mandate to undertake AD in the UN system. The Executive Committee should then decide upon the course of action to be taken, based upon the recommendations of the review.

Following the adoption of a comprehensive strategy, UNODC will need to redesign and realign AD operations top-to-bottom within the Office to meet the prerequisites for implementing the chosen strategy. This redesign would include, but not limited to, the Office"s relationships with donors, and to the processes of programme/project design, staffing and implementation.

A fundamental principle of Results Based Management, "managing available resources to achieve results," must be applied in UNODC. In reality, the results that UNODC promises are not adjusted to match the resources that materialize once projects have begun and therefore UNODC cannot deliver on its promises. In particular the 50 per cent rule and others that result in a misalignment of expectations and budget resources must be reconsidered.

11. Options for Action

As a contribution to the high-level review exercises the evaluation team has identified some options that may be considered. The team members of this evaluation are not in agreement on the best course of action for UNODC, with at least one member arguing that UNODC should stop all rural development projects as soon as possible. However, the team believes that it is the responsibility of the Office to formulate its own strategy. The following list of strategic options may not be comprehensive but it outlines the possibilities most clearly seen at this writing.

A. UNODC continues to directly implement field projects on AD.

B. UNODC continues to support AD projects but out-sources implementation.

C. UNODC shifts its focus on AD to research and knowledge management aspects and is established as a Centre of Excellence for AD.

D. UNODC focuses on promoting policy dialogue while maintaining a repository of knowledge about AD best practices.

E. UNODC expands AD activities to embrace the wider agenda of the Millennium

Development Goals to address poverty as a root of crime.

12. Conclusions

Alternative Development planning and administration takes place within complex international and national political systems that UNODC can influence but not control. The political debate on AD in the international press and scholarly publications is fierce and some question UNODC"s ability to confidently take on AD as a drug suppression tool.

UNODC has gained ample experience in AD and should have a comparative advantage over other international actors. Despite this the Office faces a series of challenges.

The primary problem is that there is no commonly accepted definition of AD in the world community or within UNODC. While UNGASS provides a definition of AD, UNODC still does not have a strategic vision of AD and thus its efforts are fragmented.

UNODC has not supported its AD effort with adequate programme or technical staff. Staffing at the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit at Headquarters is inadequate to support UNODC"s AD initiatives. UNODC's funding is precarious and complex internal procedures hamper the timely and efficient implementation of projects even further.

UNODC is at a crossroad regarding its AD initiatives. The challenge before it must be tackled with timely and appropriate decisions.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

1. The original United Nations drugs agencies, the Division on Narcotic Drugs and the Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board, worked from the 1950s and into the early 1980s on international drug-control treaties and drug-related research. These separate agencies monitored the status of drugs and drug control in Member States and worked on drug treaty issues. In 1970, as worldwide heroin use grew, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was formed to undertake small, grant-funded projects related to demand reduction and anti-trafficking. UNFDAC was restructured and renamed the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1991. In 1997, UNDCP was merged with CICP (the Centre for International Crime Prevention) to form UNODCCP, the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. In 2002, the Office was reorganized and again renamed as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

2. UNODC works to strengthen international action against drug production, trafficking and crime. UNODC provides statistics on drugs and crime and helps Member States to draft legislation and train judicial officials and carries out research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence-base for policy and operational decisions. It assists Member States in the ratification and implementation of international treaties, development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism, and provides substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies.

3. UNODC also manages field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. UNODC's mandate to undertake Alternative Development (AD) is spelled out in UNGASS resolution S-20/4 E3, CND 45/144 and other official documents. The Office provides technical advice on Alternative Development to Member States through its Field Offices, Regional Advisers and a Vienna-based AD expert. Between 1979 and 2004, the Office funded more than 120 technical cooperation projects aiming at reducing or eliminating illicit crop cultivation.

4. Modern drug control agendas focus on demand reduction, that is, suppressing the use of a substance and thus reducing the size of the market, and supply reduction, suppressing the cultivation or production of a substance and thus its availability in the marketplace. Interdiction and policing are activities that use the law and law enforcement to prevent the spread of drugs and drug precursor chemicals from place to place. Public education about drugs warns people of the physical, legal and economic consequences of growing, trafficking and using drugs.

