Section 14.2 begins by setting out the basic theory of externalities as this applies to climate change. Based on this, Section 14.3 sets out two overarching principles for reducing GHG emissions efficiently. First, abatement should occur just up to the point where the costs of going any further would outweigh the extra benefits. Second, a common price signal is needed across countries and sectors to ensure that emission reductions are delivered in the most cost-effective way.
Section 14.4 explores the policy implications of the significant risks and uncertainties surrounding both the impacts of climate change, and the costs of abatement. It concludes that a long-term quantity ceiling – or stabilisation target – should be used to limit the total stock of GHGs in the atmosphere. In the short term, to keep down the costs of mitigation, the amount of abatement should be driven by a common price signal across countries and sectors, and there should be flexibility in how, where and when reductions are made. Over time, the price signal should trend upwards, as the social cost of carbon is likely to increase as concentrations rise towards the long-term stabilisation goal.
These sections conclude that both taxes and tradable quotas have the potential to deliver emission reductions efficiently. The other key dimensions of climate change policy – tackling market failures that limit the development low carbon technologies, and removing barriers to behavioural change are discussed in Chapter 16 and Chapter 17 respectively.
The penultimate section of the chapter considers the public-finance aspects of taxes and tradable quotas. Finally, Section 14.8 briefly considers the international dimension of carbon- pricing policy. These international issues are treated in greater depth in Part VI of this Review – in particular, the challenge of how national action can be co-ordinated and linked at the international level to support the achievement of a long-run stabilisation goal is considered in Chapter 22.
14.2 Designing policy to reduce the impact of the greenhouse-gas externality As described in Chapter 2, the climate change problem is an international and intergenerational issue.
Climate change is a far more complicated negative externality than, for example, pollution (such as smog) or congestion (such as traffic jams). Key features of the greenhouse-gas externality are:
• it is a global externality, as the damage from emissions is broadly the same regardless of where they are emitted, but the impacts are likely to fall very unevenly around the world; • its impacts are not immediately tangible, but are likely to be felt some way into the future. There are significant differences in the short-run and long-run implications of greenhouse-gas emissions. It is the stock of carbon in the atmosphere that drives climate change, rather than the annual flow of emissions. Once released, carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for up to 100 years; • there is uncertainty around the scale and timing of the impacts and about when irreversible damage from emission concentrations will occur; • the effects are potentially on a massive scale.
These characteristics have implications for the most appropriate policy response to climate change. In the standard theory of externalities1, there are four ways in which negative externalities can be approached:
• a tax can be introduced so that emitters face the full social cost of their emissions2 ie. a carbon price can be established that reflects the damage caused by emissions; • quantity restrictions can limit the volume of emissions, using a "command and control" approach; • a full set of property rights can be allocated among those causing the externality and / or those affected (in this case including future generations), which can underpin bargaining or trading3; • a single organisation can be created which brings those causing the externality together with all those affected4.
In practice, cap-and-trade systems tend to combine aspects of the second and third approach above. They control the overall quantity of emissions, by establishing binding emissions commitments. Within this quantity ceiling, entities covered by the scheme – such as firms, countries or individuals – are then free to choose how best – and where – to deliver emission reductions within the scheme. The largest example of a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG emissions is the EU"s Emissions Trading Scheme, and there are a range of other national or regional emissions trading schemes, including the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Chicago Climate Exchange.
The Kyoto Protocol established intergovernmental emissions trading for those countries that took quantified commitments to reduce GHG emissions, as well as other mechanisms to increase the flexibility of trading across all Parties to the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol and its flexible mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapter 22.
Whatever approach is taken, the key aim of climate-change policy should be to ensure that those generating GHGs, wherever they may be, face a marginal cost of emissions that reflects the damage they cause. This encourages emitters to invest in alternative, low-carbon technologies, and consumers of GHG-intensive goods and services to change their spending patterns in response to the increase in relative prices.
14.3 Delivering carbon reductions efficiently Where markets are well functioning, two conditions must hold to reduce GHG emissions efficiently5:
• Abatement should take place up to the point where the benefits of further emission reductions are just balanced by the costs. Or – put another way – abatement should occur up to the point where the marginal social cost of carbon is equal to the marginal cost of abatement. This is a necessary condition for choosing the appropriate level of emissions, and hence setting a long-term stabilisation target (and is explained fully in Chapter 13).
• To deliver reductions at least cost, a common price signal is required across countries and different sectors of their economies at a given point in time. For example, if the marginal cost of reduction is lower in country A than in country B, then abatement costs could be reduced by doing a little more reduction in country A, and a little less in country B.
In ideal conditions – perfectly competitive markets, perfect information and certainty, and no transaction costs – both taxes and quantity controls, if correctly designed, can meet these criteria, and be used to establish a common price signal across countries and sectors. Taxes can set the global price of greenhouse gases, and emitters can then choose how much to emit. Alternatively, a total quota (or ceiling) for global emissions can be set and tradable quotas can then determine market prices.6
Without market imperfections and uncertainty, and with an appropriate specification of taxes and quotas (entailing an allocation of property rights), both approaches would produce the same price level and quantity of emissions7. The remainder of this chapter, and Chapter 15, consider how the considerable uncertainties and imperfections that exist in the real world affect the choice and design of policy.
14.4 Efficiency under uncertainty – the implications for climate-change policy Substantial uncertainty exists around the timing and scale of impacts, as well as the costs of abatement. In such circumstances, prices and quantity controls are no longer equivalent and policy instruments will need to be chosen with care to reduce GHG emissions efficiently.
Weitzman (1974) examined how price (here tax) and quota or quantity-control instruments compare where there is uncertainty about the costs and benefits of action, and how this affects the comparative efficiency of the two instruments8. A price instrument sets a price for a required service or good and lets markets determine its supply. In contrast, a quota instrument specifies a particular level of supply. Applying the Weitzman analysis to pollution:
• Prices are preferable where the benefits of making further reductions in pollution change less with the level of pollution than do the costs of delivering these reductions i.e. when the marginal damage curve – or the marginal social cost of carbon – is relatively flat, compared with the marginal abatement cost curve, as pollution rises.
• Quantity controls are preferable where the benefits of further reductions increase more with the level of pollution than do the costs of delivering these reductions i.e. there are potentially large and sharply rising costs associated with exceeding a given level of pollution.
Box 14.1 sets out these economic arguments in detail9.
Box 14.1 Prices versus quantities in the short term and long term.
Figure (A) illustrates how Weitzman"s analysis is applied in the climate-change case. If the emissions reductions are measured over a short period, say a year, the expected marginal benefits of abatement are flat or gently decreasing as the quantity of emission reduction increases (from left to right). This reflects the fact that variations in emissions in any single year are unlikely to have a significant effect on the ultimate stock of greenhouse gases. The expected marginal costs of abatement (MACE), however, are steeply increasing as abatement activity intensifies; firms find it progressively more difficult to reduce emissions, unless they can adjust their capital stock and choice of technology (assumed by definition to be impossible in the short term).
If it were known with certainty that the marginal costs of abatement were given by the schedule MACE, the policy-maker should set the rate of the emission tax to equal TE, given by the intersection of the schedule with the marginal benefits of abatement, also assumed to be known. The optimal quantity of emission quotas or allowances allocated (QE) would also be given by this intersection, giving rise to an equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive allowance market of PE. The choice of quota or tax would not matter in this case.
However, following the exposition in Hepburn (2006), suppose that the real marginal costs of abatement in the period are not known with certainty in advance and turn out to be higher at every point, as represented by the curve MACREAL, and that the policy-maker cannot adjust the policy instrument in anticipation. In this case, the optimal quantity of allowances to be allocated would in fact turn out to have been QREAL. In Figure 14.1, the efficiency loss caused by issuing QE instead of QREAL allowances is given by the large blue triangle. If instead a tax had been set at TE, the efficiency loss resulting from having set a slightly lower tax rate than turns out to have been warranted is given by the small red triangle. Thus it is often argued that a tax is superior to a quota as an instrument of climate-change policy10 in the short run. As Chapter 2 explains, however, diagrams like that in Figure (A) need to be interpreted with great care, as the positions of both the curves may depend on policy settings in earlier and later periods.
