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Thematic evaluation of UNODC alternative development initiatives

    Executive Summary

    1. Background

    The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) works with the international community and Member States to take action against illicit drug production, trafficking and crime. The United Nations and other international agencies have undertaken various forms of rural development initiatives that aim at reducing and eradicating the production of illicit drug crops for about 30 years. The mandate for UNODC and its predecessor agencies to undertake drug control and especially Alternative Development (AD) is articulated in the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 1998

    Resolution S-20/4 E and United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drug (CND 45/14) documents. A historical analysis of these initiatives shows that the concept of AD has evolved over the last 30 years. UNODC has adopted a project approach as its preferred implementation modality to this day.

    The initial rural development activities designed to curb drug production and promote licit economic activities that involved crop substitution began in the 1970s. This approach was followed in the 1980s by Integrated Rural Development (IRD). IRD attempted to address the broad socio-economic and infrastructural development issues as a basis of creating conditions for licit economic development. This approach was expensive and met with limited success. Alternative Development was then developed and viewed as a unique development approach that addressed problems in drug dependent economies. Today AD has evolved even further and now encompasses sustainable livelihoods.

    UNGASS defines AD as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of crops through rural development measures within the context of sustained national economic growth. The ultimate goal of AD is to help shape a set of conditions which, given sufficient time and growth of the licit economy, could lead to permanent behavioural change in drug producing areas. AD aims at creating conditions for those who give up growing illicit drug crops to participate in licit economic activities and hence permanently give up growing drugs. UNODC"s AD projects have placed more emphasis on measuring the reduction of drug crop acreages than the impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries, although there are exceptions.

    2. Purpose and Objectives

    The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to review Alternative Development strategies in different regions and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC strategy development in this area.

    In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes and sustainability of selected Alternative Development interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices. Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were reviewed.

    3. Methodology

    The Thematic Evaluation used information already available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports, existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of this exercise.

    In addition to document reviews, the evaluation team conducted field visits and interviews with relevant key informants. Field visits (Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) were conducted to collect information to complement and refine information already available, as well as to produce country reports as an input to the final comprehensive report. The major sources of information were semi- structured interviews with different stakeholders, by using open-ended questions.

    The evaluation team consisted of five consultants and two IEU evaluators.

    4. Limitations

    The evaluation faced various limitations. The field visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products. This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately, the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the Evaluation to collect necessary information.

    5. Major Findings

    The key findings of the report are organized in the following three categories: A. Alternative Development as a Discipline

    B. Alternative Development as practiced at UNODC C. External Relations and Synergies

    A. Alternative Development as a Discipline

    Finding 1. There is no universally accepted definition of Alternative Development operating around the world across agencies and writers, despite the UNGASS definition of 19981. At least four views are found: that AD is a multifaceted strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that AD is one leg of a stool along side eradication, interdiction, policing and education, that AD is a series of discrete projects (or pilot projects), and that AD is equivalent to crop substitution. (Pages 5-8)

    Finding 2. A drop in illicit crop production is not the only indicator by which success can be measured. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence at the macro level that the rural development components of AD reduced the amount of drug crops cultivated. There is an attribution gap between AD interventions and reduction of illicit crop cultivation at a national level. Agriculture and social interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure exerted by the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where reduction in drug cropping occurs, other factors, including general economic growth, can be identified as alternate explanations for the change or as contributory factors to change. Further, intimidation and coercion by traffickers are another constraint that AD has to deal with. (Pages 8-10)

    Finding 3. From a technical perspective, the rural development methodologies used in AD projects are not notably different from those employed in other development settings. They need to be informed by good development practices, but must be adapted to local conditions. (Pages 10-11)

    B. Alternative Development as practiced at UNODC

    Finding 4. There is limited information available on the impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries of UNODC AD projects, as opposed to crop reduction data. According to the information available, beneficiary"s livelihoods show an improvement due to AD interventions. (Pages 11-12)

    Finding 5. Eradication is less politically acceptable than AD and there is little evidence that eradication reduces cultivation in the long-term – drug crops move, production technologies evolve, and total production decreases very slowly if at all. (Pages 12-13)

    Finding 6. UNODC has used projects as a modality to implement AD emphasizing the first part of the UNGASS definition: "[…] through specifically designed rural development measures", and less on the second part "[…] in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts". (Page 13)

    Finding 7. UNODC"s AD interventions have played a vital and very positive role in the formulation of drug control policy in many countries. (Pages 13-14)

    Finding 8. Despite some efforts at improvement UNODC working and funding processes hinder efficient implementation of AD activities. (Pages 15-17)

    Finding 9. UNODC is less likely to produce significant impact with AD at the macro level, given the resources it receives for AD. (Pages 17-18)