5. Permanent change in farmer behaviour so as to prevent the planting of drug crops requires the following: 1. Reducing the coercive power of the drug industry and 2. Improving economies so as to assure adequate and stable income from licit activities. It is important to note that farmers will stop drug cropping even if it means a modest drop in income, provided other social and economic supports are in place. It is also important to note that farmers will not abandon the illicit economy, even for profitable alternatives, if they are threatened by dangerous criminals. Business stability is the base for a licit economy and requires a legal and juridical system that sustains the business community and markets. The development of a licit economy requires a stable society where people are assured of their rights and in which behavioural norms casting drugs in a bad light can develop. Unfortunately, the practice of AD in the past 30 years has paid little attention to the systemic causes of drug cultivation and instead has focused (at times exclusively) on providing assistance to small groups of farmers in remote locations.

6. UNODC"s AD outcome indicators have, historically, put more emphasis on the reduction of illicit crop production acreage and less on measuring the change in beneficiary"s livelihoods. There is evidence that this has begun to change in the past few years.

7. In the course of 30 years, strategic thinking behind Alternative Development has evolved as various approaches to supply reduction have been tested. At the beginning of the 1970s the international community supported crop substitution projects, first in Thailand and later Pakistan. The idea of these projects was to replace narcotic crops with other, legal crops. After many failures it became clear that the economics of crop substitution required massive and long-term subsidization of non-drug crops (e.g. Thailand). Additional development measures are necessary to tackle not only crop production, marketing and transport problems, but also the underlying economic, ecological and social problems that support an illicit economy and cause farmers to engage in illicit drug crops.

8. An integrated rural development (IRD) approach against drugs was adopted in the 1980s. IRD attacked a broad range of social problems simultaneously yet still focused almost exclusively on problems at the local level. Their long-term impacts were uneven, with some interventions being more effective than others in particular circumstances. IRD projects in the 1980s, whether for drug control or with other goals, were so complex that they were management nightmares and impossible to evaluate. They were also expensive, generally requiring large international staffs and a large complement of local counterparts. IRD projects in remote drug producing regions remained particularly difficult because, despite expensive infrastructure improvements, unfavourable market conditions persisted.

9. In mainstream development, and to some extent in AD (as will be discussed in detail later), a more cost-cognizant approach to development emerged. Today, good development practice dictates that a holistic view of the situation be refined into a progressively more focused consideration of the situation in order to choose the best among many possible interventions to use limited project funding and available skills in the most effective way to achieve a set of narrowly specified results. UNODC has, on paper at least, embraced this notion for its AD interventions but the practice of AD, particularly in Asia, has not moved far from the earlier IRD approach for reasons that will be discussed later in this report.

1.2. Purpose of the Evaluation

10. The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to review Alternative Development strategies in different regions and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC strategy development in this area.

11. In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes and sustainability of selected Alternative Development interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices. Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were reviewed.

1.3. Scope of the Evaluation

12. This Thematic Evaluation of UNODC's Alternative Development Initiatives has reviewed the results of AD activities implemented by UNODC in Asia and Latin America regions and in seven countries to determine if a common understanding of AD exists within UNODC, and to assess the overall appropriateness of AD as a development and drug control strategy. In addition, the evaluation exercise looked at the outcomes and sustainability of selected AD interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices.

13. The evaluation examined various factors such as:

A. Alternative Development Strategy

i. What is AD and what does AD mean in UNODC;

ii. The role of AD at UNODC and how it has been implemented.

B. Role of UNODC

i. The organizational structure of UNODC and its appropriateness for the task;

ii. The adequacy and appropriateness of needs assessment and selection of project sites;

iii. Organization and management of backstopping, monitoring and evaluation.

C. External Relations and Synergies

i. The most effective use of financial resources for AD, particularly in relation to other actors, donor agencies and their funding strategies;

ii. Public relations with donors, recipient countries and the general public;

iii. Linkages with other institutions working in related fields;

iv. Evolution of Alternative Development strategy and the way forward.