(A) The efficiency of taxes and tradable allowances in climate-change mitigation in the short term.
Figure (B) illustrates the situation in the long term, with the cumulative emissions reductions required to reach the ultimate stabilisation target on the x-axis now, instead of annual emissions reductions as in Figure (A). The curve representing the marginal benefits of abatement is steeply decreasing, as more and more abatement effort is put in (put another way, the costs of the impacts of climate change increase steeply as cumulative emissions increase). But the marginal costs of abatement are only gently increasing as a function of abatement effort, since in the long run there is more flexibility. In the certainty case with MACE as the true cost of abatement curve, QE is the appropriate cumulative quota, while TE
is the equivalent tax11. But if MACE represents the expected costs of abatement and MACREAL the higher ex post actual costs, the efficiency loss implied by setting the tax at TE
(the blue triangle) is now much larger than that implied by setting the quantity of tradable allowances at QE. Of course, if the policy-maker is able to revise the tax or quota schedule as information comes in about the marginal abatement costs function, s/he can do better than keeping either schedule fixed.
(B) The efficiency of taxes and tradable allowances in climate-change mitigation in the long term.
This contrast between short-term and long-term marginal cost and marginal benefit curves gives rise to the problem of how to combine a tax-like regime in the short term with a quantitative constraint in the long term. A rule is needed for updating the tax in the light of new information about costs over the long term and the ex post quantity of emissions.
In the case of climate change, these arguments indicate that the most efficient instrument – over a particular time horizon – will depend on:
• how the total costs of abatement change with the level of emissions; • how the total benefits of abatement change with the level of emissions; • the degree of uncertainty about both costs and benefits of abatement.
Chapter 8 explains that it is the total stock of GHGs in the atmosphere that drives the damage from climate change. In economic terms, this means that the marginal damage associated with emitting one more unit of carbon is likely to be more or less constant over short periods of time. Thus, in the short-term, the marginal damage curve is likely to be fairly flat. But over the long term, as the stock of GHGs grows, marginal damages are likely to rise and – as the stock reaches critical levels – marginal damages may rise sharply. In other words, the damage function is likely to be strongly convex (as discussed in Part Two and Chapter 13)12.
On the other side of the equation, many uncertainties remain about the marginal costs of abatement. Many new technologies that could be used to reduce carbon emissions are not yet in widespread use. Trying to abate rapidly in the short term – when the capital in industries emitting greenhouse gases is fixed and technologies are given – can quickly become costly for firms, as the marginal cost of abatement is likely to rise sharply13. In particular, if the costs of abatement prove to be unexpectedly high, then setting a fixed quantity target in the short term could prove unexpectedly costly. Over the long term – as the capital stock is replaced and new lower-carbon technologies become available – the marginal costs of abating in the long term are likely to be broadly flat, or, put another way, bounded relative to incomes. The implications are explained more fully in Box 14.1.
These characteristics of the costs and benefits of abatement and damage from emissions suggest three things:
• Policy instruments should distinguish between the short term and long term, ensuring that short-term policy outcomes are consistent with achieving long-term goals14; • The policy-maker should have a clear long-term goal for stabilising concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This reflects, first, the likelihood that marginal damages (relative to incomes) will accelerate as cumulative emissions rise and, second, that the marginal costs of abatement (relative to incomes) are likely to be relatively flat in the long term once new technologies are available.
• In the short term, the policy-maker will want to choose a flexible approach15 to achieving this long-term goal, reflecting the likelihood that marginal damages will be more or less constant, and there will be risks of sharply rising costs from forcing abatement too rapidly.
In practical terms, this means that a long-term stabilisation target should be used to establish a quantity ceiling to limit the total stock of carbon over time. Short-term policies (based on tax, trading or in some circumstances regulation) will then need to be consistent with this long- term stabilisation goal. In the short term, the amount of abatement should be driven by a common price signal across countries and sectors, and should not be rigidly fixed16.
This common price signal could – in principle – be delivered through taxation or tradable quotas. A country can levy taxes without consultation with another, but harmonisation requires agreement. In practice, therefore, it may prove difficult to use taxes to deliver a common price signal in the absence of political commitment to move towards a harmonised carbon tax across different countries. In contrast, to the extent that a tradable quota scheme embraces both different countries and sectors, it may be an effective way of delivering a consistent price signal across a wide area – though this, of course, requires agreement on the mechanics of the scheme. International co-ordination issues are fully discussed in Chapter 22 – here it is sufficient to note that building consensus on the best way forward will be critical to achieving a long-run stabilisation goal.
14.5 Setting short term policies to meet the long term goal The key question that arises from the previous section is how to combine a price instrument that allows flexibility about where, when and what emissions are reduced in the short term, with a long-term quantity constraint. In particular, the challenge is how to ensure that the short-term policy framework remains on track to deliver the long- term stabilisation goal.
There are two important aspects to this:
• having established the long-term stabilisation goal, the price of carbon is likely to rise over time, because the damage caused by further emissions at the margin-the social cost of carbon- is likely to increase as concentrations rise towards this agreed long- term quantity constraint; • short-term tax or trading policies will then need to be consistent with delivering this long-term quantitative goal.
In the short-term, applying these principles to tax and trading, this means that:
• In a tax-based regime, the tax should be set to reflect the marginal damage caused by emissions. Abatement should then occur up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement is equal to this tax. See Box 14.2.
• In a tradable-quota scheme, the parameters of the scheme – notably the total quota allocation – should be set with a view to generating a market price that is consistent with the social cost of carbon (SCC). In practice – and within the time period between allocations in a tradable-quota system – the market price may be higher or lower than the SCC. This is because the actual market price will reflect both the quota-driven demand for carbon reductions and the marginal cost of delivering reductions in the most cost-effective location. Ex-post, the trading period will therefore deliver abatement up to where the marginal abatement cost equals the actual market price.
In the case of either tax or trading, clear revision rules are therefore necessary to ensure that short-term policies remain on track to meet the long-term stabilisation goal. In particular, the short-term policy framework should be able to take systematic account of the latest scientific information on climate change, as well as improved understanding of abatement costs.
The framework within which any principles for revisions apply must be clear, credible, predictable and set over long time horizons, say 20 years, with regular points, say every five years, to review new evidence, analysis and information17. Chapter 22 discusses the challenge of achieving this at an international level.
Box 14.2: The social cost of carbon and the carbon price
Up to the long-term stabilisation goal, the social cost of carbon will rise over time, because marginal damage costs also rise. This is because atmospheric concentrations are expected to rise, so that temperatures are likely to rise; marginal damage costs are expected to rise with temperature. These effects are assumed to outweigh the declining marginal impact of the stock of gases on global temperature at higher temperatures.
As GHG concentrations move towards the stabilisation goal, the price of carbon should reflect the social cost of carbon. In any given year, abatement should then occur up to where the marginal cost is equal to this price, as set out in the right-hand part of the diagram above. If, over time, technical progress reduces the marginal cost of abatement, then at any given price level there should be more emission reductions.
Revision rules for climate-change policies can be compared to setting interest rates within a well-specified inflation-targeting regime18. The stabilisation target is analogous to the inflation target. In the UK, the Monetary Policy Committee each month sets a short-term policy instrument, the interest rate on central-bank money, until their next meeting, in order to keep inflation on track to hit its target. The analogy with climate-change policy would be the setting of a tax rate or an emissions trading quota for, say, a five year period, with firms and households making their own decisions about emissions reductions subject to that carbon- price path and their expectations about policy-makers" commitment to the long-term stabilisation goal.
The analogy is not, however, exact. First, there is widespread agreement about the appropriate long-term goal for monetary policy – price stability, which corresponds to a small positive measured inflation rate. In the climate-change case, there is not yet agreement about the stabilisation level at which that stability should be achieved. Second, the stabilisation objective is likely to have to be revised intermittently – possibly by a large amount – to reflect improved scientific and economic understanding of the climate-change problem, whereas the definition of price stability in terms of a specific inflation measure is less problematic. And third, the locus of decision-making in monetary policy clearly lies with the monetary authority of the country for which the inflation rate is measured, whereas climate change requires international collective action.