    Finding 10. UNODC field projects are not designed within realistic budget expectations. Changes from agreed designs, many of which are not accompanied by formal adjustment of indicators, mean that there is no clear way of measuring performance or improving effectiveness. (Pages 18-20)

    C. External Relations and Synergies

    Finding 11. There is a gap between what UNODC is expected to do and what it is enabled to do. National governments, not UNODC, are responsible for developing and implementing national drug control and economic development programs. UNODC has no control over the funds donors will provide. Drug policy planning and administration take place within complex international and national political systems that UNODC can influence but not control. UNODC's role is best described as catalytic. (Pages 20-21)

    Finding 12. UNODC has not used the Office's unique leadership position to its best advantage to mould the diverse views of the donor community into a strategic consensus leading to coherent action on AD. This has negative effects on funding for UNODC AD projects. (Page 21)

    Finding 13. UNODC has not taken full advantage to identify opportunities to partner with other organizations on AD and rural development and in some cases misses opportunities for multiplying the impact of investments. This process should begin at the design stage of project development. (Pages 21-22)

    6. Outcomes

    The report identified several outcomes, including:

    • Some AD interventions, in particular road construction, have proved to have lasting positive impacts in remote rural areas.

    • Several technology introductions accomplished in AD projects, in particular the gabion weir technology2 in Southeast Asia, have proved their worth repeatedly in bringing irrigation water to farmers fields at a very low cost. This is something UNODC AD could have capitalized on and hence created better impacts.

    • The development of marketing skills that is the focus of the many Latin America projects is starting to have a positive impact and this trend is likely to continue into the future. This is an area that UNODC should both monitor and study closely and hence replicate best practices.

    • UNODC has been unable to build a consensus of opinion around AD. The Office needs to invest in building consensus especially among donors. Success will depend on UNODC"s ability to build this consensus and hence mobilize and galvanize donors to provide resources.

    7. Sustainability

    The interventions mentioned above as having had important positive outcomes and impacts can be considered sustainable, in particular road building and gabion weir construction. Some other interventions undertaken in AD projects, however, are unlikely to be sustainable. These include paying teachers' salaries in Lao PDR and non-agricultural careers training in Myanmar. Unless complementary activities to support market system development and trade are undertaken, the sustainability of the market interventions in Latin America will be limited. UNODC should note the successes, but also deal with shortcomings if its AD interventions are to become sustainable.

    • Sustainability of AD will only be achieved if all involved look to development as a long-term endeavour. Donors must realize this and provide UNODC with the necessary support to stay until the work is complete. A drop in illicit crop production is not the only indicator by which success can be measured. Development indicators must be the basis for which to assess impact and sustainability.

    8. Lessons Learned

    Some lessons learned and best practices from this evaluation include:

    • It appears unwise to implement AD projects under a national executing modality where partner organizations lack familiarity and experience with the ambitious and demanding nature of AD approaches, or where qualified local staff is not available or unwilling to work in a remote area. Where strong implementing partners are available, UNODC may take a secondary role;

    • AD activities are found to be effective only when they are culturally appropriate. In Latin America, working with farmer"s organizations is a necessary condition for success. In Asia, adjusting program activities to accommodate ethnic differences is necessary;

    • Knowledge management is key to improving organizational performance and learning;

    • To improve their effectiveness, UNODC AD initiatives must support and strengthen communication and cooperation between organizations and actors in the construction of a better future in drug affected regions;

    • It is seen to be essential that UNODC attract implementation partners as early in the program formulation process as possible. To maximize the attractiveness of cooperation, UNODC will need to advocate interests much wider than drug control;

    • The Kokang and Wa initiative (KOWI) as an innovative partnership mechanism is a model that should be replicated.

    9. Constraints

    Some constraints identified from this evaluation include:

    • Weaknesses in project design and monitoring systems hinder adequate monitoring and evaluation of AD interventions.

    • Inadequate performance monitoring by Headquarters, Field Offices and on-site project staff negatively affects project implementation;

    • AD is not well defined in UNODC and the Office has trouble articulating a strategy and communicating it to donors and partners. There is no framework or common language for AD worldwide;

    • Inadequate resources and a limited capacity at UNODC and an inability of donors to commit funding to long-term projects and skill development;

    10. Recommendations

    The evaluation makes only one recommendation, as all other steps that UNODC can take must follow from it:

    The Executive Committee of UNODC should immediately commission an externally managed, high-level strategic exercise to determine how the Office will continue to address the AD goals as spelled out in its mandate. The participants in this exercise must be willing to challenge every aspect of the Office's rationale to AD, its approach to design and mode of implementation, soliciting and allocating funding, monitoring and evaluation. No question should be taboo, including whether UNODC has the capacity to properly execute its mandate to undertake AD in the UN system. The Executive Committee should then decide upon the course of action to be taken, based upon the recommendations of the review.