1.4. Evaluation Methodology

14. The team for this worldwide Thematic Evaluation was comprised of five independent consultants. The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit oversaw the implementation of the activity and staff from the Unit participated in the evaluation of Peru, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Over the course of about 6 months, the evaluation team reviewed relevant documents and conducted field visits in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Pakistan. Team members visited national capitals and project sites and conducted interviews with project beneficiaries, implementers, project partners and donors, using open- ended questions. The Thematic Evaluation used information already available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports, existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of this exercise.

15. The evaluation team conducted formal project evaluations in Viet Nam, Lao and Myanmar to assess design, implementation and outcomes. The team members reviewed reference documents on Thailand and Afghanistan

16. The final report was developed as follows:

Base: Regional meetings were held in two locations, Bangkok (Asia team members) and in Lima (Latin American team). Documents were collected, distributed and read by the team members in both regions followed by discussions via Internet. Evaluation instruments were developed.

Country level: A total of seven countries were reviewed for the present evaluation. In three countries, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, formal project evaluations were conducted. For each of the seven countries reviewed, a country report was produced as an input to the final report.

Regional level: Two regional level reports were prepared, one for Latin America and one for South East Asia.

Global level: The final global evaluation report was produced based on consultations between Latin America and Asia teams, country reports, and regional reports produced as part of the exercise.

1.5. Limitations

17. The evaluation faced various limitations. The field visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products. This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately, the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the Evaluation to collect necessary information.

2. Major Findings and Analysis

18. Findings and data are presented in section 2.1 with analysis and supporting information following in section 2.2.

2.1. Findings

A. Alternative Development as a Discipline

Finding 1. There is no universally accepted definition of Alternative Development operating around the world across agencies and writers, despite the UNGASS definition of 19985. At least four views are found: that AD is a multifaceted strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that AD is one leg of a stool along side eradication, interdiction, policing and education, that AD is a series of discrete projects (or pilot projects), and that AD is equivalent to crop substitution.

19. After 30 years it would seem that the world community would agree on what Alternative Development is. Unfortunately, interviews with AD practitioners and policy makers, and examination of written materials from many sources confirm a lack of agreement on what AD is, on how AD should be implemented, and on what results should be expected from AD. The various uses of the terms, "Alternative Development", "process" and "measures" very much depend on the writer's point of view with policy theorists, donors, national governments, local officials (including army and police officers) and even villagers, having different perspectives on the meaning of AD. Four major themes can be identified in the discussion:

i.AD is a multifaceted holistic, systemic, strategic approach to a complex problem. ii.The UNGASS approach in which AD is the leg of a stool with interdiction, policing, eradication and education as the other legs.

iii.AD is a series of discrete rural development projects or pilot projects. iv.AD is no more than a new name for crop substitution.

20. There are no specific dates by which to identify the evolution of rural development interventions from crop substitution through IRD to AD, the term "Alternative Development" is commonly used as a catchall.

21. The current debate, however, is increasingly being referred to as "development in drug environments". The four themes provided of AD are not mutually exclusive. AD in UNODC is the terme de rigueur and projects are the universal mechanism for delivery. Only in Afghanistan is UNODC not involved in rural development projects.

i. Strategic umbrella: AD is a holistic approach

22. One group of writers promotes AD an extended (10-15 year) holistic process of social and economic development that, by directly and indirectly addressing the systemic reasons that farmers grow drugs, leads to the permanent elimination of drug crops and a drug-based economy.

23. David Mansfield (2005), expert on AD, states "Conceptually the main point of difference is one of is development an end in itself (with reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation an externality of a holistic development process that includes creating the enabling environment for wider economic growth and extending the writ of the state) or is it a means to negotiate a reduction in drug crop cultivation (an approach of conditional assistance). The response to this question shapes the mechanisms of delivery. If it is the former then we are typically looking at mainstreaming an analysis of the causes of illicit drug crop cultivation (and how these differs by socio-economic group), as well as drug control objectives, into national development programmes (AD – or as it has moved on conceptually within this model to AL – as an outcome). If it is the latter a geographically discrete project intervention will suffice. Clearly the latter approach has a far more limited in terms of lasting change and outreach but it is easier from the perspective of donor or UN agency delivery".