Nevertheless, the comparison with an inflation-targeting regime draws attention to the importance of building the credibility of policy-makers. This requires clarity about the ultimate objective of policy and giving policy-makers control over an instrument that can change private-sector behaviour. It also means announcing the principles governing changes in the policy instrument in advance, giving policy-makers incentives to keep aiming at the ultimate target, and holding policy-makers accountable for their actions.
14.6 The interaction between carbon pricing and fossil fuel markets Imperfections in the markets for exhaustible resources and energy could have important interactions with carbon-pricing policy that should also be considered.
Carbon emissions come from energy production and use across various sectors (see Chapter 7). Much of this energy is generated using exhaustible resources such as oil. In the face of climate change policy, the owners of the natural resource may be willing to reduce producer prices substantially in order to sell off the commodity before it becomes obsolete or of a much lower value. Thus any carbon-pricing policy would need to be carefully designed to ensure it does not accelerate the pace with which carbon-intensive exhaustible resources are used up. The policy implications of this – as well as market imperfections more generally – are explored in Box 14.3.
Box 14.3 Efficiency market structure and exhaustible resources Energy and related markets have pervasive market imperfections that will affect the efficiency of a given policy instrument19. For example, the collusive behaviour of the OPEC cartel can make it difficult to predict what the final impact on market prices will be from either a tax or a quota-driven carbon price. Thus, on the one hand, OPEC might respond to a carbon tax by further restricting supply, pushing up producer prices and retaining most of their rents. On the other hand, they may choose to retain market share and extract a lower rent20 with little change in carbon emissions21.
Where the input prices concerned relate to fossil fuels, the policy must also take account of the fact that such fuels are exhaustible natural resources. Prices to consumers will reflect both the marginal costs of extraction and a scarcity rent (which reflects the stock of the natural resource relative to the expected demand schedule over time). In these circumstances, attempts to reduce carbon emissions through tax measures (imposing the social cost on polluters) may simply lead to a fall in producer prices, with little change in consumption and therefore carbon emissions. In some models, the incidence of the tax would fall wholly on the resource owner"s rent. For the same reason, the introduction of new renewable-energy technologies may simply accelerate the use of carbon-intensive energy sources22 – as the owners of the natural resource try to sell them off before they become obsolete or fall sharply in value. In these circumstances – for some market structures, and in the absence of carbon capture and storage – optimal tax theory can suggest that a declining ad valorem23 tax rate over time may eventually be desirable, to delay fossil-fuel consumption and push back in time the impacts of climate change24. In this case, the tax rate through time reflects more than the social cost of carbon, as it is also takes account of these other market dynamics. The key point here is that there are many complexities that should be considered.25
Under a tradable quota system, the price associated with an emissions quota may be much higher than expected if exhaustible-resource pricing is ignored. In effect, rent may be transferred from the owners of fossil fuels to the owners of the allowances (or issuers, if allowances are auctioned). More generally, if trading creates rents, it may undermine the acceptability of policy and lead to gaming, wasted resources in rent-seeking, and possibly corruption. Where incumbent firms enjoy rents, they may also discourage competition and new entry.
14.7 Public finance issues Both taxes and tradable quotas can be used to raise public funds. Carbon taxes automatically raise public revenues, but tradable-quota systems only have the potential to raise public revenue if firms have to purchase the quotas from government through a sale or auction.
Carbon taxes automatically transfer funds from emitting industries to the public revenue. This transfer may be used to:
• enhance the revenue base26; • limit the overall tax burden on the industry affected through revenue recycling27; • reduce taxes elsewhere in the economy; Revenue recycling to the industry can encourage emitters to reduce GHG emissions, without increasing their overall tax burden relative to other parts of the economy28. The advantage of this approach is that it can ease the initial impact of the scheme for those industries facing the greatest increase in costs, and therefore ease the transition where carbon taxes are introduced. As the introduction of carbon pricing through taxation is a change to the rules of the game (which will affect shareholders in the short run), there is a case for some transitional arrangements. Over time, however, recycling may discourage or slow the necessary exit of firms from the polluting sectors. Monitoring and protecting the position of incumbents in this way could also reduce competition.
Alternatively, revenue from carbon taxes can be used to reduce taxes elsewhere in the economy. In such circumstances, the revenue from the carbon tax is sometimes argued to generate a so-called "double dividend" by allowing other distortionary taxes to be reduced.
But this argument needs some care. There is no doubt that environmental taxes have the special virtue of reducing "public bads", at the same time as they generate revenue. Reducing the "bad" is indeed central to any assessment of this type of tax. But arguments invoking the so-called "double dividend" as sometimes advanced in general terms (i.e. that there is always a double dividend), can be incorrect. Putting the reduced public bad to one side for a moment, there is a "dead-weight" loss to the economy from raising any tax on the margin. Whether it is greater or less with goods associated with carbon (compared with other goods or services) is unclear and depends on the circumstances. For example, where energy is subsidised, reducing the subsidy (equivalent to raising the tax) will probably be a gain in terms of reducing deadweight losses. Note, however, that where other taxes have been optimally set – and abstracting from the externality – then the deadweight loss on the margin from increasing any one tax will be exactly the same as the loss on another and there will clearly be no "double dividend" in this context.
This is not an argument against raising revenue through pricing GHG emissions. On the contrary: there are strong benefits from ensuring that GHG emissions are properly priced to reflect the damage they cause. Thus GHG taxes have the clear additional benefit relative to other ways of raising revenue of reducing a "bad". Where that benefit has not been adequately recognised, they will be underused relative to other forms of taxation.
In contrast, a quota-based system will not automatically raise revenue unless firms must initially purchase some or all quotas from the government in either an auction or a direct sale. In contrast, if quotas are allocated for free, then the asset is passed to the private sector and the benefits ultimately accrue to the owners and shareholders of the firms involved29. In the short term, there may be reasons for introducing auctioning slowly – to ease the transition to a new policy environment. Equally, finance ministries will want to ensure that the overall tax revenue base is reliable and predictable: revenues from auctioning may be less predictable than those from taxation. In the long term, however, there is little economic justification for such transfers from the public sector to individual firms and their shareholders30.
Free allocation of quotas to business also has a number of other potential drawbacks. These are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, which focuses on practical issues associated with the implementation of tax and trading schemes.
In summary, a tax-based approach will automatically generate public revenues, whereas a tradable-quota approach will only generate revenues if quotas are sold. Requiring firms to pay for the right to pollute is consistent with a move to raise revenue via the taxation of "bads" rather than "goods"31. In the case of climate change, where understanding of the potential damage caused by emissions continues to improve, there is a strong argument for shifting the balance of taxation. In the case of tradable quotas, there are good economic reasons for moving towards greater use of auctioning over time, though the transition will need to be carefully managed – in particular, to ensure a robust revenue base.
14.8 Co-ordinating action across countries The mitigation of climate change requires co-ordinated action across different countries. In thinking about the differences between tax and tradable quotas, it is therefore important to recognise the different implications they have for market-driven financial flows between countries.
Chapter 22 will explore the challenges in building up broadly similar price signals for carbon around the world. Issues of equity – as discussed in Chapter 2 – are likely to be central to creating frameworks that support this goal. It is therefore important to consider how taxes and tradable quota systems may differ in the relative ease with which they can drive financial flows between countries.
In theory, either a tax or a tradable quota system could drive financial flows from the developed to developing countries. Under a tax-based system, revenues raised will in the first instance flow to national governments. An additional mechanism would need to be put in place to transfer resources to developing countries.
Under a tradable-quota system, there are a number of ways that governments in rich countries can drive flows, either through direct purchase of quotas allocated to developing countries or through the creation of company-level trading where companies have access to credits for emissions reductions created in developing countries. In this case, financial flows between sectors and/or countries can occur automatically as carbon emitters search for the most cost-effective way of reducing emissions. The opportunities and challenges in these areas are discussed in detail in Chapters 22 and 23.