    Following the adoption of a comprehensive strategy, UNODC will need to redesign and realign AD operations top-to-bottom within the Office to meet the prerequisites for implementing the chosen strategy. This redesign would include, but not limited to, the Office"s relationships with donors, and to the processes of programme/project design, staffing and implementation.

    A fundamental principle of Results Based Management, "managing available resources to achieve results," must be applied in UNODC. In reality, the results that UNODC promises are not adjusted to match the resources that materialize once projects have begun and therefore UNODC cannot deliver on its promises. In particular the 50 per cent rule and others that result in a misalignment of expectations and budget resources must be reconsidered.

    11. Options for Action

    As a contribution to the high-level review exercises the evaluation team has identified some options that may be considered. The team members of this evaluation are not in agreement on the best course of action for UNODC, with at least one member arguing that UNODC should stop all rural development projects as soon as possible. However, the team believes that it is the responsibility of the Office to formulate its own strategy. The following list of strategic options may not be comprehensive but it outlines the possibilities most clearly seen at this writing.

    A. UNODC continues to directly implement field projects on AD.

    B. UNODC continues to support AD projects but out-sources implementation.

    C. UNODC shifts its focus on AD to research and knowledge management aspects and is established as a Centre of Excellence for AD.

    D. UNODC focuses on promoting policy dialogue while maintaining a repository of knowledge about AD best practices.

    E. UNODC expands AD activities to embrace the wider agenda of the Millennium

    Development Goals to address poverty as a root of crime.

    12. Conclusions

    Alternative Development planning and administration takes place within complex international and national political systems that UNODC can influence but not control. The political debate on AD in the international press and scholarly publications is fierce and some question UNODC"s ability to confidently take on AD as a drug suppression tool.

    UNODC has gained ample experience in AD and should have a comparative advantage over other international actors. Despite this the Office faces a series of challenges.

    The primary problem is that there is no commonly accepted definition of AD in the world community or within UNODC. While UNGASS provides a definition of AD, UNODC still does not have a strategic vision of AD and thus its efforts are fragmented.

    UNODC has not supported its AD effort with adequate programme or technical staff. Staffing at the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit at Headquarters is inadequate to support UNODC"s AD initiatives. UNODC's funding is precarious and complex internal procedures hamper the timely and efficient implementation of projects even further.

    UNODC is at a crossroad regarding its AD initiatives. The challenge before it must be tackled with timely and appropriate decisions.

    1. Introduction

    1.1. Background

    1. The original United Nations drugs agencies, the Division on Narcotic Drugs and the Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board, worked from the 1950s and into the early 1980s on international drug-control treaties and drug-related research. These separate agencies monitored the status of drugs and drug control in Member States and worked on drug treaty issues. In 1970, as worldwide heroin use grew, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was formed to undertake small, grant-funded projects related to demand reduction and anti-trafficking. UNFDAC was restructured and renamed the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1991. In 1997, UNDCP was merged with CICP (the Centre for International Crime Prevention) to form UNODCCP, the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. In 2002, the Office was reorganized and again renamed as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

    2. UNODC works to strengthen international action against drug production, trafficking and crime. UNODC provides statistics on drugs and crime and helps Member States to draft legislation and train judicial officials and carries out research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence-base for policy and operational decisions. It assists Member States in the ratification and implementation of international treaties, development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism, and provides substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies.

    3. UNODC also manages field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. UNODC's mandate to undertake Alternative Development (AD) is spelled out in UNGASS resolution S-20/4 E3, CND 45/144 and other official documents. The Office provides technical advice on Alternative Development to Member States through its Field Offices, Regional Advisers and a Vienna-based AD expert. Between 1979 and 2004, the Office funded more than 120 technical cooperation projects aiming at reducing or eliminating illicit crop cultivation.

    4. Modern drug control agendas focus on demand reduction, that is, suppressing the use of a substance and thus reducing the size of the market, and supply reduction, suppressing the cultivation or production of a substance and thus its availability in the marketplace. Interdiction and policing are activities that use the law and law enforcement to prevent the spread of drugs and drug precursor chemicals from place to place. Public education about drugs warns people of the physical, legal and economic consequences of growing, trafficking and using drugs.

    5. Permanent change in farmer behaviour so as to prevent the planting of drug crops requires the following: 1. Reducing the coercive power of the drug industry and 2. Improving economies so as to assure adequate and stable income from licit activities. It is important to note that farmers will stop drug cropping even if it means a modest drop in income, provided other social and economic supports are in place. It is also important to note that farmers will not abandon the illicit economy, even for profitable alternatives, if they are threatened by dangerous criminals. Business stability is the base for a licit economy and requires a legal and juridical system that sustains the business community and markets. The development of a licit economy requires a stable society where people are assured of their rights and in which behavioural norms casting drugs in a bad light can develop. Unfortunately, the practice of AD in the past 30 years has paid little attention to the systemic causes of drug cultivation and instead has focused (at times exclusively) on providing assistance to small groups of farmers in remote locations.