24. As a long term, holistic strategy, AD embraces a long list of activities including land tenure, business law, international trades issues, civil rights enforcement, education, health, etc. AD when viewed from this perspective includes economic development, eradication, interdiction, education and policing as integral sub-components of the AD process. As a systemic approach, AD should begin long before coercive measures are started so as to prevent and mitigate economic hardship during the process of economic realignment toward a stable licit economy. In this view, AD should continue, even after drug crops are gone, until the economy is robust enough to prevent reinvestment in drug crops.

25. AD, when viewed holistically, should be part of a nationwide strategy for poverty elimination that focuses on the maturation of a just civil society and on the growth of small and medium sized businesses that recycle money in the economies of drug growing areas. In this approach, projects are only methodological tools used toward specific ends. This broad conceptual approach to AD is seen in the widely published writings of Chouvy (2004), Mansfield (2002), McCoy (2004), Kennefick and Morgan (2003), and Berridge and Edwards (1981). Members of this evaluation team strongly support a strategic view of AD with Bechtstadt (2005), in particular, arguing that eradication and interdiction are subcomponents of AD and that breaking the power of drug traffickers is of particular importance in reducing coercion to grow drugs.

ii. The UNGASS mandate: AD is a leg of a stool.

26. The most commonly quoted definition of AD is derived from the Political Declaration and Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development, adopted by the Special Session of the General Assembly in 1998 (UNGASS) and seems to support AD as a holistic activity. UNGASS defines Alternative Development as:

"… a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs."

27. Seldom quoted, however, is the preceding paragraph that says,

"…effective crop control strategies can encompass a variety of approaches, including Alternative Development, law enforcement and eradication."

28. In this view, AD is an equal and separate component of a drug control program. The UNGASS definition and description of AD as rural development measures distinct from eradication and law enforcement is further supported in 2002 by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Resolution 45/14: The Role Of Alternative Development In Drug Control And Development Cooperation, which lists "comprehensive measures such as Alternative Development, law enforcement and eradication" against drugs.

29. UNGASS and CND 45/14 texts, by specifying that AD is one of several separate components of the anti-drugs strategy, predisposes the drug control community to view the components separately. So, for example, we find that even the most progressive thinkers use the term Alternative Development to describe a component of something else:

• The government of Lao PDR calls its anti-opium program the "Balanced Approach to Opium Elimination" and lists the components as 1. Alternative Development, 2. Demand reduction, and 3. Law enforcement;

• The National Drug Control Strategy of Peru consists of four elements: 1. Reduction of drug consumption and rehabilitation of drug addicts, 2. Interdiction of illicit drug trafficking and related crime, 3. Alternative Development, environmental protection and rehabilitation of damaged ecosystems, and 4. Eradication of illicit cultivation. The Peruvian strategy is implemented through five programs: a. Prevention and rehabilitation, b. Alternative Development, c. Environmental protection, d. Eradication, e. Interdiction and prevention of money laundering;

• UNODC in Bolivia cites eradication, complemented by AD, as being the main focus of the drug control program. A report prepared for US Agency for International Development in Bolivia, cites 1. Interdiction, 2. Eradication and 3. Alternative Development as necessary components of a drug suppression program.

iii. AD is a project

30. Although CND 45/14 and UNGASS imply that AD projects should only be undertaken where needed, in practice, UNGASS' use of the phrase "rural-development measures" is commonly taken to mean "rural-development projects" and the definition of AD is too often reduced to a simple equation: AD = time and geographically limited, externally-funded projects. This simplification is most often heard in conversations with UNODC field officers and officials of national governments. The discussion begins with the national strategy that includes AD as one of several components of drug control approach. Then, a map is presented showing the regions where illicit crops are grown. It is explained that law enforcement and eradication are underway across the illicit crop zone and that interdiction and drug awareness programs are underway nation wide. But when the discussion turns to AD, the official will explain that AD only is underway at the sites of externally funded AD projects. Villagers certainly understand that AD, if they have heard of it at all, is a local project that they either participate in or do not. In this context, AD at least in Asia is not a part of the national economic development strategy, nor is AD seen to complement national growth.