In summary, financial flows from developed to developing countries can occur under either a tax or tradable-quota system. However, market-driven financial flows will only occur automatically under the latter route, and only at sufficient scale if national quotas are set appropriately.
14.9 The performance of taxation and trading against principles of efficiency, equity and public finance considerations In terms of the criteria discussed above – efficiency, equity and public finance – carbon taxes perform well against the efficiency and public finance criteria, as they:
• can contribute to establishing a consistent price signal across regions and sectors.
However, this may prove difficult if a country perceives that it is acting in isolation, and – as discussed in chapter 22 – there are many reasons why achieving a common price signal through harmonising taxes across countries is likely to be difficult to achieve; • raise public revenues; • can be kept stable, and thus do not risk fluctuations in the marginal costs that could increase the total costs of mitigation policy.
However, • they do not automatically generate financial flows to developing countries in search of the most efficient carbon reductions.
In terms of the criteria discussed above – efficiency, equity and the impact on public finances – the strengths of a tradable quota scheme are:
• to the extent that the scheme embraces different sectors and countries, it will establish a common price signal and therefore have the potential to drive carbon reductions efficiently; • to the extent that inter-country trading is allowed, it will ensure carbon reductions are made in the most cost-effective location, and automatically drive private-sector financial flows between regions; • if allowances are sold or auctioned, then the scheme also has the potential to generate public revenues.
Some countries may make substantial use of tax measures to reduce GHG emissions. Others may place greater emphasis on participation in emissions trading schemes or, indeed, regulation. Some countries may choose a mix of all three depending on the sector, other policies, market structures, and political and constitutional opportunities and constraints.
The effectiveness of any tax or emissions trading scheme depends on its credibility and on good design. Investors need a credible and predictable policy framework on which to base their investment decisions; and good design is important to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. This is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Carbon-pricing policy is only one element of a policy response to climate change. There are a range of other market failures and barriers to action which must be tackled. For this reason, carbon pricing policy should sit alongside technology policies, and policies to remove the behavioural barriers to action. These two further objectives are discussed in Chapter 16 and Chapter 17 respectively.
14.10 Conclusion – building policies for the future A shared understanding of the long-term goals for stabilisation is a crucial guide to climate change policy-making: it narrows down strongly the range of acceptable emissions paths, and establishes a long-term goal for policy. But, from year to year, flexibility in when, where and how reductions are made will reduce the costs of meeting these goals. Policies should adapt to changing circumstances as the costs and benefits of climate change become clearer over time. This means that short-term policy may be revised periodically to take account of information, as and when it comes, so as to keep on track towards meeting a long-term goal.
This need for both a long-term goal, and consistent short-term policy to meet this, should guide action at the international and national level to price carbon.
At the international level, this means that the key policy objectives for tackling climate change should include:
• Choosing a policy regime that:
i. in the long term, will stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and establish a long-term quantity goal to limit the risk of catastrophic damage; ii. in the short term, uses a price signal (tax or trading) to drive emission reductions, thus avoiding unexpectedly high abatement costs by setting short-term quantity constraints that are too rigid.
• Establishing a consistent price signal across countries and sectors to reduce GHG emissions. This price signal should reflect the damage caused by carbon emissions.
In theory, either taxes or tradable quotas – and in specific circumstances regulation – can play a role in establishing a common price signal. Chapter 22 discusses the potential difficulties of co-ordinating national policies to achieve this.
Both taxes and tradable quotas can contribute to raising public revenues. Under a tradable quota scheme, this depends on using a degree of auctioning and, over time, there are sound economic reasons for doing so. However, this would need to be well managed, understanding fully the implications for governments" revenue flows, and ensuring that these remain predictable and reliable.
Taxes and tradable quotas can both support the financing of carbon reductions across different countries. However, only a tradable-quota system will do this automatically, provided there is an appropriate initial distribution of quotas and structure of rules.
At the national – or regional level – governments will want to tailor a package of measures that suits their specific circumstances, including the existing tax and governance system, participation in regional initiatives to reduce emissions (eg. via trading schemes), and the structure of the economy and characteristics of specific sectors.
Some may choose to focus on regional trading initiatives, others on taxation and others may make greater use of regulation. The factors influencing this choice are discussed in the following chapter.
References Useful background reading that summarises the debate on the use of price or quantity instruments are included in the list below. The seminal article by Weitzman (1974) is a technical exposition of the arguments. Pizer (2002) is good outline of the debate in terms of international climate change policy. Hepburn (2006) outlines a clear application of the Weitzman analysis to climate change policy, including the trade-off between credible commitments and flexibility.
Blyth, W. & K. Hamilton (2006): "Aligning Climate and Energy Policy: Creating incentives to invest in low carbon technologies in the context of linked markets for fossil fuel, electricity and carbon", Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 21 2006, London Coase, R.H. (1960): "The problem of social cost", Journal of Law & Economics, 3 (1): 1-44 Dasgupta, P. and G. Heal (1979): "Economic theory and exhaustible resources", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Helm, D., Hepburn, C., and Mash, R. (2005), "Credible carbon policy", in Helm, D. (ed), Climate Change policy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, chapter 14.
(Also available as Helm, D., Hepburn, C., & Mash, R. (2003), "Credible carbon policy", Oxford Review of Economic Policy).
Hepburn, C. (2006): 'Regulating by prices, quantities or both: an update and an overview', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2): 226-247 Hotelling, H (1931): "The economics of exhaustible resources", Journal of Political Economy, 39: 137-175 Lydon, P., (2002): 'Greenhouse warming and efficient climate protection policy, with discussion of regulation by ''price'' or by ''quantity'', Working Paper 2002-5, Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies.
Meade, J.E. (1951): 'External economies and diseconomies in a competitive situation", Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 245, 54-67 Newberry, D. (2005): "Why tax energy? Towards a more rational policy", Energy Journal, 26(3): 1-40 Newell, R., Pizer, W. and Zhang, J (2005): "Managing permit markets to stabilise prices", Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics, 31(2): 133-157 Pigou, A.C. (1920): "The economics of welfare", Macmillan, London.
Pizer, W.A (2002): "Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change", Journal of Public Economics, 85: 409- 534 Sinclair, P.J.N (1994): "On the optimum trend of fossil fuel taxation", Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 869-877 Ulph, A and Ulph, D (1994): "The optimal time path of a carbon tax", Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 857-868 Weitzman, M.L (1974): " Prices versus quantities", Review of Economic Studies, 41 (4):477- 491 NOTAS:
1 Developed mainly in the first half of the last century.
2 Pigou (1920) showed how taxes can establish a marginal cost to polluters equal to the marginal damage caused by their pollution.
3 Coase (1960)
4 Meade (1951). This is not discussed further, as it is clearly not a practical option in relation to climate change.
5 These conditions abstract from uncertainty and market imperfections.
6 Continuous trading is necessary to ensure a common price between auctions/ allocations.
7 But it is worth noting that even if these ideal conditions were to hold, the nature of the climate-change problem means there are limitations to the applicability of some of the policy options set out above. In particular, a full set of property rights cannot be allocated, because many of those affected by the impacts of climate change are yet to be born. It is not possible for them to bargain with the current emitters for the impacts that they will have to endure.
8 Weitzman (1974)
9 This box draws on the exposition in Hepburn (2006).
10 The direct allocation of non-tradable allowances requires information about relative costs across firms, as well as total costs, and so is likely to be even less efficient, given the uncertainties in the real world, than promoting perfect competition in the market for allowances.
11 Strictly, there is an intertemporal tax schedule that generates cumulative emissions reductions Q E 12 To the extent that damages may relate to the rate of climate change, the relationship is more complex, but it remains true that the damage curve is likely to respond most to cumulative emissions over several years or even decades.
13 For a discussion of the relative abatement costs and marginal benefits of climate change see, for example, Lydon (2002) and Pizer (2002). Both conclude that the marginal damage curve is relatively flat – at least in the short term – and, as such, there are strong arguments for flexibility in the quantity of abatement in the short term, subject to a fixed carbon price.