    6. UNODC"s AD outcome indicators have, historically, put more emphasis on the reduction of illicit crop production acreage and less on measuring the change in beneficiary"s livelihoods. There is evidence that this has begun to change in the past few years.

    7. In the course of 30 years, strategic thinking behind Alternative Development has evolved as various approaches to supply reduction have been tested. At the beginning of the 1970s the international community supported crop substitution projects, first in Thailand and later Pakistan. The idea of these projects was to replace narcotic crops with other, legal crops. After many failures it became clear that the economics of crop substitution required massive and long-term subsidization of non-drug crops (e.g. Thailand). Additional development measures are necessary to tackle not only crop production, marketing and transport problems, but also the underlying economic, ecological and social problems that support an illicit economy and cause farmers to engage in illicit drug crops.

    8. An integrated rural development (IRD) approach against drugs was adopted in the 1980s. IRD attacked a broad range of social problems simultaneously yet still focused almost exclusively on problems at the local level. Their long-term impacts were uneven, with some interventions being more effective than others in particular circumstances. IRD projects in the 1980s, whether for drug control or with other goals, were so complex that they were management nightmares and impossible to evaluate. They were also expensive, generally requiring large international staffs and a large complement of local counterparts. IRD projects in remote drug producing regions remained particularly difficult because, despite expensive infrastructure improvements, unfavourable market conditions persisted.

    9. In mainstream development, and to some extent in AD (as will be discussed in detail later), a more cost-cognizant approach to development emerged. Today, good development practice dictates that a holistic view of the situation be refined into a progressively more focused consideration of the situation in order to choose the best among many possible interventions to use limited project funding and available skills in the most effective way to achieve a set of narrowly specified results. UNODC has, on paper at least, embraced this notion for its AD interventions but the practice of AD, particularly in Asia, has not moved far from the earlier IRD approach for reasons that will be discussed later in this report.

    1.2. Purpose of the Evaluation

    10. The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to review Alternative Development strategies in different regions and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC strategy development in this area.

    11. In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes and sustainability of selected Alternative Development interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices. Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were reviewed.

    1.3. Scope of the Evaluation

    12. This Thematic Evaluation of UNODC's Alternative Development Initiatives has reviewed the results of AD activities implemented by UNODC in Asia and Latin America regions and in seven countries to determine if a common understanding of AD exists within UNODC, and to assess the overall appropriateness of AD as a development and drug control strategy. In addition, the evaluation exercise looked at the outcomes and sustainability of selected AD interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices.

    13. The evaluation examined various factors such as:

    A. Alternative Development Strategy

    i. What is AD and what does AD mean in UNODC;

    ii. The role of AD at UNODC and how it has been implemented.

    B. Role of UNODC

    i. The organizational structure of UNODC and its appropriateness for the task;

    ii. The adequacy and appropriateness of needs assessment and selection of project sites;

    iii. Organization and management of backstopping, monitoring and evaluation.

    C. External Relations and Synergies

    i. The most effective use of financial resources for AD, particularly in relation to other actors, donor agencies and their funding strategies;

    ii. Public relations with donors, recipient countries and the general public;

    iii. Linkages with other institutions working in related fields;

    iv. Evolution of Alternative Development strategy and the way forward.

    1.4. Evaluation Methodology

    14. The team for this worldwide Thematic Evaluation was comprised of five independent consultants. The UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit oversaw the implementation of the activity and staff from the Unit participated in the evaluation of Peru, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Over the course of about 6 months, the evaluation team reviewed relevant documents and conducted field visits in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Pakistan. Team members visited national capitals and project sites and conducted interviews with project beneficiaries, implementers, project partners and donors, using open- ended questions. The Thematic Evaluation used information already available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports, existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of this exercise.

    15. The evaluation team conducted formal project evaluations in Viet Nam, Lao and Myanmar to assess design, implementation and outcomes. The team members reviewed reference documents on Thailand and Afghanistan

    16. The final report was developed as follows:

    Base: Regional meetings were held in two locations, Bangkok (Asia team members) and in Lima (Latin American team). Documents were collected, distributed and read by the team members in both regions followed by discussions via Internet. Evaluation instruments were developed.

    Country level: A total of seven countries were reviewed for the present evaluation. In three countries, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, formal project evaluations were conducted. For each of the seven countries reviewed, a country report was produced as an input to the final report.

    Regional level: Two regional level reports were prepared, one for Latin America and one for South East Asia.

    Global level: The final global evaluation report was produced based on consultations between Latin America and Asia teams, country reports, and regional reports produced as part of the exercise.

    1.5. Limitations

    17. The evaluation faced various limitations. The field visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products. This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately, the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the Evaluation to collect necessary information.

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