iv. AD as a synonym for crop substitution

31. At the farthest conceptual remove from AD as a holistic strategy, AD is merely a new name for crop substitution. Although less frequently seen today than previously, one contemporary example of this use is found in the Lao-American Integrated Rural Development Projects (funded by the US Narcotics Affairs Section in Lao PDR and currently underway). The project lists activities as: 1. Road Construction 2. Demand Reduction, 3. Agriculture and Alternative Development (which in this project is promotion of cattle and pig banks and five high value crops, 4. Public Health 5. Education, Teacher Training and Gender

6. Food For Work.

Finding 2. A drop in illicit crop production is not the only indicator by which success can be measured. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence at the macro level that the rural development components of AD reduced the amount of drug crops cultivated. There is an attribution gap between AD interventions and reduction of illicit crop cultivation at a national level. Agriculture and social interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure exerted by the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where reduction in drug cropping occurs, other factors, including general economic growth, can be identified as alternate explanations for the change or as contributory factors to change. Further, intimidation and coercion by traffickers are another constraint that AD has to deal with.

32. Based on the empirical evidence, we find that the objectives of preventing investment and reinvestment in drug crops have not been met by rural development initiatives. Despite massive expenditures over 30 years, AD interventions have little apparent effect in slowing the movement of drugs from one region to another in response to localized suppression efforts. Where cultivation has been suppressed, often trafficking has increased and traffickers from one country practice their skills across international borders. Without policing, it is widely observed that investment in drug crops increases rapidly in response to demand. Evidence for this finding come from data on drug supplies and demand supplied by UNODC, the government of the United States, and respective national governments. To summarize:

• It is difficult to measure the effect AD interventions have on the total area under cultivation. Far more data is available on the results of forced eradication techniques. Total coca production in the Andean region had been decreasing for three years, until a slight increase in 2004. In Colombia the trend remained downward, whereas in Bolivia and Peru, the area under coca cultivation increased;

• Huge tracts of Colombia have been developed for coca in the past 15 years. Coca leaf production grew from 40,000 hectares in 1990 to about 160,000 hectares in 2000 dropping to about 80,000 hectares in 2004, in response largely to extensive eradication activities. The contribution of AD to this decrease is difficult to measure;

• Opium production in Afghanistan fell to its lowest under the Taliban in 2001.

However, following the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, production increased rapidly despite international intentions to prevent it. Now opium production represents up to 60 per cent of the national economy;

• Poppy production has been steady at low levels in Pakistan for some years but recent reports suggest that production is rising again. Farmers continue to oppose opium eradication and suppression. The Pakistan military and paramilitary use force to suppress opium in some tribal areas, approaching these regions only in armoured vehicles;

• Bolivia's drug control program was helped by a surge in worldwide coffee and cacao prices but farmers are reinvesting in coca as prices for these substitute crops fall.

33. Even on a geographically limited scale, based on aggregate data, UNODC's rural development interventions cannot be proved to have reduced drug cropping. A clear example of this can be found in the Peru Coca Cultivation Survey of 2004, where the amount of area under illicit cultivation in areas where AD projects are present has remained unchanged.

34. There are three main constraints to the analysis:

35. First, an examination of the chronological pattern of drug production taken from official sources such as UNODC's annual drug surveys indicates that drug crop production rose in the 1980s and 1990s in response to improved markets regardless of the presence of rural development projects. From 1995 onward the area under drug crop cultivation (although not necessarily the value of the crops produced) dropped in many places irrespective of the presence of AD projects.

• In Lao PDR poppy cultivation has as dropped rapidly in areas without AD projects as in areas with AD projects. There is little evidence that AD projects have influenced Lao farmers' decisions not to grow drugs, although there is evidence that sites with active or recently active AD projects are better buffered against economic hardship.

• In Peru the area under illicit crops increased by 14 per cent in 2004 according to UNODC"s Peru Coca Cultivation Survey. The same survey shows that in those areas benefiting from AD projects, the area under illicit crops remained stable.

• In China and Viet Nam elimination of poppy followed effective campaigns and eradication programs, not AD interventions. AD was never practiced in China at all.

• In Lao PDR, Pakistan, Viet Nam and Latin America, poorly designed AD projects actually increased drug crop cultivation as farmers sought to participate in development projects aimed at former drug cultivators6.