14 The short term is defined as the period during which the capital stock is essentially fixed. This will vary from sector to sector.
15 With respect to the size of emission reductions.
16 One option is to combine price controls within a quota trading system in the short term. This is discussed more in Chapter 15.
17Newell et al (2005)
18 This analogy has been explored by Helm et al (2005).
19 See Blyth and Hamilton (2006) for background discussion on the nature of electricity markets, interaction with fossil fuel markets and issues to consider for policy approaches to introducing climate policy to electricity systems.
20 This would shift rents from OPEC to Kyoto countries.
21 Hepburn (2006)
22 The economic theory of exhaustible natural resources is exposited in Hotelling (1931) and Dasgupta & Heal (1979).
23 Ad valorem taxes are based on the value or price of a good or service. The alternative to ad-valorem taxation is a fixed-rate tax, where the tax base is the quantity of something, regardless of its price.
24 There is a debate about whether the tax rate should first rise and then fall. See Ulph & Ulph (1994) and Sinclair (1994).
25 For a more detailed discussion, see Newbery (2005).
26 In practice, the overall impact on the revenue base may be limited, if taxes are reduced elsewhere in the economy.
27 The ultimate incidence of the tax is on the industries" customers and – in the absence of perfect competition – shareholders.
28 Although, as already noted, in a competitive industry the tax will ultimately fall on the consumer.
29 To the extent that firms are able to pass on to consumers the increase in marginal production costs, a system with free quotas may be regressive (because shareholders tend to be wealthier than the general population).
30 Where the ultimate incidence of the tax falls on customers, they pay a price of carbon, but there is no benefit to the wider revenue base.
31 Were auctioning to substitute in whole or in part for taxation, it would be important to manage the revenue base to underpin the sustainability of the public finances.
15 Carbon Pricing and Emissions Markets in Practice
Key Messages Both tax and trading can be used to create an explicit price for carbon; and regulation can create an implicit price.
For all these instruments, credibility, flexibility and predictability are vital to effective policy design.
A lack of credible policy may undermine the effectiveness of carbon pricing, as well as creating uncertainties for firms considering large, long-term investments.
To establish the credibility of carbon pricing globally will take time. During the transition period, governments should consider how to deal with investments in long-lived assets which risk locking economies into a high-carbon trajectory.
To reap the benefits of emissions trading, deep and liquid markets and well designed rules are important. Broadening the scope of schemes will tend to lower costs and reduce volatility. Increasing the use of auctioning is likely to have benefits for efficiency, distribution and potentially the public finances.
Decisions made now on the third phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme pose an opportunity for the scheme to influence, and be the nucleus of, future global carbon markets.
The establishment of common incentives across different sectors is important for efficiency. The overall structure of incentives, however, will reflect other market failures and complexities within the sectors concerned, as well as the climate change externality.
The characteristics of different sectors will influence the design and choice of policy tool. Transaction costs of a trading scheme, for instance, will tend to be higher in sectors where there are many emission sources. The existing framework of national policies in these sectors will be an important influence on policy choice.
15.1 Introduction This chapter considers how markets for emission reductions can be built on the principles considered in Chapter 14. The application of these principles requires careful analysis of the context of specific economies and institutional structures– at the national, international, regional or sectoral levels.
Section 15.2 discusses the importance of designing policies in a way which creates confidence in the future existence of a robust carbon price, so that businesses and individuals can plan their investment decisions accordingly. The current use of emissions trading schemes is discussed in Section 15.3, and 15.4 focuses particularly on the issues around creating a credible carbon price in emissions trading schemes.
The choice and design of such policy instruments also depends on the specific sectoral context. Policies which work for one sector may be inappropriate for another, although a common price is still needed across sectors for efficiency in the costs of mitigation. The relationship between climate change policy and other objectives, such as energy security and local air pollution, is also important. These issues are discussed in 15.5.
Carbon pricing is only one part of a strategy to tackle climate change. It must be complemented by measures to support the development of technologies, and to remove the barriers to behavioural change, particularly around take-up of energy efficiency. These two elements are discussed in Chapters 16 and 17.
15.2 Carbon pricing and investment decisions Investors need a predictable carbon policy Businesses always have to take uncertainties into account when making investment decisions. Factors such as the future oil price, changes in consumer demand, and even the weather can affect the future profitability of an investment. Business decision-makers make judgements on how these factors are likely to evolve over time.
But unlike many other uncertainties that firms face, climate change policy is created solely by governments. To be successful, a carbon pricing policy must therefore be based on a framework that enables investors to have confidence that carbon policy will be maintained over sequential periods into the future.
Serious doubt over the future viability of a policy, or its stringency, risks imposing costs without having a significant impact on behaviour, so increasing the cost of mitigation. Creating an expectation that a policy is very likely to be sustained over a long period is critical to its effectiveness.
Credibility, flexibility and predictability are key to effective policy Three essential elements for an effective policy framework are credibility (belief that the policy will endure, and be enforced); flexibility (the ability to change the policy in response to new information and changing circumstances); and predictability (setting out the circumstances and procedures under which the policy will change). These apply to any type of policy, including the technology and regulatory measures set out in the following chapters, but are particularly pertinent to carbon pricing.
A key issue for credibility is whether the policy commands support from a range of interest groups. Public opinion is particularly important: sustained pressure from the public for action on climate change gives politicians the confidence to take measures which they might otherwise deem too risky or unpopular. It must also make sense within an international context: if there are good prospects for a robust international framework, this will greatly enhance the credibility of national goals for emissions reductions.
As Chapter 14 has discussed, the flexibility to adjust policy in the short term is an important principle for efficient pricing under conditions of uncertainty. Policy must be robust to changing circumstances and changing knowledge. If policy is seen to be excessively rigid, its credibility may suffer, as people perceive a risk that it will be dropped altogether if circumstances change.
Building in predictable and transparent revision rules from the start is the best way to maintain confidence in the policy, whilst also allowing flexibility in its application.
Issues of credibility are particularly important for investments in long-lived capital stock Taking a long-term view on the carbon price is particularly important for businesses investing in long-lived assets1. Assets such as power stations, industrial plant and buildings last for many decades, and businesses making investment decisions on these assets often have longer time horizons than many governments.
If businesses believe that carbon prices will rise in the long run to match the damage costs of emissions over time, this should lead them to invest in low-carbon rather than high-carbon assets. But in the transitional period, where the credibility of carbon pricing is being established worldwide, there is a risk that future carbon prices are not properly factored into business decision-making, and investments may be made in long-lived, high-carbon assets.
This could lock economies into a high-carbon trajectory, making future mitigation efforts more expensive. Governments should take careful account of this: as well as providing as much clarity as possible about future carbon pricing policies, they should also consider whether any additional measures may be justified to reduce the risks2.
Uncertainty about the long-term future framework for carbon pricing is also a reason why additional measures to encourage the development of low-carbon technologies are important. This is discussed in Chapter 16.
Policy uncertainty not only undermines climate change policy – it can also undermine security of supply, by creating an incentive to delay investment decisions.
Uncertainty about the future existence or overall direction of policy creates difficulties for how businesses respond. There is a risk that businesses will adopt a "wait and see" attitude, delaying their investment decisions until the policy direction becomes clearer.
Blyth and Yang (2006) look at the incentives for a company faced with a decision on whether to invest in high-carbon or low-carbon infrastructure. If a decision is expected at some point in the future about whether or not a new climate change policy will be introduced, a company which makes its investment decision now, risks a loss later if it makes the wrong call on policy. If it waits until the policy is agreed, it can make a more informed choice. Given this uncertainty, a much higher expected profit level would be required to trigger the investment now3.
In the energy sector, such delays in investment could create serious problems for a country"s security of supply. Modelling work by Blyth and Yang (2006) indicates that an increase in the period of relative carbon price stability from 5 to 10 years (which could equate to increasing the length of an allocation period in a trading scheme) could reduce the size of the investment thresholds arising from uncertainty by a factor of 2 or more4.
