Hamas in levels I and II of the isaeli-palestinian conflict negotiations? (página 2)

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1-800-134. Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 1999.

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FIGURE 1

Figure 1. Comparative table of interests. Traffic light assessment on less effort in the negotiation rounds and the need of mediation[19]

Row 1 LESS EFFORT IN THE NEGOTIATION ROUNDS Row 2 NEED OF MEDIATION

Autor:

Andres Munoz Mosquera.[20]

Alumni of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.[21]

[1] “The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.” Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,” International Security, Vol 42, No.3 (Summer, 1988): 434.

[2] Also of “multilevel nature” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. 2005) p. 355

[3] Putman 1998, note: Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

[4] A “Bottom line” indicates the worst possible outcome that can be accepted. Therefore, bottom line approaches tend to be barriers beyond in the negotiation process, that while it is intended to fence off a party against the pressure and temptation to agree to a deal that not convenient, unfortunately creates inflexibility, inhibits the potential creativity and innovation that parties develop during the negotiation process, reducing the incentive to seek adapted solutions bring differences closer.

[5] “Hamas internal leadership profile…resembles the profile of its electoral candidates: professional, educated at secular institutions, with only a handful affiliated with traditional religious institutions…Its political theory also encourages Hamas to privilege political over religious authority. In Hamas’ theoretical framework, legislators in Islamic state do not have to be religious scholars or have religious expertise…Rhetorically, Hamas has acted, to use Stedman’s terminology…, as a “total spoiler”, unwilling to compromise on its vision of a liberated Islamic state in all of British Mandate Palestine. Its actual behavior has been more ambiguous. During the 1990s it staged suicide attacks which undermined the peace process and since coming to power it has refused to recognize Israel, even in the face of crippling financial sanctions…But from early 2005, it has, notwithstanding violations, rocket attacks and various suspensions, broadly honoured a ceasefire with Israel although tensions have increased since summer 2007…” [to end up in the late 2008 Israeli incursion that ended up with no harm to the Hamas political infrastructure] Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (Columbia University Press, New York, 2008) p. 164-165.

[6] “On June 25, 2009 speech by Hamas leader Khalid Mishal, in which Mishal said the armed movement was ready to deal with the international community in order to reach an agreement with Israel”. From PTSS Daily “The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies”, by Leigh A. Truly and al.

[7] Jacob Bertcovitch, Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1996) p. 125

[8] Raymond Saner, The Expert Negotiator (Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2008) p. 111-134

[9] Hamas officials Bassem Naim and Mahmoud al-Zahar, had a recent meeting in Switzerland with a former senior U.S. diplomat (Pickering) represented an opening in relations with the Obama administration, and a path to easing the Islamist group's isolation. From Washington Post, 16 Jul 09. Available in http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503791.html

[10] Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 3, July (2006): 87.

[11] The recent nominations of June 15 at the new PA Cabinet, with the expulsion of Hamas members and harassment of sympathizers, do not help to head towards a “unity government”. According to Hamas data, in June the Palestinian Authority detained more than 470 of its activists, three of whom were killed (Imana, a Hamas West Bank website, July 2, 2009). According to Fatah data, more than 190 of its activists were detained and interrogated (Wafa News Agency, July 2, 2009). Sources within the Palestinian Authority's security forces told the Israeli daily Haaretz that a Hamas-affiliated squad had been detained which had planned to attack senior Palestinian Authority figures and among others, had followed the movements of Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. According to the sources, when the squad was captured it had in its possession weapons, maps and pictures of senior Palestinian figures. The squad operated in the Ramallah region, directed by Hamas both in the Gaza Strip and abroad (Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz , July 3, 2009).

[12] Note above sections continuously refers to “Third-party”; so that no dedicated paragraph to it is in this paper.

[13] “Holbrooke…faced a situation in which he had to manipulate BATNAs to bring about a situation in which mediation and negotiation were possible…aggressive approach” (Non-attributable comments – The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy)

[14] Signed by Fatah PLC member, Marwan Barghouthi, Fatah Secretary; by Hamas Sheikh Abdul Khaleq al-Natsheh, Higher Leading Commission; by Islamic Jihad Movement, Sheikh Bassam al-Sa'di; by PFLP Abdul Rahim Mallouh, member of PLO Executive Committee and Deputy General Secretary of the PFLP; and DFLP, Mustafa Badarneh.

[15] Available in http://www.jmcc.org/documents/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf

[16] “Omar Addel-Razeq, who was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council from Hamas in 2006 and was recently released from Israeli prison: ‘The recognition of its right to exist is another matter. I don't think time lies on the Israeli side. What if the balance of power’” June 2009, available in The Palestinian Telegraph http://www.paltelegraph.com/palestine/gaza-strip/1388-former-us-diplomat-talks-with-hamas

[17] “Quartet Plus” would include China and Jordan and Egypt, plus key Arab countries.

[18] This is independent issue and linked to that of “Borders 1967” at the same time. Mediation here will have to have a more Touval and Zartman role, i.e., formulator to satisfy Israel, Palestine and the Muslim and Christian worlds with substantive suggestions to draft a comprehensive agreement signed by Quartet plus and parties on the ownership and use of the Old City and neighborhoods. Besides it will need to use the “carrot and stick” tools as a good manipulator to avoid blocked positions on the above that can overrun common interests and develop a network of talks in its role of communicator.

[19] Table filled out with data and criteria available in The RAND Palestinian State Study Team Building a Successful Palestinian State (Santa Monica, CA, RAND 2005) and Robert E. Hunter, Seth G. Jones Building a Successful Palestinian State: Security (Santa Monica, CA, RAND 2006).

[20] Andres.Munoz[arroba]alumni.tufts.edu

[21] DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions of the author expressed therein do not state or reflect those of the university he is an alumni of nor the organization he works for.