Credibility may also vary between policy instruments Credibility may vary between different types of policy instrument. For instance, taxation provides governments with a revenue stream, and there tends to be an expectation that it will not be in a government"s interests to abolish it. Regulation may be more effective in countries with a culture of using command and control methods, or where there are political or administrative problems with raising taxes or with tax collection. Specific national circumstances, including constitutional structures, the stability of political institutions and the quality of legal infrastructures and enforcement, play a key role in determining what credible policy is.
Another important element is the level at which policy takes place. Regulation or trading schemes which are agreed at the EU level, for instance, are difficult to reverse, and hence may be seen as more credible than some national policies.
The issues surrounding credibility in trading schemes are discussed in detail in the following section.
15.3 Experience in emissions trading As outlined in Chapter 14, emissions trading has several benefits. Emissions trading schemes can deliver least-cost emission reductions by allowing reductions to occur wherever they are cheapest. A key corollary benefit to this is that it generates automatic transfers between countries, while delivering the least-cost reductions. In many instances, introducing trading schemes is also an easier mechanism through which to achieve a common carbon price across countries than attempts to harmonise taxes. As such, trading schemes can be used to introduce carbon pricing, without risking carbon leakage and competitiveness implications between participating countries. Emissions trading is therefore a very powerful tool in the framework for addressing climate change at an international level.
Emissions trading is not new to environmental policy. Trading in emissions has been used to reduce sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions that cause acid rain in the US since 19955. The experience of this scheme increased interest in the potential use of emissions trading to tackle climate change – particularly due to its potential cost effectiveness compared to the use of regulation. Burtaw (1996) estimated that emissions trading under the US Acid Rain Program saved 50% of the costs compared to command and control.
The use of carbon trading schemes is expanding During the 1990s, as experience of emissions trading for air pollution grew in the US, the EU began to consider the potential of using trading to help meet its Kyoto target emission reduction obligations. The European Commission presented a "Green Paper" in 2000 that proposed the use of emissions trading. It showed that a comprehensive trading scheme could reduce compliance costs of meeting Kyoto by a third, compared to a scenario with no trading instrument6.
The EU has since gone on to implement a trading scheme in major energy intensive and energy generation sectors, and in so doing, established the world"s largest greenhouse gas emissions market. Launched in January 2005, the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is still in its infancy. The scheme will enter a second, longer phase in 2008, with a major review on the scheme"s design from 2013 to be launched in 2007. Box 15.1 describes how the EU ETS works, and discusses the experience of the scheme to date.
Box 15.1 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
The EU ETS is the first international emissions trading scheme.It established a uniform price of carbon for greenhouse gas emissions from specific heavy industry activities in the 25 EU member states. Phase One of the scheme was launched on 1 January 2005 and runs to the end of 2007. Phase Two runs from 2008-12, and the scheme will continue with further phases beyond 2012. Participation is mandatory for emissions from industrial sectors specified in the scheme. These currently include energy generation, metal production, cement, bricks, and pulp and paper7.
Member states decide, through their National Allocation Plans (NAPs), on the quota or total allocation of allowances for each phase within their country, and on how these are distributed between companies. The plans are subject to approval by the European Commission. They must demonstrate that allocation levels will not exceed expected emission levels in sectors, and are in line with broader plans to make reductions to meet Kyoto targets8. Allowances are then issued to all firms on the basis of the NAP. Firms in the scheme must provide an annual report on their emissions, which is audited by a third party.
In Phase One, the scheme covers less than 40% of all EU25 GHG emissions9, with the permit market over the three-year period worth around US $115 billion10. The majority of permits are currently allocated for free to installations included in the scheme (only 0.2% of all allowances will be auctioned in Phase One11), and most member states have prevented the banking of allowances between the two phases. An allowance market has developed through trade exchanges and brokers, with the City of London emerging as an important location for trading.
Traded volumes have grown steadily (see below). The price of allowances has been in the range of €10 to €25 per tonne of CO2 for most of the period, with a steep price drop in April 2006.
The market for EU allowances (EUAs) –prices and volumes
Source: Data taken from Point Carbon, www.pointcarbon.com Early experience in the scheme has highlighted a number of important issues:
• The potential for emissions trading schemes to generate demand for emissions reductions in developing countries: the Linking Directive has enabled EU-based industry to purchase carbon reductions from the cheapest source, including projects and programmes being implemented in the developing world through the use of the Clean Development Mechanism12. This has driven growing interest of EU firms in the CDM market, particularly as CDM credits can be used in either phase of the scheme. The CDM market volume grew threefold between 2005 and 2006, to 374 million tonnes (CO2e), much of this driven by demand from the EU ETS13.
• The importance of long term confidence in the future of the scheme: the EU ETS will continue with a third phase beyond 2012. But companies would like greater clarity over what the EU ETS will look like in Phase III and beyond in order to help judge the impact on their investment decisions. A survey to discover the issues that need to be considered in the review of the EU ETS put the need for certainty on future design issues in the scheme as a top priority14. The majority of those surveyed also stated they would prefer allocation decisions to be made a few years in advance of trading periods, and trading periods be lengthened to around 10 years.
• The impact of imperfect information on prices: at the start of trading in January 2005, traders had limited information on supply and demand for emission allowances. In particular, the NAPs did not contain clear data on the assumptions lying behind the projections of emissions used as the basis for allocations. The release of the first data on actual emissions from the scheme"s participants in April 2006 led to a sharp downward correction in prices (see figure above), as the data showed that the initial NAP allocations exceeded emissions in most sectors of the scheme15. The volatility that this caused demonstrates the importance of transparency in initial allocation plans.
• The difficulties of ensuring scarcity in the market: overall allocation in the EU ETS market is not set centrally. Rather, it is the sum of 25 individual member state decisions, subject to approval by the Commission. As such, total EU allocation is an outcome of many decisions at various levels, with a risk of gaming on allocation levels between member states if they make their decisions expecting allocation levels will be higher elsewhere in Europe. It has therefore been difficult to ensure scarcity in the EU ETS market. As a result, the total EU wide allocation in Phase One is estimated to be only 1% below projected "business as usual" emissions16,17. This underlines the need for stringent criteria on allocation levels for member states, and robust decisions by the European Commission on NAPs to ensure scarcity in the scheme.
• The need for robust administrative systems: the methods used to determine allocations placed considerable demands on companies to collect, verify and submit historical data on emissions.In addition, to ensure confidence in compliance standards across the EU on measuring emissions18, companies had to set up monitoring, reporting and verification systems in line with EU guidelines19. Costs were high for small firms that had low annual emissions included in the EU ETS; requests to reconsider the minimum size of plants included in the scheme have subsequently been made by both member states and business.20
The growing importance of the use of emissions trading markets to price carbon is also illustrated by the scope of trading schemes planned or already operating across the world. Norway introduced emissions trading in January 2005 for major energy plants and heavy industry. New South Wales (Australia) already operates a mandatory baseline-and-credit scheme for electricity retailers. Japan and South Korea are also running pilot programmes for a limited number of companies.
Elsewhere, the biggest plans for new emissions trading markets are in the USA, through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) from January 200921, and California"s plans for using a cap and trade scheme from 200822. Switzerland and Canada also plan to implement trading schemes as part of their programmes to meet Kyoto commitments.The voluntary market for carbon reductions is also growing, driven by demand from both companies and individuals looking to reduce or offset their emissions23. The CCX (Chicago Climate Exchange) is an example of a voluntary carbon market. Since December 2003, US based companies that take on voluntary targets to reduce GHG emissions have used this market to achieve their targets.
The following section outlines the design issues that impact on trading scheme efficiency and market effectiveness.
15.4 Designing efficient and well-functioning emissions trading schemes To reap the benefits of emissions trading, deep and liquid markets and well-designed rules are important.
Emissions trading schemes will, necessarily, deliver carbon prices that vary over time. But a degree of price stability through the emergence of a predictable average price within the emissions trading mechanism is important, particularly for businesses planning long-term investments. And the efficient operation of the scheme, including its impact on incentives, is important to achieve least-cost reductions.
One option to limit the bounds of price movements is to supplement the market instrument itself with price controls, such as formal price caps and price floors24. Although this approach has some attractions in principle, there are significant problems with its practical implementation and effectiveness, including the implications for the feasibility of linking with other schemes. These are set out in Box 15.2.
Box 15.2 Price caps and floors in emission trading schemes As explained in Hepburn et al (2006), a hybrid instrument can in principle be tailored to ensure that in the long term, an overall quantity ceiling is achieved, but that in the short term there is sufficient flexibility to avoid temporarily very high marginal abatement costs. This would help to achieve the balance of long-term certainty and short-term flexibility discussed in Chapter 14.
Price caps (or "safety valves')25 supply allowances on demand if the agreed ceiling price is hit, and would eliminate the risk of price spikes. Price floors would stop the carbon price from falling below a minimum level. They can be implemented in a number of ways, including through a levy that only becomes operational once the floor is breached, or by guaranteeing a minimum future quota price to emitters, by entering a contract to buy permits (which the government can then sell back to the market)26 – although the risks to the public finances from this latter route should be taken seriously.
However, people would still have to believe that the caps and floors themselves will not be changed. There are also risks that the imposition of a cap alone would damage incentives for investing in low carbon technologies as it sets an upper limit on the future expected price, lowering potential returns to low carbon technology27.
Importantly, the use of different price caps and floors in different schemes would compromise the efficiency of regional trading schemes- there are risks of carbon leakage and unintended transfers across jusrisdictions with different carbon price ranges. As such, to operate efficiently, price caps and floors would need to be the same across all participating countries. Agreeing a common price cap or floor across countries is likely to suffer from the same difficulties as any attempt to harmonise carbon taxes more generally. Even if countries within a single scheme could agree a cap or floor, this would present an obstacle to linking to other schemes with different rules. This is a drawback to the practical applicability of these methods.
Fundamentally, to ensure confidence in a stable long-term carbon price, and to realise the full efficiency benefits of any trading scheme, the creation of deep, liquid and efficient markets is essential. Several factors can facilitate this:
• Broadening the scope of the scheme, to include more gases, more countries, and international credits; • Ensuring appropriate scarcity in the system; • Lengthening the trading periods, to provide longer-term confidence; • Designing appropriate allocation schemes; and • Promoting transparency.
The following sections discuss these in more detail.
Broadening the scope of the scheme will tend to lower costs and reduce volatility In general, the deeper and more liquid a market, the harder it is for any individual trade to affect the overall price level, and hence the less volatile the market will tend to be. Introducing different economic sectors or countries to a market can also reduce the impact of a shock in any one sector on the scheme as a whole. In addition, the greater the degree of flexibility about what type of emissions reductions are made and where they are made, the lower the cost will be.
There are a number of ways to widen the scope of trading schemes. One is to widen the number of sectors and activities covered by an individual scheme. Some of the practical issues associated with this are discussed in Section 15.5 below.
Another is to offer access to flexible mechanisms such as Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)28. This expands the options for generating credits for emissions reductions to most parts of the world, maximising the opportunities for efficiency. The environmental benefits of using these credits will depend on the credits representing a real reduction on what emission levels would otherwise have been (the "business as usual" level of emissions). Countries that can generate CDM credits do not have binding caps on emissions, and are often fast changing economies; as such, establishing a credible estimate of what a business as usual baseline is, and whether reductions would have taken place in the absence of the CDM project, can be complex29. Chapter 23 examines this in more detail.
Linking different national or regional cap and trade schemes is also desirable on efficiency grounds, but, to reap the efficiency benefits, the schemes should be broadly similar in design. The practical issues of linking are discussed in Chapter 22.
The introduction of new sectors, and linking to new regions, can cause some short-term price instability, as there is uncertainty over the net impacts of newly included sectors and their response to the scheme. But the impact on long-term stability should still be positive.
As well as bringing extra depth and liquidity into markets, commonality or linking of schemes avoids the leakage, confusion and inefficiency of parallel schemes with different carbon prices. In any one area or country, a single or unified scheme is better than a proliferation of schemes.
The degree of scarcity in the market is important in determining prices To facilitate more stable carbon markets, allocation levels should be consistent with overall national, regional or multilateral emissions reductions targets, and be clearly below expected "business as usual" (BAU) emissions. This is complicated by the uncertainties in predicting future emissions over an entire trading period.
The first phase of the EU ETS illustrates this. Allocation decisions were based on projections of BAU emissions of the sectors in the scheme, many of which appear to have been overestimated, meaning that total EU allocation was just 1% under projections of BAU of the whole EU ETS. In contrast, earlier emissions trading schemes such as the US Sulphur Dioxide trading programme, had allocation levels at around 50% below baseline emissions30.
The degree of scarcity in a scheme depends not just on the cap which is set for the scheme itself, but also on whether or not companies are permitted to use credits for emission reductions that are generated in areas without a cap, such as those from the CDM. As long as these credits represent real emission reductions, there is little reason to limit their use, as cost-efficiency demands that emissions reductions are made wherever this is cheapest.
If allowing the use of mechanisms such as the CDM turns out to deliver large quantities of low-cost reductions into a trading scheme, then, at the time when allocations for subsequent periods for the scheme are set, the cap may need to be tightened to ensure that the carbon price continues to reflect the social cost of carbon, and is consistent with the achievement of the long-term goal for stabilisation. The impact of CDM credits on the price should be considered alongside other emerging information on the costs and benefits, as part of the revision process for allocations.
Greater certainty on the evolution of prices over future trading periods, and banking and borrowing between periods, can help to smooth compliance over time and investment cycles Longer trading periods in trading schemes can help to smooth compliance over time and investment cycles, as they allow the private sector to have greater control over the timing of the response to carbon policy. They also reduce policy risk to the extent that they suggest a deeper commitment to carbon policy. However, excessively long commitment periods limit policymakers" flexibility in responding to changing information and circumstances.As the previous chapter discussed, this is important in order to keep down the overall costs of carbon pricing to the economy31, and to readjust targets as more information on climate change itself is gathered.
The key issues for investor confidence are a commitment to the long-term future of the scheme and predictability in its overall shape and rules. This predictabilty can be achieved through establishing revision rules for future allocation periods. For instance, governments may announce that future allocations will be contingent on factors such as the price of permits in the preceding period. They could also announce a target range for prices32 (which should be in line with the expected trajectory for the social cost of carbon – see Chapter 13). Setting out expectations on issues such as expansion to new sectors, or the use of CDM, could also be important. These principles could be set over a very long time period of perhaps 10 to 20 years, with allocations made at more regular intervals.
Within this framework, banking, and possibly borrowing, can be used to create links between different phases of a trading scheme. Banking is the ability to carry over unused quotas from one period to another, and borrowing the ability to use or purchase quotas from a future period in the current period. This allows trading to take place across commitment periods, as well as across sectors and countries. This can improve flexibility, as well as reducing the risk of price spikes or crashes at the end of trading periods discussed above.
Some existing emission trading schemes already allow banking. Banking should help to encourage early emission reductions where this is more cost effective33. For example, the heavy use of banking in the US Acid Rain Program has been seen by some as a success in terms of delivering early reductions and improving efficiency. Ellerman and Pontero (2005) found that 30% of allowances were banked between 1995-99 (Phase One of the programme). Firms made efficient decisions to make earlier reductions and bank allowances forward, due to the expectation of tighter caps in future phases. As a result, in total, emissions reduced in Phase One were twice that required to the meet the cap.
In contrast, very few existing emissions trading schemes have made use of borrowing. The main reason why borrowing has been restricted in existing trading schemes is credibility and compliance, including the risk of borrowing simply being offset by compensating increases in allocations in future periods. In theory, unrestricted borrowing could delay emissions reductions indefinitely, thus raising the risk of "overshooting" a long run quantity ceiling. A credible enforcement strategy, and long-term principles for allocation, are therefore essential to ensure that reductions borrowed from the future are real and delivered.
Where there are longer periods within which compliance is possible, and a clearer view of the longer term direction of carbon policies, liquid futures markets in carbon are more likely to emerge, and hedging instruments will be developed that allow firms to manage price uncertainty more systematically.
The choice and design of allocation methodology is an important determinant of both efficiency and distributional impact Permits in an emissions trading scheme can be allocated for free, or sold (usually, though not necessarily, through auction34). It is possible to combine these – for instance, the EU ETS allowed for up to 5% of permits to be auctioned in Phase One, and 10% in Phase Two.
In principle and assuming perfect competition, free allocation and auctioning should both be equally efficient. In both cases, businesses face the same marginal costs arising from the emission of an extra tonne of carbon dioxide, and should therefore make the same decision on whether or not to emit in either case.
But this argument is static, ignores the structure of markets and takes no account of distributional or public finance issues. In reality the methods differ in two important respects. First, free allocation methodologies can dampen incentives to incorporate the cost of carbon into decision making consistently, and distort competition. Thus they slow adjustment and potentially raise the overall cost of compliance.
Second, they differ in their distributional impact. Free allocations give companies lump sum transfers in the form of carbon allowances; depending on market structure and demand.Such transfers may result in windfall profits. Not surprisingly, free permits are generally favoured by existing players in an industry. Auctioning leads to financial transfers to governments, which may have benefits for the public finances, depending on whether this is a new revenue flow or a substitute for other sources of finance.
These issues were raised in the preceding chapter, and are explored in the next two sections.
Free allocations can significantly distort incentives There are a number of reasons why emissions trading schemes based on free allocation may distort incentives for emissions reductions:
• If there is an expectation that the baseline year upon which free allocations are based will be updated, participants have incentives to invest in dirty infrastructure and emit more now to get more free allowances in the future35. A one-off allocation based on past emissions (or grandfathering) over all trading periods is one way of avoiding this. However, as a trading scheme matures, the relevance of past emission levels may become a less and less relevant basis for the likely emissions of each plant, say ten or more years later.
• Free allocations can act as a disincentive to new entry to a market, restricting competition and reducing efficiency. If incumbents receive free allowances, but new plants must purchase allowances, free allocations directly create barriers to entry, meaning that the provision of free allocations for new plants may be required36. In turn, the rules for free allocations to new plants may indirectly distort incentives: if allocations are given in proportion to the expected emissions from the new plant, they may reward higher-carbon technologies37.
• There may also be disincentives to exit from markets. The existence of "use it or lose it" closure rules, which mean a plant must be open in order to receive free allowances, may prevent the closure of inefficient plants.This would mean emission levels are higher than if plants could keep allowances if they shut down, or had no free allowances to begin with38.
• Under auctioning, with no lump sum of free allowances, businesses will face upfront costs in buying permits to cover their emissions. This will tend to bring management attention to the importance of making efficient decisions that fully account for the cost of carbon. Free allocations may not have the same behavioural impact, delaying adjustments to making effective decisions on carbon compliance39.
Free allocation methodologies can therefore seriously reduce the dynamic efficiency of a trading scheme, making the cost of reductions higher in the longer term than would otherwise be the case.
Benchmarking the emissions needed for efficient low carbon technologies for both existing and new plants is an alternative basis for issuing free allocations. It offers the opportunity to more clearly "reward" clean technologies, and penalise carbon intensive technology by developing an average "rate" of emissions for particular fuels, technologies or plant sizes. The more standardised a benchmark is, the more effective benchmarking is likely to be40. Benchmarking can also be used specifically for new entrants, by allocating on the basis of the most efficient technologies available41.
Auctioning can avoid many of the incentive problems associated with free allocation, although good design is necessary to avoid introducing new inefficiencies. Small, frequent auctions may be more effective in limiting any market power that may exist in the permit market42. In principle, to ensure an efficient outcome, the auction method should promote competition and participation for small as well as larger emitters. While one auction at the beginning of the permit period may minimise administration costs, it may also carry a risk of larger players buying the majority of permits and extracting oligopoly rents in the secondary permit market. More frequent auctions also allow for all players to adjust bids and learn from experience of early auctions, and may be helpful in promoting price stability43. Given the administrative costs of the data required for free allocation methodologies, auctioning may also offer lower administrative costs to both firms and governments.
Using free allocation has benefits for managing the transition to emissions trading, but risks creating substantial windfall profits Free allocations and auctioning have very different distributional impacts. This has led to a debate over whether allocation methods will affect the profitability of firms, as well as the implications for competitiveness. Carbon pricing will most affect the operating costs of energy intensive industries that compete in international markets, such as non-ferrous metals and some chemicals sectors (see Chapter 11). In the first instance, as auctioning and free allocation both impose the same marginal cost on emissions (as the carbon price is the same), the profit maximising quantity and price for any company should be the same in each case, and there should be no impact on the fundamental risks to competitiveness from the choice of allocation method.
There is, however, an important difference in terms of the impact on companies" balance sheet, which may have competitiveness implications44. A firm with free allocations that competes against other firms who face the cost of carbon but do not have free allowances, would be in an advantageous direct position in the sense that it receives a subsidy. It could for example, use this to capture market share by a period of low prices. However, if a firm competes against other firms who do not face a cost of carbon, the "subsidy" of free allowances may be used to maintain its competitiveness, rather than gain competitive advantage over other firms.
This subsidy effect means that free allocations may have an important role to play in managing the transition to carbon pricing. Full auctioning imposes an immediate hit on companies" balance sheets equivalent to the full cost of all their emissions, whereas free allocation means that companies only have to pay for the cost of any additional permits they need to purchase. This difference in upfront costs may be important, particularly for firms that have significant sunk costs in existing assets and need to invest in lower-carbon assets in response.
In terms of the impact on firms" profits, free or purchased allowances are one factor influencing whether firms face profit or losses from the introduction of a trading scheme. Emissions trading increases the marginal costs of production, but the extent to which firms have to internalise these costs and therefore suffer reduced profits, will depend on:
• whether they can pass on costs to consumers (which depends on market structure and the shape of the demand curve for the good); • whether they have ways of reducing emissions themselves which are cheaper than buying allowances (cost effective abatement); and • whether they have some free allowances that can compensate for increased marginal costs A firm that receives free allowances equal to its existing emissions can make the same profits as before from unchanged production activities, provided the market price for its output is unchanged – or do still better by responding to the new price for carbon. What happens to the market price for its product will depend on industrial structure.
If firms are in perfectly competitive markets, the increase in marginal costs from emissions trading will be fully reflected in prices to consumers, and (in the absence of abatement) profits will stay the same as before the scheme"s introduction. Any free allowances they receive equate to windfall profits45. But where firms operate in markets where there is international competition and/or very elastic demand and so are unable to pass on costs, free allowances can act to maintain profitability by compensating for the increasing operating costs and reduced revenue that may be necessary to maintain market share46.
Nevertheless, whatever the market structure, it is important that free allocations are only temporary. They may be necessary to manage a transition, but if permanently used, they would distort competition and emission reductions will be below their efficient levels.
The creation of robust institutions, and the collection and provision of reliable information, are important for efficiency Price stability can also be encouraged by the provision of robust information. In particular, transparent and regular information on actual emissions of scheme participants, as well as on the intial allocations, will help to reveal the basis of market demand and supply.
The importance of information of this kind is illustrated by the experience of the EU ETS when the first verified emissions data of installations included in the scheme were published in March 2006. As Box 15.2 showed, prices dropped sharply in response, as it was clear that, for many firms, actual emissions were well below the number of allowances given to them at the start of the scheme. Revealing information on actual emissions more regularly through the trading period would help limit this volatility. Such requirements for more frequent information releases would, however, impose additional costs on emitters, implying that these requests may need to be limited to the largest emitters.
The quality of monitoring, reporting and verification standards is integral to confidence in a trading scheme. A transparent and well enforced system of measuring and reporting emissions is crucial for securing the environmental credibility of a scheme as well as free trade across plants. Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) rules ensure that a tonne of carbon emitted or reduced in one plant is equal to a tonne of carbon emitted or reduced in a different plant47.
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